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ABSTRACT
Despite views to the contrary, 'action' is not a
concept alien to ordinary ways of thinking, hence the
significance of the philosophical problem of action, which
demands that we ground this concept in some real difference
between actions and other occurrences. I argue that of the
two likely candidates, the causal and the volitional
theories of action, the causal approach will not suffice
because it is unable to cope with instances of wayward
causality.
\
My concern is principally with the volition theory of
which the views of James and Prichard are discussed at
length. James's account of the will is deemed unacceptable
by virtue of its emphasis upon introspection. While Prichard
appears to offer good reasons for believing that willing is
fundamental to action, his identification of action with
volition is rejected. Subsequently, detailed consideration
is given to the relation of volition to action, and I
suggest that volition be regarded neither as action nor
cause of action. Instead, actions are best understood as
causings, which embrace both volitions and their effects.
This analysis of action is extended through the concept of
'basic action', and it emerges that there is a clear sense
in which willing is not intentional.
The suggestion that 'trying' is crucial to the concept
of action is discussed and it is argued that willing may
constitute trying in every instance of action, although it
never counts as action in its own right.
Volition is faced with with criticisms from Ryle. I
defend the view that volitions may be regarded as
essentially voluntary, although we may do better to construe
it as involuntary. The problem of descriptive deficiency and
the logical connection argument are the next challenges met
by my account of volition. Several remaining objections to
my account of action are dismissed before I demonstrate
that, unlike the causal approach, the volition theory meets
the rigours of wayward causality.
In conclusion, we have an account of action which harks
back to the suggestion of J.S. Mill, that action is 'not one
thing but a combination of two'. By thus supposing that
volition plays an essential role in action, we can
adequately resolve the problem of action with which we
began.
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CHAPTER 1_ : THE PHILOSOPHER' S 'ACTION'
(1) THE RELEVANCE OF ACTION
There is a vast and ever-growing literature in the
field known as 'philosophy of action' or 'action theory',
and although understandably perhaps, the philosophical
problems associated with action seldom occur to the ordinary
man-in-the-street this does not mean that the philosopher's
concern is irrelevant, say, to the average housewife. Yet
there are those who take the view that the concept of action
is itself far removed from ordinary ways of thinking, being
a device of the philosopher and not the ordinary man.
Austin, in 'A plea for excuses', suggests that
"The beginning of sense, not to say wisdom, is to
realize that 'doing an action', as used in
philosophy, is a highly abstract expression
....[and] this use has little to do with the more
down-to-earth occurrences of 'action' in ordinary
speech." (Austin, 1970:178)
Austin may be correct in his view that the
philosopher's talk of action is not to be found verbatim in
ordinary speech, but this does not show that the concept of
action is alien to everyday thinking. On the contrary, I
should wish to suggest that the philosopher's concept of
action is matched in the conceptions of the
non-philosophical man-in-the-street.
Whereas the philosopher talks of actions, ordinary
2
speech cites the things that people do. But the class of
actions does not match this class of doings, for not all the
things that are done qualify as actions. There are many
things such as sleeping, sneezing, or dying, that one can
do, without thereby acting. So actions, at most, form a
subclass of all the things we can be said to do.
Since there is no precise correlation between the
familiar notion of what people do and the concept of action,
does this indicate a lack of empathy between ordinary ways
of thinking and the technical conceptions of the
philosopher?
Even if ordinary language does not distinguish actions
from non-actions within the class of things people do this
does not show a lack of concern for the class of actions.
Though not delimited in ordinary speech it is nonetheless
true that people adopt different attitudes to those doings
which the philosopher would call actions from those which he
would not.
Among the things that people can be said to do are
many which the person suffers rather than performs. In cases
such as sleeping, falling off a cliff, or digesting a meal,
the person is passive and although these occurrences, in an
important respect, involve the individual, he is not active
as he would be in case he was trying to go to sleep, jumping
off a cliff, or ingesting a meal. That people respond
uniquely to those doings philosophers would call actions can
be seen from this contrast between 'active' and 'passive'
doings. It is the former class of doings that corresponds to
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the class of actions.
An important difference between these two sorts of
doing is shown from the fact that approbation is only
appropriate in the range of actions. Thus, whenever someone
is eligible for praise or blame this is in virtue of some
action (active doing) of his. So, if the correlation of
actions to active doings is appropriate, we should expect
approbation to be inapplicable in instances of passive
doing. Yet it appears that people are in fact blamed for
sleeping (when they ought to be working) even for falling
off a cliff (if they ought to have had more sense). If, as
these examples suggest, blame is appropriate in cases of
passive doing then the thesis that approbation marks our
sensitivity to the class of actions, fails.
In fact, these examples of blame in cases of passive
doing are misleading. When we blame the sleeping workman we
do so not for his sleeping (passive doing) but for his
having gone to sleep (active doing). The fact that he
allowed himself to fall asleep on the job is what is
reprehensible, not the fact of his sleeping, and we can
appreciate this by noting that if there was no way he could
have avoided falling asleep (if, for example, he had been
drugged) we would not blame him. Furthermore, the
possibility of his avoiding falling asleep is just the
possibility of his doing something (in the active sense)
that would avoid his sleeping on the job. Thus, he might
have concentrated on getting on with his work.
Similar considerations apply to the man who falls
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from the cliff. He cannot be blamed for this passive doing,
but may be blamed for getting into a situation that led to
his fall. Getting into that situation, we suppose, involved
active doing on his part. If not, then blame is entirely
inappropriate.
In his article 'Is 'Human Action' a category?',
Arthur Cody poses a seeming objection to this line of
thought. Apparently praise and blame are irrelevant in at
least some cases of active doing. Thus:
"..examples such as 'coiling a rope', 'signalling
a left turn','walking', 'playing ball', do not
usually suggest either praise or blame. So it
would appear that not all actions are praise- or
blame- worthy..." (Cody, 1971:394)
If there are active doings to which praise and blame do
not attach it would seem that approbation cannot serve to
distinguish these active doings from passive doings. But
this misses the point, for the classification of doings as
active or passive does not depend upon the propriety of
approbation. Rather, approbation is applicable or otherwise
depending upon whether the doing is active or passive. Of
course this still leaves unexplained why it is apparently
inapplicable in the examples of active doing cited by Cody.
When an individual does something actively he is regarded as
responsible in a sense in which he is not so regarded if the
doing is passive. Praise and blame are applicable only to
the former cases, but this does not mean that every active
doing will either be praised or blamed. Sometimes we are not
sufficiently interested, or the action is not significant
5
enough to evoke praise or blame. Yet praise and blame
potentially extend to any action and not to anything that is
not an action. Thus, in relevant circumstances any active
doing may receive praise or blame, even 'coiling a rope',
'signalling a left turn', 'walking', and 'playing ball'. In
fact, Cody notes that 'the notions of praise- and
blame-potentiality are dependent upon what we believe a
person can do, and not the other way around' (p.394).
Clearly, where a doing is passive, this potential is not
present.
So, I have argued that in familiar ways of thinking
we contrast the things people do actively with what they do
passively. The possibility, not the actual application of
praise and blame, marks this distinction, but is not its
ground. I thereby submit that people do acknowledge action
as conceived of by the philosopher.
Despite what Austin's cited comment may suggest, the
abstract notion of 'doing an action' is highly pertinent to
ordinary ways of thinking, yet this leaves unchallenged his
contention that the philosopher's use of 'action' has little
to do with its use in ordinary speech. I shall not leave
this unquestioned.
Although I accept Austin's first point that 'doing an
action' as used in philosophy is a highly abstract
expression, it is misleading to suppose that its use has
'little to do with the more down-to-earth occurrences of
'action' in ordinary speech'.
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Some insight may be gained by looking at a dictionary
analysis of 'action', as representative of ordinary usage.
My dictionary offers the following:
'action, n., acting; activity; behaviour; a deed;
operation; gesture; fighting; a battle; a lawsuit,
or proceedings in a court; mode of moving the
legs; the movement of events in a drama, novel,
etc.; mechanism, esp. of a keyboard instrument.'
Here we have twelve connotations for 'action'. The
first ten are clearly pertinent to the philosopher's notion
of action, since they embody the ordinary idea of active
doing. The last two are not so obviously relevant. The range
of things that make up the events in a drama or a novel
exceeds the range of active doings. Obviously, many of the
events in the average Shakespeare play are non-actional in
the philosopher's sense, but this does not indicate that
this connotation of 'action' is less relevant to active
doing than the others, for every event involved in such
dramatic or literary action is the 'product' of its author.
Hence there is a clear sense in which all the 'action' is
the author's doing.
The sense of 'action' in the mechanism example is
also related to the notion of active doing. Although the
mechanism itself, which is called the action, is not an
action in the philosopher's sense, it represents a means to
action. The mechanism when functioning properly is an
instrument for some active doing such as typing a letter, or
playing a sonata. I conclude that the evidence weighs
against Austin's contention, and that the down-to-earth
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occurrences of 'action' in ordinary speech are clearly
relevant to the abstract expression of the philosopher.
Indeed, the relation between them may be likened to that
between the scientific conception of electron flow and the
ordinary usage of 'electricity'. Naturally, 'electron flow'
as used by scientists is a highly abstract expression, and
it may not be exactly what ordinary people have in mind when
they talk of electricity, nevertheless, there is a link at
the conceptual level between the scientific notion and that
of the unscientific man-in-the-street. The latter is faced
with everyday manifestations of electron flow, as he is with
everyday manifestations of action. It is to be expected then
that his understanding of these phenomena, though perhaps
imperfect, displays significant features of the more
abstract technical conception.
It is clear from what has been shown that some
correlate of action plays a vital role in ordinary ways of
thinking, for it is actions that are the basis for praise
and blame. Furthermore, the common conception of the nature
of a person invokes the capacity to act. In philosophical
terms, persons are conceived of as agents. In ordinary
terms, a person must be able, in principle, to do things
(actively and not merely passively).
The commonplace correlate of the concept of action
in fact figures prominently in the ordinary conception of
what persons are like. We can learn from cases of
individuals who become totally paralysed and unable to
respond in any way. They are deemed 'human vegetables'.
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Although retaining human form they lack the distinctive
human capacity to act. There may even be some temptation not
to call such individuals 'persons' at all. Certainly they
cease to have personality, which is, after all, a function
of the individual's behaviour and responses to the world
around him. The concept of action is an important aspect of
our concept of a person, indeed some would go further and
urge that it is a necessary feature of our world view.
Hampshire, in "Thought and Action", comments that
"the most unavoidable feature of our
consciousness is the initiation of change at
will... the idea of a thinking observer who could
form from his experience no notion of making a
movement, or, more generally, of doing something
is one that may scarcely be entertained."
(Hampshire, 1959:69)
I have been at pains to point out the central
importance of having a concept of action both for the
philosopher and the non-philosopher. We should note that
because of its centrality, the position we adopt on the
nature of action will ultimately affect our concept of a
person. The issue of the nature of action lies with a
cluster of philosophical problems which together will
determine one's conception of man. (Other related problems
are the relation of mind and body, freewill and determinism,
and personal identity. The standpoint one adopts on any of
these issues affects one's options in each of the others.)
Clearly, the concept of action is of crucial significance,
for the nature of action prescribes in part the nature of
man.
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To sum up: I have argued that the concept of action
although abstract is not far removed from ordinary ways of
thinking. A correlate of this technical notion can be found
in the way people commonly acknowledge differences within
the range of things that people do. Furthermore, contrary to
what Austin suggests, the use of the term 'action' in
ordinary speech is clearly relevant to the philosophical
concept. Finally, and most importantly, I have noted the
significance and centrality of this concept of action in its
relation to our overall picture of the nature of man.
Thereby, enough has been said to justify taking the
philosopher's concern with action seriously. Next, we meet
the philosopher's 'problem of action', and consider how it
should be approached.
(2) THE PROBLEM OF ACTION
Those people who do not hold a prejudiced view of
philosophy, may be surprised to learn that philosophers
locate a problem in the area of action. After all, most of
us operate happily and successfully with the concept of
action, so how does there come to be a problem?
Clearly, the problem does not lie with our ability to
distinguish actions from non-actions, but rather with the
presumed distinction itself. Our familiar use of the concept
invokes this distinction between actions and other events,
and the problem is to understand this classification.
Richard Taylor tells us that
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"The 'problem of action' ...is essentially that
of supplying the difference between mere bodily
motions and those that represent acts. There are
other problems of action... But at any rate, this
is the first that demands our attention." (Taylor,
1966:88-9)
These are concepts with which we all operate, and the
problem, we may suppose, is simply to explain what underlies
this distinction. Yet there are different ways in which this
task can be approached, and this is important because the
way that one interprets this problem dictates the sort of
theory that can be accepted as a valid account of action. In
particular, the task of 'supplying the difference' between
actions and other occurrences may or may not be construed as
that of locating the basis for this distinction.
Within the various approaches to this problem of action
we may discern two categories or types of approach. The
first of these covers those responses which seek a solution
to the problem through making clear our ordinary usage of
'action' and its related concepts. Often, such approaches
are concerned to make explicit what we mean by our talk of
actions, or what is entailed when we call something
'action'. Because of this trend, we might call the
approaches in this category semantic in nature.
The second category of responses, construe the task of
'supplying the difference' as locating a ground for our
distinction between actions and other occurrences. As such,
they are concerned less with what we mean by 'action', than
with what this term denotes. Because the aim is to seek what
underlies or grounds our distinction, we can see this type
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of approach as epistemic in nature. Here, the concern is
with the epistemological justification of our concept of
action; with the basis iri fact, for our claim that actions
are different from other occurrences.
As an example of the semantic approach, the differences
between actions and other events may be detailed by
explicating the different attitudes and expressions that
apply in each case, as well as the circumstances under which
we apply them. Since the concept of action has its roots in
ordinary ways of thinking, one may reasonably expect the
task to be one of explication. After all, the concept
embodies distinctions that we all fundamentally employ,
hence the presumption that we only have to articulate the
principles of this familiar usage. This conception of the
problem is implicit in the views of A.I. Melden who offers a
contextual theory of action (Melden, 1956, 1960, 1961).
According to this account, the difference between
actions and other events is that the former occur in a
context that makes it appropriate to treat them differently
from the latter. In particular, the required context would
fit the action-occurrences within social customs, habits and
rules, which in turn, make the aim, goal or purpose of the
behaviour comprehensible. Thus, Melden advises us to
"Consider some of the things we commonly do: we
purchase food, drive automobiles, play, work, help
and hinder our fellows. In all such activities, we
have learned by imitating or following the
instructions of others in obeying rules, following
criteria, following policies in the practices in
which we engage." (Melden, 1956:71; page
references to Gustafson, 1970.)
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He concludes that
"in the case of the concept of any action the
context of practices in which rules are obeyed,
criteria employed, policies are observed- a way of
thinking and doing- is essential to the
understanding of the difference between such
bodily movements and actions." (op. cit., p.73)
A similar view of action (and hence a similar approach to
the problem of action) is adopted by R.S. Peters:
"the concept of an action is inseparable from
that of intelligence; for part of what we mean by
'intelligence' is the ability to vary movements
relative to a goal in a way which is appropriate
to changes in the situation relevant to attaining
it." (Peters, 1960:13)
Thereby, like Melden, Peters supposes that
"general standards or rules are implicit in the
concept of an action. We can therefore say that a
man is doing something efficiently, correctly, and
so on, if he knowingly varies what he does in
accordance with changes in the situation
conventionally singled out as the goal and the
conditions perceived as relevant to attaining it.
It can only make sense to talk of actions in this
way, not of cases where something happens to a
man." (op. cit., p.14)
On such an approach, whether an occurrence counts as
action depends upon its fitting into a specific type of
situation, which means that if we set out to explain the
difference between actions and non-actions, all that we can
do is explicate the relevant conditions, contexts and
conventions that render it appropriate (or not) to treat
something as an action. When such details are fully
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articulated, they will specify the principles on which we
actually apply our distinction between actions and other
events. In fact, this would produce a set of rules for the
use of 'action-language1.
As this form of solution concentrates on making
explicit how and when to apply the concept of action, we may
thereby reasonably expect to achieve a clearer understanding
of what we mean by 'action'. But it is a consequence of this
approach that the basis for this concept and the
action-distinction is never in question. After all, it is
quite apparent that we mean something by our talk of
actions, so the problem is assured of coming up with an
answer if it sets out to detail this meaning. This is the
essential difference between the semantic and the epistemic
conception of the problem of action. Thus, on a theory such
as Melden's, to ask whether there is really a difference
between actions and other occurrences would indicate one's
failure to appreciate the conventions and conditions (the
'common form of life') that makes talk of actions
appropriate (Melden, op. cit., p.74).
A second variety of semantic approach to the problem of
action is provided by Richard Taylor. Although in many
respects similar to the previous conception of the problem,
Taylor's response is marked by his denial that a full
analysis of action can be attained. Thus he writes that
"While there is no informative way to analyze the
concept of human action which is not at least
question-begging, this does not preclude
describing actions and thus trying to discover
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what it is that distinguishes them from everything
else." (Taylor, 1966:99)
Although Taylor calls the problem of action 'the first
that demands our attention' (p.89), his concern with it is
almost entirely negative, and he is at pains to argue that
one should not be lured into treating this problem as
requiring an analysis of action. In his words,
"Obviously... something more is contained in an
act than in an otherwise similar motion that is
not an act. We can say moreover, that acts are
'caused' by the agents who perform them. These
elementary observations are enough to set the
trap." (op. cit., p.89)
On the positive side, Taylor's view of the problem is
that one can profitably consider the differences between
actions and other occurrences (although this will not
provide an analysis of action). He claims that
"describing actions and thus trying to discover
what it is that distinguishes actions from
everything else ... can be philosophically useful
if we can derive certain things from [it]... which
are significant in themselves... and such that
anyone who believes himself to be active, in the
sense suggested by these descriptions, will also
be likely to accept what is derived from them."
(p.99)
From the features of action that are picked out as
significant, we can see that such an approach is not
concerned with locating a ground for the concept of action.
For example, Taylor notes that
"the first and most obvious thing... is that
acts... are things which can without any
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incongruity be commanded, requested, or
forbidden." (p.104)
"an act, and even an act involving overt
behaviour, need not be a change, but can be the
absence of change." (p.106)
and again,
"[a] most important thing to note is that there
must always be an essential reference to an agent
in the description of any act." (p.108-9)
Features of a similar type are selected as crucial to
the concept of action, by David Rayfield, who suggests that .
"an item of behaviour, say running, qualifies as
A's action if and only if: (1) A is running or has
run; (2) someone, not necessarily A, could on some
occasion decide to run; (3) A is responsible for
running or for having run;and (4) A would give, if
he were asked it, a candid, affirmative answer to
'Are you running?' or 'Did you run?'" (Rayfield,
1972)
Obviously such features are part of what we convey when
we describe someone as acting; they serve as elucidations of
our familiar concept of action. As such, they are
essentially akin to the responses of Melden and Peters, for
like these latter authors, Taylor and Rayfield are concerned
to detail what follows from the facts of our regarding
certain occurrences as actions, or how to fully understand
the use of action expressions. Clearly, such semantic
approaches to the problem of action are not concerned with
how we come to regard occurrences as actions, if this means
anything beyond the way in which we Oidinarily apply the
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concept. There is no question as to the ground for this
conception nor with its justifiability. For this, we must
turn to the other type of approach to the problem of action:
the epistemic approach.
Unlike the semantic approaches, which begin from an
assumption of familiarity with the concept of action and its
application, the epistemic approach is specifically
concerned with the legitimacy of this concept and the
distinction we draw between actions and other events.
Whereas the former approaches see the problem as one of
explication or articulation, the latter sees it as a problem
of justification. It views the distinction between actions
and other occurrences as on a par with any other
distinction, in that, to be legitimate, it must be founded
upon a genuine difference between actions on the one hand
and non-actional occurrences on the other. Thereby, the
problem of action is the task of finding an adequate
epistemological ground for the concept of action. It is, in
this sense, the task of finding the difference between
actions and other events.
What makes this a philosophical problem is that there
is no readily discernible difference 'in the fabric of the
world' that corresponds to the difference presupposed by our
use of the concept of action, so it is not immediately
obvious that the concept is legitimate. We have on this
account, an example of what Leonard Goddard sees as a common
form of philosophical problem:
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"What motivates a good deal of philosophical
enquiry is that there often seems to be a gap
between many of the ordinary beliefs we have and
the evidence we have for them. And since the
beliefs are not ones that we usually want to give
up, a lot of philosophical discussion turns on the
question of v/hether or not the gap can be filled.
Sometimes the answer seems to be no, and there is
then a tendency to become sceptical about the
belief; sometimes the answer seems to be yes."
(Goddard, 1977:Preface)
For an epistemic approach, the problem arises because
of the apparent gap between our ordinary commitment to
action and the evidence we have for such a belief. So, the
task is one of trying to fill this gap and thereby show that
the concept is well-founded.
There is a clear contrast between the semantic and the
epistemic type of approach in the presuppositions that each
is prepared to allow. In the former, primacy is granted to
the view that we operate successfully with our distinction
between actions and other events, and the question of
understanding this distinction and the concept of action
comes second to this fact. On the latter approach, the basic
tenet is that the distinction must have an epistemological
base, and must be shown to have such, if it is to be upheld
as legitimate. Of course a semantic approach need not deny
this last point, which may appear to be commonsensical in
any case. Nevertheless, the semantic approach rests content
in the belief (also commonsensical) that we all operate
successfully with the concept of action. Hence it sees the
problem not as that of securing an epistemological
justification but rather as explaining how we go about
successfully employing this distinction. Although the search
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for such a base may seem pertinent to the task of
explicating our use of the action-distinction, an important
difference between the two types of approach is evident from
the way in which failure in the enterprise would be viewed.
If the task is seen as the search for a sure
epistemological base for the concept of action, then failure
to secure this inevitably casts doubt on the propriety of
the concept itself. On the other hand, since the semantic
approach is concerned with elucidating what it accepts as
basically sound, it will not view failure in this light. Far
from challenging the legitimacy of the concept, it will
simply suppose that the task has yet to be successfully
completed, or that the person asking the question does not
understand what it is he is asking for (hence, cannot
recognise the explanation when it is presented to him). The
difference between these two types of approach to the
problem of action is crucial for I shall suggest that only
the epistemic response engenders a truly philosophical
account of the problem.
According to the semantic approaches, the problem is
really one of explicating our distinction between actions
.and other events; this is a problem of articulating what, in
a sense, is already familiar to us. Thus, according to
Melden and Peters the task is one of expressing the
appropriate rules for applying the concept. We simply have
to make explicit what is already implicit in common usage.
For Taylor and Rayfield the task is to detail what follows
from our regarding something as an action. Again, this is a
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matter of making clear what is already implicit in our use
of the concept of action. But, in either case, if the
problem is to articulate what we may be supposed already to
know, then this is not a philosophical issue.
The fact, if it is one, that we have difficulty in
expressing something may be of no direct philosophical
significance. Even if everyone of us encounters this
difficulty in the same specific area of knowledge, it is not
thereby the concern of the philosopher. More plausibly, it
would be the psychologist's job to explain such a generic
verbal block.
Of course it may be said that the problem of action is
not one of explaining how such articulatory problems arise,
for this may indeed be a psychological question. The problem
is simply that of performing the necessary articulation.
This being so, and since philosopher's are often concerned
to arbitrate on matters of what one can and cannot say, this
may indeed fall under the domain of philosophy. But this is
not plausible under the auspices of this semantic approach.
Although the task is seen as one of articulation, and
although philosophers may be more articulate than some, this
does not render it a philosophical issue. This is especially
so since it is assumed that we are all familiar with what is
to be articulated, namely, the details of the use of our
distinction between actions and other occurrences. Since we
all have access to the raw data that is to be articulated,
there is nothing in this representation of the problem of
action that renders it of special philosophical interest.
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With reference to Goddard, I have suggested that the
epistemic approach bears the hallmark of a philosophical
problem. We have a concept of action which requires the
distinction between actions and other events, and we are
firmly committed to this concept and distinction. What gives
rise to the problem on this view is that there is no obvious
epistemological basis for this distinction, hence it is not
obvious that we are justified in our commitment to this
concept. Here, the problem of action is construed as the
task of locating an epistemological ground for our concept
of action. It is an enquiry into the legitimacy of the
concept. As such, it is philosophical in nature.
It is important to note that adopting a semantic
approach does not thereby defuse the philosophical problem.
Certainly, it may be more easily disregarded or ignored if
one concentrates on another interpretation, but the
epistemological problem does not disappear on adopting any
semantic line of response. Indeed, it is logically basic to
any such semantic approach. One can only set out to
articulate the details of how to distinguish between actions
and other occurrences on the assumption that this is
fundamentally a valid distinction. This assumption is
implicit in the semantic approaches but is precisely what is
called into question on the epistemic account of the
problem. So, this latter view is logically anterior to the
former.
Seeing that the epistemic interpretation of the problem
of action is properly understood to be a philosophical
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concern, this naturally raises the issue of the appropriate
sort of response to the problem thus conceived. We have met
examples of semantic responses but as yet, none from the
epistemic camp. At present, rather than offer such examples,
I wish to consider the broader issue of the appropriate type
of theory to meet the epistemic problem.
(3_) SUITABLE SOLUTIONS
Since the task set by this conception of the problem is
that of locating an epistemological basis for our
action-distinction, any acceptable account of the nature of
action must specify what it is 'in the nature of things',
that characterises actions as distinct from non-actional
occurrences.
To this end, it seems obvious that any theory of action
which fails to identify (or advocate) some difference that
could, at least in principle, be discerned, as a means of
distinguishing actions, is playing the wrong game. Because
there is a need to justify our conception of action, this
could only be achieved in a satisfactory epistemological
way, by indicating a candidate, which is at least
theoretically discernible as a characteristic of action. If
there is held to be no real difference between actions and
other occurrences, there can be no justification for
speaking as if there were. So what sort of theory of action
may reasonably expect to meet the task of locating a ground
for the concept? Clearly, we must look for a theory that
lays great emphasis upon the difference between actions and
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non-actions. One such account is the causal theory of
action.
This theory expresses the nature of actions in terms of
their unique causal ancestry. Thus, the required fundamental
difference between action and mere occurrence is thereby
located in the causes of these respective events. The causal
theory maintains that actions form a class distinct from
non-actions by virtue of their unique causal genesis. Such a
response seems appropriate, since we may hope to
characterise actions in terms of the specific type of cause
(a unique sort of event in the world), that leads to action
and not to anything that is not action. Yet, there is an
additional contender for the title of 1 acceptable theory of
action'.
The alternative to a causal account lies with the
traditional account of action in terms of volitions. Which
theory characterises actions as events with a unique
relation to agent's willing. Thus, we may hope to
distinguish actions from other events on the assumption that
only the former bear the requisite relation to those
occurrences called 'volitions'.
The important aspect of each of these theories is that
they are committed to expressing the nature of action in
terms of a real difference in the fabric of the world.
Furthermore, this is a difference which we can, in
principle, discern. So, by some such theory we may hope to
resolve the philosophical problem of action, as represented
by the epistemic view of this issue.
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In what follows, I shall argue that of these putative
acceptable accounts of action, the causal approach fares
badly in its attempt to detail the character of action,
whereas, with judicious alterations, the volition theory can
meet the demands of the problem of action.
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CHAPTER 2_ : THE CAUSAL ALTERNATIVE
(_1) WAYWARD CAUSALITY
Having established that theories such as the causal and
volitional accounts are correctly motivated for resolving
the problem of action, in the present chapter I shall argue
that the causal approach is vitiated by the problem of
wayward causality, and that in consequence, it must be
rejected as an adequate account of action.
The major difficulty on the causal approach is to
explain how actions actually come to be performed. It is one
thing to say that actions arise from particular desires and
beliefs that together form a reason which causes the event
to qualify as action (pace Davidson), but it is difficult to
see how one's reason for doing something can produce the
action. Certainly, we can understand the idea that such
reasons cause events, still it is hard to accept that this
is sufficient to render such events actions. This difficulty
centres on whether we can construe reasons as executive.
While it is standardly in the nature of volition to be
executive, it is not clear that reasons can be so. Thus we
are all familiar with having reasons for doing things that
we do not in fact do. This suggests that reasons on their
own need not result in action, so why suppose that they have
executive power? Furthermore, if we are intent on adopting
such a view we are obliged to explain why all reasons do not
result in action. It looks as if something additional is
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required to mediate between our reasons for acting and the
action itself. This is the ideal role for volition.
Apparently, there is a significant gap between having a
reason for doing something and doing it 'for that reason'.
This is the gap that the causal account has difficulty in
spanning, and this is most evident in examples of 'wayward
causation'. Here, although the agent's behaviour results
from his reason for doing what he does, he does not do it
for that reason and consequently, his behaviour does not
qualify as action.
An example is provided by Davidson in his article
'Freedom to act':
"A climber might want to rid himself of the
weight and danger of holding another man on a
rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold
on the rope he could rid himself of the weight and
danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him
as to cause him to loosen his hold, and yet it
might be the case that he never chose to loosen
his hold, nor did he do it intentionally."
(Davidson, 1973:153-4)
Obviously Davidson's climber has a reason for releasing the
rope, yet though his releasing it results from his reason,
this does not capture the sense of the agent's doing it for
the reason in question. The problem is that even if the
behaviour is caused by the agent's reason for releasing the
rope, this is not sufficient to render this an action. And
this is serious for any attempted causal analysis of action.
Indeed, Davidson goes so far as to say:
"what I despair of spelling out is the way in
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which attitudes must cause actions if they are to
rationalize the action." (op.cit., p.153)
In the face of this problem of wayward causal chains,
the causal theory seems unable to pin down a single routing
to the causality such as to be sure that the event thus
produced will be action. This being so, such a theory is
ill-equipped to resolve the problem of action, for it is
unable to give an adequate characterisation of the
fundamental difference between actions and other events.
Hence, the problem of wayward causation is important
firstly, because it highlights a deficiency in the causal
approach, and secondly, because it can be altogether avoided
on the volitional approach; although I shall reserve proof
of this latter contention for later.
(2) GORR'S DEFENCE
Before dismissing the causal theory altogether it is
worth noting that several recent writers have attempted to
defend such a theory against wayward causality. (See for
example, Armstrong, 1975:1-7; and McCullough, 1975; both of
these attempts are discussed and ably dismissed by Michael
Gorr in Gorr, 1979b. It is Gorr's own defence of the causal
theory that I wish to consider.)
In particular, Michael Gorr argues that there is
"a way of explicating our intuitive feeling of
the connectedness of our volitions and our actions
[which] is adequate to exclude counterexamples
based upon the possibility of anomalous causal
chains." (Gorr, 1979b:10)
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We must note that Gorr's use of the term 'volition' does not
indicate that he upholds a volitional a_s opposed to a causal
account of action. He applies this term to the 'mental
element' in action and does so only 'for convenience'
(sic.).
Put simply, Gorr's strategy for overcoming the problem
of wayward causation is to suggest that in acting, the agent
is aware of an appropriate mode of execution, such that he
can tell whether what occurs is or is not his action. This
is based upon the view that we employ our muscles when we
move, and have awareness of this muscular activity:
"Although it is perhaps only infrequently that we
actually pay attention to this sort of activity
(usually this will be in cases... where the task
involves a relatively great or unusual effort), it
is nonetheless true that some muscular movement is
involved in all cases of (overt) action."
(op.cit., p.9)
Thereby,
"action occurs only when an appropriate mental
event initiates muscular activity which in turn
initiates an appropriate bodily movement.
Moreover... there is a 'characteristic manner' in
which these events not only follow one another
but, to put it somewhat metaphorically, flow into
one another... because we conceive of our wants or
intentions as initiating causal chains that lead
uninterruptedly (via the associated muscular
activity) to the overt manifestations of behaviour
constitutive of the act itself." (op.cit.,
pp.9-10)
Gorr suggests that the appropriate
from mental cause, through muscular
movement. Consequently, should any




replaces an aspect in this sequence the resultant behaviour
will not be action, and would ordinarily not be 'felt' to be
action by the agent concerned. Any other events required for
the action's occurrence, other than those in the chain of
mental cause, muscular activity and bodily movement, would
operate as auxiliaries to elements in this chain, otherwise
the result may not qualify as action.
If we look again at Davidson's mountain climber
example, we can see that Gorr's requirement disqualifies the
climber's behaviour from being action because
"the relevant causal chain involved at least one
link that was neither identical nor concurrent
with an element in either the agent's volition,
his muscular effort or his behaviour, i.e. the
nervous spasm which intervened to cause him to
loosen his hold on the rope." (p.10)
In Davidson's example, the agent's behaviour does not
issue directly from his 'mental initiative', but from 'the
intervention of an unexpected and foreign element in the
production of his behaviour- the attack of nerves.' (p.11).
On the face of it, Gorr's position appears able to
overcome examples like Davidson's climber. But this does not
mean that the causal theory can adequately deal with the
problem of wayward causality. There is a further variety of
problem case, recognised by Gorr, which is not excluded on
his criteria, as outlined so far. The following example
(which we may call Variant _1) is given by Gorr:
"Suppose that Jones has a volition to raise his
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arm, that this is immediately followed by his
experiencing the sensations characteristic of the
appropriate muscular effort, and that this in turn
is immediately followed by his arm's going up.
Suppose further, however, that during the previous
night, Smith had secretly rewired the relevant
neural connections between Jones' brain and his
arm so that, at the moment he (Jones) willed to
raise his arm, Smith induced in him the
characteristic sensations of effort (though these
were unrelated to his volition) and then caused an
impulse that produced the appropriate muscular
contraction in his arm (though these were
unrelated to his experience of muscular effort).
All the conditions specified earlier appear to
have been met, yet Jones was clearly deceived in
so far as he believed that he experienced a
'natural' and uninterrupted flow from his willing
to his behaviour. Consequently, we must conclude
that he failed to act." (p.11)
Clearly, such a case presents difficulties for Gorr's
position, for here we have an anomalous causal sequence
which meets the requirements already outlined, yet we would
not consider the culmination of this sequence as an instance
of action. Although all that occurs 'feels right' to the
agent in question, it does not follow that he has acted,
even if he thinks he has. Hence, as we have them thus far,
Gorr's criteria are not adequate to exclude such an example
of deviant causality.
Obviously, Gorr is aware of this problem, and in order
to accommodate such cases, he adds a further condition for
the resultant behaviour to qualify as action. This condition
is described by Gorr as
"a very essential epistemic requirement, viz.,
that the agent know that his volition will result
(or at least probably result) in behaviour in a
way that is consonant with the other conditions."
(pp.11-12)
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With this further qualification the counterexample
above is ruled out. Since Jones is ignorant of Smith's role
in the proceedings he could not know that his arm would rise
as a result of his having willed it. Thereby, Gorr concludes
that
"for something to constitute an action... it
appears necessary to require not only that certain
objective connectivity conditions be satisfied but
that the agent have knowledge that they will be
satisfied..." (p.12)
In this manner, Gorr believes he has avoided the problem of
wayward causation, but I would not agree to the validity of
his 1epistemic condition1. Clearly, this condition does
overcome the counterexample in question, but this is not
sufficient ground for accepting it. Furthermore, I shall
offer reasons for rejecting this knowledge requirement as a
condition for action.
My first consideration concerns an example discussed by
Godfrey Vesey (Vesey, 1961; derived from James, 1890:105),
where we have a subject with an anaesthetised arm. This
subject is asked to raise his arm whilst blindfolded and
upon removing the blindfold is surprised to find that his
arm has not moved. Obviously there is some obscurity in this
example as to what we should say about this agent's
'action', for it is unclear whether he has in fact acted at
all. Nevertheless, it is clear that the subject's arm may
not rise even when he thinks it will. There may be nothing
in what he 'feels' that tells him whether his arm will or
will not rise under such circumstances. So there will come a
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time, as the anaesthesia wears off, when after further
failure to raise his arm, the subject successfully raises
his limb.
In this case it is clear that the subject does not know
that his arm will rise when he tries to raise it, hence
Gorr's epistemic condition is not met when, as the
anaesthesia wears off, the agent first successfully raises
his arm.
On commonsense grounds, we would allow such an instance
as full-blooded action. If the anaesthesia has worn off and
the subject raises his arm, then he has acted, even on the
assumption that he did not know that his arm would respond
as normal.
The alternative, to which Gorr is committed, given the
failure of his epistemic condition, is to disqualify the
subject's moving his arm as not action. Gorr must suppose
that the agent did not act till after he learned that his
arm would respond, which excludes the possibility that he
learns this by raising his arm. Or, strictly, if the subject
learns that the anaesthesia has worn off by moving his arm,
then his moving his arm is not an action. This would be
strange. How then should we class his arm raising? Certainly
it is not a nervous response; it is not the result of a
deviant causal chain. In fact it would pass muster as an
action save for meeting Gorr's requirement that the agent
know that what he wills will occur.
In similar fashion, Gorr must describe the process of
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learning to move one's limbs as beginning with limb
movements which are actions in every respect except that the
young agent did not know when he initiated them, that they
would occur.
It seems to me peculiar to suppose that we must move
our limbs at least once before we can be said to be capable
of action. More naturally, we would describe such 'first
doings' as actions in their own right. So, my first argument
against Gorr's epistemic condition is to the effect that
such a requirement would exclude cases of action which are
not in themselves problematical. If we have actions which we
must disqualify on Gorr's epistemic condition, then this-
condition will not do; it cannot be validly employed to
exclude problem cases of wayward causation if it also
excludes non-problematical examples of action. In addition,
Gorr's criterion has serious implications for all instances
of action, as I shall show in my second argument.
Looking closely at the counterexample in which Jones's
arm raising is disqualified from being action, we see that
what Jones failed to know was that Smith was interfering
with the 'normal' sequence of the action. In particular,
what Jones did not know was the presence of a feature in
this causal sequence other than his mental cause, his
muscular activity, and his arm movement. This feature was
Smith's interference; the reason Gorr gives for
disqualifying Jones's arm raising.
From this we should be able to conclude that if there
is a causally effective factor in the sequence producing the
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bodily movement which is additional to the mental cause,
muscle contractions and bodily movement, and the agent is
ignorant of the role played by this factor, then the
resultant movement fails to qualify as action.
This is our generalisation from Gorr's own example,
whereby Jones's arm raising is disqualified because he is
ignorant of the part played by Smith in producing this arm
movement. From this general statement of Gorr's epistemic
condition we can consider how it would apply to a normal
instance of Jones raising his arm.
Under normal circumstances when Jones acts to raise his
arm, there occurs, in Jones, a mental cause followed by
muscular contractions, then his arm rising. Furthermore,
Jones has the required feeling of 'connectedness' with
regard to this sequence of events. Yet, surely there are
additional factors in this causal sequence other than mental
cause, muscular activity, and bodily movement. There must,
for example, be nerve impulses to connect the mental cause
with the muscles. And who is to say that there are not other
factors essential to the sequence which are neither
identical nor concurrent with these three 'recognised'
features?
The significance of these additional features is that
they are necessary for the action sequence and are distinct
from the mental cause, muscle contractions and bodily
movement. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that
agents are normally unaware of the part played by such
additional features in their action sequences.
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It follows from the fact that Gorr's knowledge
requirement will disqualify as action, every sequence in
which the agent lacks knowledge of any effective factor
(distinct from mental cause, muscular contractions and
bodily movement), that every action sequence would be
disqualified. For, in every such sequence there will be
effective factors of which the agent has no knowledge
whatsoever. Clearly Gorr's knowledge requirement is no more
than an ad hoc means of overcoming a particularly awkward
example of wayward causation. Although it does achieve this
much, it would, at best, also exclude acceptable instances
of action, and, at worst, would entail the total abolition'
of action, which is absurd. We can see therefore that Gorr
fails to deal adequately with Variant 1 of wayward
causation, which is surprising, since there is an obvious
response to this sort of problem case.
(3_) RESOLVING GORR'S PROBLEM
The details of Variant 1 resist the criteria Gorr uses
to overcome the original problem of wayward causation (as
instanced in Davidson's climber). In this case, the putative
agent Jones has the appropriate feelings of 'connectedness'
and the sequence of mental cause, muscle contractions, and
bodily movement occur as specified in Gorr's criteria. Yet
we should not allow that Jones raised his arm in the sense
of being the agent of the arm rising.
According to Gorr, this is because the 'knowledge
requirement' is not satisfied, when Jones is deceived into
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believing that he experiences a 'natural and uninterrupted
flow from his willing to his behaviour'. We have seen that
Gorr's knowledge condition is not acceptable as a criterion
for action. How then do we explain our unease with Variant
1?
The solution is simple. In such a case the raising of
Jones's arm does not count as Jones's action because it is
Smith's action. We disqualify Jones as agent precisely
because of the role Smith plays, and since Smith plays an
active role, the event brought about (Jones's arm going up)
should be attributed to Smith as his action.
It is apparent that when Smith ' induced in [Jones]...
the characteristic sensations of effort... and then caused
an impulse that produced the appropriate muscular
contractions in [Jones's]... arm' (p.11), Smith is active.
Smith it is, who produces the relevant effects in Jones,
including the arm movement, hence, Smith, and not Jones, is
the agent.
We may generalise on this insight and note that
whenever someone acts as a result of another's stimulus (in
this case Jones's mental cause), the agent of the deed in
question will be whoever is closest (in causal terms) to the
deed itself. Thus, in Variant 1, Smith (as agent) is
causally closer to the arm raising than Jones, despite the
fact that it is Jones's arm.
Even if Jones does something in producing the
appropriate mental cause, the fact that this leads, through
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Smith's actions, to the arm movement fails to render it
Jones's action. This is the point, noted by Aune (Aune,
1974:115), that 'agency is not transitive through persons'.
We can now see why Variant 1 is not Jones's action;
because it is Smith's. But the fact that this variety of
wayward causation is easily resolved does not reinstate
Gorr's criteria for action, i.e. those he invokes to
overcome Davidson's climber example, for there is a further
variant for which Gorr's criteria fail.
This variant (Variant 2) of wayward causation is
derived from Gorr's Variant 1. But here, instead of an
interfering Smith, we have Jones connected without his
knowledge to an electronic 'black box'. This unit takes over
the role previously played by Smith, but does not depend
upon action on Smith's part.
We can now suppose that Jones has the appropriate
combination of belief and desire to raise his arm.
Immediately upon the occurrence of this combination in
Jones, the 'black box' automatically induces in Jones the
characteristic sensations of effort, and then causes an
impulse that produces the appropriate muscle contractions in
Jones's arm. When Jones's arm is raised in this fashion,
Gorr's criteria for action are satisfied, but do we have an
action on the part of Jones? The precise answer is 'maybe'.
Our 'black box' need not disqualify the arm going up
from being Jones's action. Nevertheless, what occurs need
not be action by Jones. From Davidson's climber example, we
37
know that having a reason for a particular action may cause
the relevant deed without its thereby being action. In other
words, it does not follow that the deed is done for the
reason in question, even if it was done because of that
reason.
The same facts apply in Variant 2. The fact that Jones
has the requisite reason, plus the resultant deed's being
caused by Jones's reason, does not preclude the possibility
that Jones did not do _it for this reason. We know from our
first example of deviant causation that being caused by a
reason is not a sufficient condition of action. Variant 2
indicates that Gorr's supplement to this, in terms of the
agent having the appropriate feeling of 'connectedness'
between the key elements in the causal sequence, and this
sequence taking its 'normal' course from mental cause
through muscular contractions to bodily movement, does not
suffice as a criterion of action.
This being the case, the causal account of action
remains in an unacceptable state, for it is unable to detail
the essential difference between actions and other events.
Unless the problem of wayward causation in Variant 2 (and in
any subsequent forms), can be resolved, the causal theory is
neutered, and we must look elsewhere for an adequate account
of the nature of action. The obvious place to look is the
volition theory, for we shall find that it is not
susceptible to wayward causation. With this in mind, I turn
now to consider what may be termed the 'traditional' account
of action, in terms of volitions.
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CHAPTER _3 : VOLITION
U) THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF VOLITION
As a source for the traditional, or classical theory of
volitions we can look to writers such as Hobbes, Locke,
Hume, Reid, and Mill. All of these, to differing extents,
explicitly avowed a volitional approach to understanding
action. Considering the views of these authors we shall
detect many of the aspects of the 'dogma of volitions' that
have come to cause concern and dispute in modern action
theory.
My purpose in this section is to cast a cursory eye
over the volitional theory as found in these classical
sources.
The origin of our idea of volition seems to lie in our
impression that we can initiate events in the world; that we
have the power or ability to determine at least part of what
occurs around us. It is almost taken for granted, as
'datum', that we are conscious of such a power. Thus,
according to Locke:
"we find in ourselves a Power to begin or
forbear, continue or end, several actions of our
minds and motions of our Bodies, barely by the
thought or preference of the mind... This Power is
that which we call the Will. The actual exercise
of that power, by directing any particular action




"We are every moment conscious of internal
power... we feel that by the simple command of our
will, we can move the organs of our body, or
direct the faculties of our mind." (Enquiry, p.64)
"By the will. I mean nothing but the internal
impression we feel and are conscious of, when we
knowingly give rise to any motion of our body, or
new perception of our mind." (Treatise, p.399)
Also in Reid:
"Everyman is conscious of a power to determine
things which he conceives to depend upon his
determination. To this power we give the name of
will." (Essays, p.57)
This being the case, if we are conscious of such a
power, then of course it follows that we have such a power.
We cannot be aware of X if X does not exist. On the other
hand, we may be mistaken in our belief, in which case,
though we reckon that we are aware of a power to determine
events, what we are aware of may not be such a power. This
may be some false impression. Whereby, just as the fact that
we feel ourselves to be free is no argument against the
impugning of freedom by determinism, our 'awareness' of
active power, does not establish the reality of such power.
Still, this active power of which we are conscious, is
to be explained in terms of volition. Volition is the act of
determining; the exercise of the power. 'Will' is the power
itself:
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"To this power we give the name of will... the
act of determining [is]... properly called
volition." (Essays, loc. cit.)
Beside the fact that volitions occur as the exercise of
our active power there appears to be little that can be said
of volitions themselves. Locke asserts that volition is
itself an action, though one which is best understood by
reflection and considering what happens when one wills
(op.cit.). In like fashion, Hume describes the impression of
active power as impossible to define (Treatise, p.399).
Still, one might ask whether it is clear that we are
conscious of volitions. There appears to be a lack of
clarity on whether we are aware of volitions themselves, as
opposed to our power of will. In being conscious of 'a
power1, as Locke, Hume and Reid suggest, are we thereby
conscious of our volitions?
Since Hume calls 'the will' an internal impression felt
when we 'knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body,
or new perception of our mind' (loc. cit.), we can presume
that when a volition takes place we are conscious of it, as
an exercise of our active power. Yet it may be unclear
whether we have awareness of the act of volition and thereby
of our power, or whether acts of volition are posited in
order to explain our consciousness of power.
Reid seems confident on this matter. He distinguishes
instinctive and habitual deeds, such as blinking, from
voluntary deeds, such as closing one's eyes when told to do
so. The basis for this distinction is his view that
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voluntary deeds must invoke some conception on the part of
the agent, of what he wills. As evidence, he cites the fact
that no one is ever aware of willing to blink whenever he
does blink (Essays, pp.59-60). Thus, Reid suggests that in
voluntary deeds we are conscious of our willing the deed (of
our volition), while in instinctive and habitual deeds we
are aware of no volition.
The difficulty with Reid's position is that he seems to
equate our having some conception of what we are willing in
voluntary deeds, with our awareness of willing, or of having
a volition. Reid's class of voluntary deeds are
characterised as those deeds which involve some conception
in the agent of what he wills, yet it may be true that, in
voluntary action, I have a conception of what I am willing,
say, to close my eyes, without it being the case that I
conceive of 'closing my eyes' as something that _I will.
It may be that in voluntarily closing my eyes I must
conceive of 'my closing my eyes', without thereby conceiving
of my eyes closing as a result of my willing to close my
eyes. For I may conceive of my closing my eyes, as a
necessary part of closing my eyes, without having any
conception of volition whatever. It is far from clear from
Reid's position that the agent must be aware of his willing,
or the occurrence of his volition, in voluntary action.
Obviously, the fact that no one is aware of willing to close
his eyes when he blinks does not establish that he must be
aware of such a thing when voluntarily closing his eyes.
There may, in the latter case, be awareness of what one is
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doing without the agent conceiving of his willing to close
his eyes. In consequence, it remains an open question
whether we are aware of our volitions, even though voluntary
actions involve us in conceiving of what we are doing, say,
in closing our eyes.
In contrast, it may be said that we must be aware of
our volitions if such acts are the exercise of our active
power. After all, how could we be aware of having such power
if not aware of exercising it? And, since our volitions are
the instances of our exercising this power, if we are
conscious of this power, we can only be so through awareness
of our volitions, and what they can do.
This position is supported by Mill:
"the volition... is the antecedent [in the causal
sequence of action]; the motion of our limbs in
conformity to the volition is the consequent...
The antecedent, and indeed the consequent are
subjects of consciousness..." (Logic, p.232)
Mill also cites Hamilton as endorsing the view that
"the internal act of mental determination [is
something] of which we are cognisant." (Lectures;
cited in Mill, loc.cit.)
Although, as Mill and Hume suggest, we may have no
immediate consciousness of 'moving through one's volitions',
one is nevertheless aware of willing (having the volition),
and the movement which is its effect. In consequence, it
seems most plausible to account for our awareness of active
power via our awareness of the exercise of this power, viz.
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through awareness of volitions (through awareness of acts of
will).
Let us accept for the moment that we can be conscious
of our acts of will. What then can be said of the nature of
these volitions?
The difficulty here is that when one attempts to
characterise attributes of mind one's descriptive faculties
seem limited. Hence, Locke describes willing as
"a very simple act, and whosoever desires to
understand what it is, will better find it by
reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it
does when it wills, than by any variety of
articulate sounds whatsoever." (Essay, p.249)
Really, this is Locke's way of saying that he can say very
little about the nature of willing. Hume is more direct:
"this impression [of willing] 'tis impossible to
define..." (Treatise, p.399)
though he adds that
'volition is surely an act of the mind, with
which we are sufficiently acquainted." (Enquiry,
p.69)
Despite this vagueness on what can be said about
volition, some reassurance may be drawn from an observation
made recently by Bruce Aune, who notes that
"The fact that we cannot form images of our
thoughts, or discern the material features they
possess, does not warrant the conclusion that v/e
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do not think at all. The same holds true for those
volitional thoughts called 'acts' of willing."
(Aune, 1974:109)
This lesson is well taken by those who would otherwise
attach great significance to the lack of information on the
nature of volitions, or acts of will.
Although there is uncertainty on just what can be said
about volition, it is generally agreed that volitions
produce effects which are usually bodily movements or new
thoughts in the mind. Importantly, the relation between
volition and its effect is construed causally. Thus, from
Mill, we find that
"volition is... simply a physical cause. Our will
causes our bodily actions in the same sense, and
in no other as cold causes ice, or a spark causes
an explosion of gunpowder." (Logic, loc. cit.)
while Hume describes the will as 'a cause' with a contingent
connection with its effect (Treatise, Appendix, p.632), and
talks of acts of volition 'producing motion' in our limbs
(Enquiry, p.64).
Reid, on the other hand, is vague on the role of
volition in producing our movements. He suggests that when
we will to do a thing,
"the volition is accompanied with an effort to
execute that which we willed." (Essays, p.63)
Here, we may suppose that the effort to execute what we have
willed to do is the physical correlate of our volition,
whereby, the effort, and not the volition would be the
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physical cause of our bodily movement.
Alternatively, we might imagine that such effort is the
first 'significant' physical effect of our volition, and
thereby, merely an 'intermediate' cause of our movement. The
remaining difficulty would be the idea that every action
need involve some exertion of effort on the part of the
agent; though such a thesis has been defended recently by
Hugh McCann (McCann, 1972).
As to further characterising volitions, it is generally
held that volitions (acts of will), are actions, presumably
on a par with overt bodily actions.
Thus, Locke explicitly describes willing or volition as
an action (Essay, p.245) and, like Hume, calls volitions
'acts of mind' (Essay, p.249; Enquiry, p.69), or as Reid
puts it, 'the acts of the power to determine things
conceived to depend upon one's determination' (Essays,
p.57) .
Later, this characterisation of volitions as actions in
their own right brought serious criticisms against the
volition theory. In particular, if we are to employ the
concept of volition to make sense of the notion of action,
then so long as volitions are construed as actions, they
offer no hope as clarification of the character of action.
We cannot hope to articulate the nature of action in terms
of actions, albeit actions of a different order, for thereby
the nature of action would remain a mystery.
To his credit, Mill did not accord with the
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assimilation of volitions to actions. He is adamant that an
action is
"not one thing but a series of two things; the
state of mind called a volition, followed by an
effect. The volition... to produce the effect is
one thing; the effect produced in consequence...
is another thing, the two together constitute the
action." (Logic, p.35)
Clearly, on this view, volition is not an action but a
component of action. Consequently, there remains the
possibility of using 'volition' as an explanatory concept to
underpin that of 'action'. (More will be said of the
advantages of such an analysis of action in subsequent
chapters.)
Mill goes further in his characterisation of volition,
and identifies it with the agent's intention or purpose
(loc. cit.). Initially, at least, this assimilation of
volition to intention or purpose is unconvincing. The main
drawback is that we often have both intentions and purposes
which do not lead to action. Of course it is open to Mill to
reply that not all intentions or purposes are volitions.
Specifically, those intentions or purposes are volitions
which clo lead to action.
While this rejoinder may be plausible, it leaves a
mystery of the important difference between intentions and
purposes which do not lead to action and those which do.
Additionally, Mill's identification of volition with
intention may face the objection that it excludes the
possibility of unintentional actions. After all, if actions
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are produced by volitions, and volitions are intentions,
then it appears that all actions must be intentional. In
fact, this difficulty is easily overcome, for we may
understand unintentional actions as the unwanted or
unexpected results of one's volitions. Thereby, on Mill's
account, unintentional actions will be the unwanted or
unexpected results of the intentions which lead to
(intentional) action.
Similar comments apply to the assimilation, suggested
at one point by Hume, between volition and choice (Treatise,
p.467). Obviously one can choose to do something yet not do
it. So not all choices can be volitions. Furthermore, to
identify volitions with those choices which do lead to
action generates a puzzle as to the difference between
effective choices (volitions) and ineffective choices (which
do not lead to action).
If choices (or intentions) are to be executive acts,
only on some occasions, further explanation is required as
to how on such occasions the choices (intentions) are
effective in bringing about actions. In other words, what
makes a choice (intention) executive?
It is strange however that we should be asking how
actions come to be executed after introducing volitions into
the explanation. After all, volitions are of their nature
executive, so it is precisely their job to explain how such
mental features as beliefs, desires, intentions and choices
lead to action. In consequence, while it appears attractive,
wilh an eye to parsimony, to identify volition with
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intention, choice, purpose or something of the sort, the
remaining puzzle of how such a feature becomes executive
does injustice to the explanatory potential of volition.
Indeed, by not identifying volition with such features,
though we add an item to our theoretical inventory, the
resultant explanation of how actions derive from our mental
states is all the more streamlined, since it removes the
enigma of how such mental features become executive.
Although he does not strictly identify volition with
choice, Hobbes represents volitions as the last appetite or
aversion in deliberation. Thus, volition is the appetite or
aversion '.immediately adhering to the action' (Leviathan,-
p.46).
Since he identifies volition with the last appetite or
aversion in deliberation, Hobbes has an answer to the
objection that not all appetites or aversions lead to action
hence cannot all be volitions. Hobbes specifies that
volitions are those appetites or aversions which occur
immediately prior to action.
Again, this leaves unexplained the significance of
those appetites and aversions which 'happen' to lead to
action. For Hobbes, the question would remain, 'what makes
an appetite or aversion a volition?' So far as his account
goes, the answer could be 'coincidence'.
Despite the sparsity of description of volitions,
several formal features are indicated. Thus, Reid notes that
'every act of will must have an object' (Essays, p.59), and
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'the immediate object of will must be some action of our
own' (p.60). Locke seems to express the same point where he
says
"the will or power of volition is conversant
about nothing but our own actions." (Essay, p.250)
Thus, the object of one's will is that which one wills, for
he that wills 'must will something' (Reid:Essays, p.59).
Reid goes further and suggests that the necessary
presence of an object when one wills constitutes the
essential difference between voluntary and other deeds.
Thus,
"the person who wills must have some conception,
more or less distinct, of what he wills... By
this, things done voluntarily are distinguished
from things done merely from instinct, or merely
from habit." (loc. cit.)
In contrast to the suggestions that the object of
volition be one's action, it may be more plausible to think
otherwise. If what I will is my action then when I raise my
arm the object of my volition is my raising my arm, for this
was my action. Yet it seems improper to say 'I will that I
should raise my arm'. More familiarly, we may say 'I will
that my arm should rise', or 'I will my arm to rise'. If
what one wills is that one's arm rise, rather than that one
should raise one's arm, then the object of one's volition is
not the action of raising one's arm, but the movement which
is the arm's rising.
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Furthermore, there is reason to suppose that the object
of one's volition cannot be one's action. Thus, in order
that I raise my arm I must have a volition which results in
my arm rising. That is, my arm must rise as a result of my
willing. If what I will (the object of my volition) is my
action, then what I will is not merely my arm rising but
what makes my arm rising an action of arm raising. What
makes this difference is my volition. Hence, in order to
will my action, rather than merely the movement, I must will
my volition, which is to say, I must will my willing.
This reduction argument indicates the impropriety of
supposing that what we will is action. The object of our'
volition is more plausibly the logically necessary 'effect'
of such an action. Hence, in the arm raising example, what I
will (the object of my volition) is the movement of my arm,
and not my bringing about that movement.
We have seen that both Locke and Reid insist that
volition embody the conception of an object, this object
being, in their view, the action which the volition is
intended to bring about. Yet there is a further peculiarity
in this notion.
It is difficult to see how we could ever learn to act,
or perform a first action if such an action requires us to
will, with a volition that embodies a conception of the
action we are to perform. If we are ever to learn how to
bring about those things that we want to bring about, we
must begin by finding out what things we can bring about.
The implausible alternative is to suppose that we begin with
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a prior conception of the actions we are able to perform.
Here it is worth noting Mill's point that 'our consciousness
of volition contains no a priori knowledge that its effect
will follow' (Logic, p.233). Nor, we may add, does it
contain a priori knowledge of what its effect will
ordinarily be. We must accord with Hume, that we tell the
results of our volitions by experience (Enquiry, p.65ff.).
So, it is through experience that we learn what can
reasonably be an object of will. Having such an object in
mind cannot be a logical prerequisite for action, or we
would be required to have a conception of action prior to
ever acting.
Further investigation reveals that the general
characterisations of 'will' and 'volition' offered by
Hobbes, Locke, Hume and Reid all fall foul of the above
failing.
Hobbes presents volition as part of the process of
deliberation, which is the process of considering what we
might do and why. So what we consider is which action, if
any, to execute. Once again, we seem to have a precondition
on performing action which implies that no one could ever
act in the first instance. There cannot be a first action,
if this requires prior consideration of which action to
perform (deliberation). For this would require that prior to
ever performing any action we had developed the capacity to
consider which action to execute. Clearly, the execution of
action must be logically anterior to such deliberation.






its nature, require prior deliberation. (Of course this does
not mean that we cannot learn to deliberate after learning
how to act. The point is that acting is logically basic to
deliberating about action.)
A similar argument is effective against the general
characterisation of will proffered by Reid, Locke and Hume.
They insist that the ability to act is a conscious power to
determine things that we conceive to be within our power.
But this represents our ability to act as requiring that we
conceive of what it is in our power to do, which once again,
would render it impossible for anyone to perform a first
action. For in order to act for the first time one would be"
required to conceive of what actions one could perform,
which is to demand prescience of the agent.
As with Hobbes' characterisation, we cannot require as
a precondition of action that the agent have a prior
conception of action. It may be true that having learned how
to perform various actions we generally bear in mind what we
can do and how we can do the things that we have learned to
do. But the point remains that such a conception is
logically dependent on a prior ability to act. So it would
appear that neither Hobbes, Reid, Locke, nor Hume represent
the will in a fashion that would make action an initial
possibility.
We shall find that this issue arises again in
connection with William James, and the account he gives of
willing. Meanwhile, in concluding our summary of these
classical sources for the volitional account of action, we
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might restate what appear to be the salient details
attributable to such a theory:
(1) Volition is construed as a mental act, which is an
action in its own right.
(2) The influence of the will (the relation between
volitions and their effects) is causal in nature.
(3) Volition (willing) is something which we are
conscious of, though we have no awareness of how
volitions come to have the effects they have. We are
conscious of a power to determine things (that we take,
to be within our power).
(4) The act of volition is difficult (or impossible) to
characterise.
(5) A volition (act of will) always has an object,
which is that which one wills. The immediate object of
volition is one's action.
(6) It is the relation of volition to action that
distinguishes 'the voluntary' from other deeds and
sufferings.
The point of listing such details is that they show us
the sort of views that have come to be expected from
anything purporting to be a volition theory of action. This
is not to suggest that anyone who calls himself a volition
theorist, nor indeed any of the aforementioned authors, must
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adhere to all of these particulars.
Much of what I have to say in the forthcoming chapters
will be concerned with changing these specifications for
those that I deem more appropriate for an acceptable account
of action in terms of volition. To this end, I turn next to
a theory of the will, which, at least initially, seems very
much at odds with the more traditional approach just
encountered.
(2) JAMES ON THE WILL
We have seen that the dogma of volitions is well
represented in the writings of Locke, Reid, Hume, Hobbes,
and Mill. Indeed, there may be sufficient unity of doctrine
to distinguish what we might call 'the traditional
volitional account'; the main features being that volition
is a mental event, and one which leads causally to action.
Although many subsequent writers maintained a belief in
volitions, William James, for one, opted for a view
different in important respects from the traditional theory.
Indeed, there are several interesting lessons to be learned
from a detailed look at James on the will.
James begins his account of the will by distinguishing
the state of mind called 'willing' from desiring and
wishing. In keeping with Hume and Locke, he comments that
these are states of mind,
"which everyone knows and which no definition can
make plainer." (James, 1890:486)
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The difference between wishing and willing is that, if
with the desire for some end 'there goes a sense that
attainment is not possible, then we simply wish'. Whereas,
if we believe the end to be within our power, 'we will that
the desired feeling, having, or doing shall be real; and
real it presently becomes' (loc. cit.).
Like Reid and Locke, we find James claiming that the
only 'direct' outward effects of our will are bodily
movements. Such movements are 'the only ends which follow
immediately upon our willing.' Furthermore, since such
movements are desired and intended beforehand, they 'are-
done with full prevision of what they are to be.'
This last fact leads James to conclude that voluntary
movements are not logically basic, that is,they
"must be secondary not primary functions of our
organism." (p.487)
Here, James is acknowledging the point, which we made
previously in relation to the views of Hume, Hobbes, Locke,
and Reid, that if voluntary movement requires the prior
conception of what the voluntary movement is to be, then
there is a problem as to how such a voluntary movement can
be performed in the first place. As James puts it, if in
voluntary action the act must be forseen, it follows that
"no creature not endowed with divinatory power can
perform an act voluntarily for the first time."
(p.487)
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From this, once again, in keeping with Hume and Mill,
James supposes that we learn all our possibilities by way of
experience. Hence, in order to perform a specific voluntary
action, say, a particular movement, the movement must have
'once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way' and
'left an image of itself in the memory', whereupon, 'the
movement can be desired again, proposed as an end, and
deliberately willed' (p.487). This is what James means by
describing voluntary movement as a secondary function of our
organism, for it logically requires that there be some
other-than-voluntary movements, in order that we be able to
learn to act voluntarily.
One feature which may cause confusion arises from
James's contention that 'no creature not endowed with
divinatory power can perform an act voluntarily for the
first time'. Here there is a possible confusion between two
different, though related, claims. James may be saying that
the prevision requirement in voluntary movement presents a
problem as to how one is able to perform one's first
voluntary action. This is the point we met in the previous
section. Yet James may wish to make a stronger claim, namely
that this prevision requirement generates a problem as to
how we perform each distinct voluntary movement for the
first time.
Following James's logic, the former point would have us
suppose that some movement (at least one movement) occurred
in an other-than-voluntary fashion as a requirement for our
learning to move voluntarily. The latter point suggests that
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each voluntary movement of which we are capable, must have
been preceded by an other-than-voluntary occurrence of that
movement, in order that we learn how to make that particular
movement voluntarily.
If, as James suggests, an image of our movement must be
stored in our memory before we can desire that movement, and
deliberately will it, we would require an image for each of
our possible voluntary movements. Hence, he must imagine
that for each such movement, it must have occurred in an
other-than-voluntary fashion in order that we learn to bring
it about voluntarily.
One worry about this is that we would have no reason to
expect that everyone learn to perform the same repertoire of
movements, since what they learn is dependent upon the
'accidental' occurrence of these movements. It would be a
happy coincidence if the same range of movements occurred in
an other-than-voluntary way, for each and every person. Yet
there seems to be no reason to suppose that by an early age
we have not all learned pretty well the same range of
voluntary movements.
James does allow that we can learn to perform some
movements by observing similar movements in others,
nevertheless, this detracts from the requirement that we
have an image of the movement in question, in order to will
that movement.
Perhaps it is more plausible to deny that there is a
problem over learning to perform each voluntary movement,
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while accepting the problem over learning to perform one's
first voluntary movement. After all, having once found that
we can bring about a particular movement, this could well
lead us to experiment in order to see whether we can bring
about any other. Thereby, learning to perform one voluntary
movement may be sufficient cue for a process of practical
inquiry through which one may quickly learn what scope one
has for voluntary movement.
James's commitment to 'mental samples' of our
movements, as a requirement for any voluntary bringing about
of movement, is part and parcel of his theory of volition.
According to the traditional view, action is explained
in terms of movements caused by volitions. Hence, what makes
a movement voluntary is the fact that it originates in, or
more precisely, is an effect of volition. James's story is
more elaborate than this.
In the first place, James maintains that many of our
actions involve no specific prior occurrence of volition. As
he puts it, there is no
".. additional mental antecedent in the shape of a
fiat, decision, consent, volitional mandate, or
other synonymous phenomenon of consciousness,
before the movement can follow ... " (p.522)
Of such cases, we may well ask how the movements come
about voluntarily if not by means of volition. We must note
however that we have here two questions, and not one.
Firstly, we can ask how such movements occur at all, and
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secondly, how their occurrence qualifies as voluntary if
volitions have no role in their production.
To the former, the answer James gives is that these
movements arise naturally from our ideas of their 1 sensible
effects'. Indeed, he goes so far as to represent this
pattern as the 'essence' of voluntary action. Thus, he
states that
"... the first point to start from in
understanding voluntary action and the possible
occurrence of it with no fiat or express resolve,
is the fact that consciousness is in its very
nature impulsive... Every pulse of feeling which
we have is the correlate of some neural activity
that is already on its way to instigate a
movement." (p.526)
From this one might suppose that James is
misrepresented when described as a volition theorist.
Apparently, he wishes to characterise action without
recourse to any 'fiat', 'express resolve' or 'volitional
mandate'. Yet how do these voluntary movements, which James
describes as instances of 'ideo-motor action', qualify as
voluntary in the absence of even any close relative of
volition?
The answer to this question becomes all the more
obscure when we learn that James distinguishes this form of
voluntary behaviour, from another, for which 'an additional
conscious element has to intervene and precede the movement'
(p.522). In such cases we do have what James calls a 'fiat'
or 'volitional mandate'. This makes it clear that James is a
believer in volitions but it does nul explain how we are to
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understand his two-fold classification of voluntary
movements.
It may appear that James is confused as to what
qualifies these two types of action as voluntary. In the
first place, he claims that there are voluntary movements
that involve no 'volitional mandate', yet he also avows that
'the fiat, the element of consent or resolve that the act
shall ensue... constitutes the essence of the voluntariness
of the act'(p.501). How can such a fiat constitute the
essence of voluntariness in actions which involve no such
fiat?
Perhaps James means to say that such a fiat is the
essence of the act's voluntariness only in cases where such
fiats, or volitions actually occur. Then, of course, there
may be other actions whose essential voluntariness consists
in something other than such a fiat. Yet James seems to
disallow this option, for he describes this fiat as 'a
constant coefficient, affecting all voluntary actions alike'
(p.501). Can this apparent contradiction in James's account
of voluntary movements be resolved?
One possible resolution is to ascribe to James's
two-fold account of voluntary movement, a two-fold account
of volition. Thus, there may be a sense in which 'simple'
ideo-motor actions involve a volition so as to qualify as
voluntary, and a distinct sense in which 'non-simple'
voluntary movements involve a volition, whereby they also
qualify as voluntary. In this way, we might be able to say,
with James, that it is this fiat (volition) that is the
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essence of a movement's voluntariness, even though the
nature and the role of volition differ between the two types
of voluntary movement. Yet this is very abstract, and in
need of some support to lend credence to the view that this
accurately represents James's position.
(2) THE 'VOLITIONAL STATE'
According to Godfrey Vesey:
"In the psychology books of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries the dogma of
volitions was held in a particular form. This was
that the 'volitional state' which we have to
produce in ourselves in order to move some part of
our body is an uninhibited thought of the movement
occurring (or what it would be like for the
movement to be occurring). This was known as the
Ideo-motor theory." (Vesey, 1965:59)
Perhaps this concept of a 'volitional state' is the key we
need to make sense of the apparent inconsistency in James's
account. If the state which leads to every instance of
voluntary movement can be aptly termed 'volitional', then we
may be able to unite both the simple and more complex
instances of voluntary movements as voluntary for the same
reason, viz., their relation to this volitional state. What
will then distinguish the simple from the complex voluntary
movement is that the latter require a 'volitional mandate'
in order to achieve the volitional state, while the former
require no such mandate. This accords with James's assertion
that 'the anticipation of the movement's sensible effects
[the volitional state] must precede it [the movement] in
order that it be voluntary' (p.521).
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So, we can see James's account as involving two aspects
of volition. Firstly, and for the concept of voluntariness
most important, is 'the state of volition'; in Vesey's
terms, 'the uninhibited thought of the movement's
occurring'. Secondly, there is the 'volitional mandate',
which is required on some occasions, to produce this
volitional state.
To fully grasp what James has in mind, we have to look
in more detail at the nature both of the volitional state,
and the volitional mandate. The volitional state is
described as 'the uninhibited idea of the movement
occurring', or 'the idea of the movement's sensible
effects'. For simple ideo-motor action (simple voluntary
movement), this state is considered 'sufficient mental cue'
for the movement to follow (p.552). One worry that this
raises is that on this scheme, the resultant movement would
appear to be suffered rather than performed by the agent. He
has an idea in mind, of what it feels like for his arm to
rise, and thereupon, his arm rises. On this view, one would
have to be careful of the ideas one has, otherwise our
bodies might make movements that we do not wish to make. An
element of agent's desire or approval for the resulting
movement seems to be lacking in this account of ideo-motor
action. What would make such movements voluntary rather than
mere reflex responses to one's ideas? Where is the
'voluntary making' element in such movements?
James's response seems straightforward. Although in
simple ideo-motor action there need be no 'volitional
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mandate', there is still a 'volitional state'. But what
makes this state volitional, and hence the resultant
movements voluntary? James does introduce a concept of the
agent's 'attending' to the idea or thought of the movement
to be brought about. Indeed he claims that 'attention is the
first and fundamental thing in volition' (p.568), and this
'effort of attention' is 'the essential phenomenon of will'
(p.562). We might suppose that such 'attending' may
characterise the volitional state which gives rise to simple
voluntary movement, but this is not what James has in mind.
Although in introducing this concept of 'attending to
the thought of movement', he incorporates something like a
sense of agent's approval for the movement, James is adamant
that there is a sense of voluntary movement which does not
require this 'attending'. These instances would be the
'simplest' form of voluntary movement (simple ideo-motor
action), in that they arise directly from the agent's idea
or thought of movement. No conscious attention is involved
in such cases because there is no conflict of ideas, hence
nothing to inhibit the thought from resulting in the
movement. As James puts it:
"In all [such actions] ...the determining
condition of the unhesitating and resistless
sequence of the act seems to be the absence of any
conflicting notion in the mind." Cp.523)
To illustrate this type of action, James gives a
biographical example of trying to get out of bed on a
freezing morning, in a room without a fire:
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"How do we ever get up under such circumstances?
...we more often than not get up without any
struggle or decision at all. We suddenly find that
we have got up. ...an idea which at that lucky
instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing
suggestions, and consequently produces immediately
its appropriate motor effects. It was our acute
consciousness of both the warmth and the cold
during the period of struggle which paralyzed our
activity then and kept our idea of rising in the
condition of wish and not of will. The moment
these inhibitory ideas ceased, the original idea
exerted its effects." (pp.524-5)
Since James is disinclined to explain voluntariness in terms
of the agent's 'attention to the thought', we may again be
led to ask why the simple cases of voluntary movement should
count as voluntary, if they result directly from the thought
of the movement with no 'decision' on the part of the agent.
It seems that movements may occur _in spite of what the agent
wants, so long as there are instances of uninhibited
thoughts of movement. By concentrating on examples such as
the above, James may neglect the possibility of uninhibited
thoughts leading to movements contrary to what one wants, or
what one 'should' want.
James does offer a response which may meet this
criticism, and thereby justify viewing such movements as
voluntary. He claims that
"It is unqualifiedly true that if any thought[s]
do fill the mind exclusively, such filling is
consent. The thought, for that time at any rate,
carries the man and his will with it." (p.568)
In this way, James would deny that agents suffer, rather
than perform, such 'simple' voluntary movements.
We see then that James's theory has this two-fold
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account of voluntary movement. Simple ideo-motor actions
involve no fiat nor volitional mandate, but arise from the
agent's uninhibited thought of his movement's sensible
effects. On occasion, however, a volition proper is
required. Thus,
"the express fiat or act of mental consent to the
movement comes in when the neutralization of
antagonistic and inhibitory ideas is required."
(p.526)
It is this 'effort of attention', that James considers 'the
essential phenomenon of will' (p.562), which also, we can
suppose, bears some of the traditional features of volition..
Such is an act of mind, which is necessary in order that the
desired movement be produced. Although, on James's account,
this preceding mental act is not always required for
voluntary action, he does acknowledge that 'the essential
achievement of the will, in short, when it is most
voluntary', is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it
fast before the mind. This so-doing is the fiat' (p.561).
This 'fiat' or 'volitional mandate' is James's version of
volition. Nevertheless, the detail of his account does not
stop there, for he wishes to distinguish this 'act of
attending' from a further aspect of the will. Thus, he
writes:
"Often ...we need a new state of effort to break
down the sudden hesitation which seizes upon us,
and to persevere. So that although attention is
the first and fundamental thing in volition,
express consent to the reality of what is attended
to, is often an additional and quite distinct
phenomenon involved." (p.568)
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Thus, James distinguishes 'attending' to the thought of
movement, from another occurrence which is a distinct
'effort of consent' to the thought attended to. James
expresses the distinction as follows:
"It is unqualifiedly true that if any thought[s]
do fill the mind exclusively, such filling is
consent... But it is not true that the thought
need fill the mind exclusively for consent to be
there; for we often consent to things whilst
thinking of other things, even of hostile things;
[it] is just this coexistence with the triumphant
thought of other thoughts which would inhibit it
but for the effort which makes it prevail. The
effort to attend is therefore only a part of what
the word 'will' covers; it covers also the effort
to consent to something to which our attention is
not quite complete." (p.568)
So there is a third aspect to the will, as James presents
it. A movement may arise from the volitional state, it may
also be produced by way of our attending to the thought of
that movement. Nevertheless, on some occasions, an
additional mental operation is required to ensure that this
volitional state, plus 'attending', are adequate to produce
the movement. This 'express consent to the reality of what
is attended to' is 'an additional and quite distinct
phenomenon' from our 'attending to the thought of the
movement'.
From the details of James's account of the will, it may
appear that he could hardly be further from the traditional
theory of action in terms of volition. It is worthwhile
contrasting his views with those of the volitionists
detailed in the previous section.
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The most significant difference between James and the
more orthodox volitionists is that he would allow voluntary
movement without an express volition. More usually,
volitions are considered causally necessary for each action.
Since, in this latter case volitions are taken to explain
the voluntariness of the resultant movement, James has to
provide an alternative account of how voluntary movement
without volition, qualifies as voluntary.
We have seen that his explanation is in terms of the
agent's ideas naturally leading to his movement. The state
of mind which leads to such movement may even be termed 'a
volitional state', though this is something of a misnomer if
it is taken to imply the presence of volition. To the
objection that James's non-volitional voluntary movements
need not involve the agent's consent or desire for the
movement in question, James replies that 'if any thoughts do
fill the mind exclusively, such filling is consent. The
thought, for that time at any rate, carries the man and his
will with it' (p.568).
The worry with this reply is that it avoids the problem
by stipulating that consent is involved when movements
result from uninhibited thoughts. Why should we accept that
consent to one's movements consists in one's mind being
exclusively filled with the thought of such movement?
I may be told by a thug that on the count of three he
will forcibly twist my arm behind my back. Anticipating this
movement, which is totally against my will, my mind may be
filled exclusively with the thought of my arm moving in just
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the way the thug intends it to move. We would not suppose
that in this state of mind, I consent to the arm movement,
when the thug moves my arm, even though my only thoughts are
of that very movement. Nor will it do to say that the
thought must lead to the requisite movement in order for it
to be a case of consent. For whether the thought ultimately
leads to the movement depends not solely upon the agent, but
upon contingent facts about his physiological make-up, hence
this contingent relation between the thought and the
movement cannot determine the agent's consent or otherwise.
The agent's consent depends upon the agent himself, not upon
any of the contingent physiological factors which may affect
his body.
Furthermore, the concern that James's simple voluntary
movements need involve no desire or consent on the part of
the agent, is not alleviated by his comment (above) that the
man and his will are carried with the thought. This makes it
appear more like movement _in spite of what the agent wishes,
as opposed to movement because he wishes it.
Interestingly, there are some features in common
between James's account of the will, and orthodox
volitionism. In particular, when a volition is involved in
action, the agent must have some conception of what he is
doing. On the traditional view this is the point that
volitions must have objects. For James, this is embodied in
his view that in volition, the agent attends to the idea of
the movement. James goes so far as to say that volition is
concerned solely with such ideas of movement. Thus, 'the
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terminus of the psychological process in volition, the point
to which the will is directly applied, is always an idea'
(p.567).
It is the job of volition to attend to thoughts of
one's proposed movements, but James notes that 'it is a mere
physiological incident that when the object is thus attended
to, immediate motor consequences ensue' (p.561).
This view accords with Hume:
"We tell the results of our volitions by
experience." (Enquiry, p.69)
and Mill:
"The causal sequence whereby volition produces
its effect, is taken not to be a subject of
consciousness... the connection between [volition
and its effect] ...is a matter of experience."
(Logic, p.232)
It is agreed even by James that the connection between the
occurrence of a volition and of its effect, is a contingent
and not a necessary relation.
A further notable parallel between James and
traditional volitionists lies in the basic assumption that
volitions are objects of experience. Indeed, James would
accord with Locke (Essay, p.236), and Reid (Essays, p.57),
that the power we call will is the act of determining things
that we conceive to be in our power. And particularly, that
this is a power of which we are conscious. James describes
will as a state of mind which everyone knows. Yet, in
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keeping with earlier writers, he concludes that there is
something essentially mysterious about the overall process
of willing. We find agreement that the ultimate character of
what is involved in willing, cannot be expressed, though it
is something we are all familiar with, from our own
experience. In James's words,
"the transition from merely considering an object
as possible, to deciding or willing it to be real;
the change from the fluctuating to the stable
personal attitude concerning it; from the 'don't
care' state of mind to that in which 'we mean
business' is one of the most familiar things in
life. We can partly enumerate its conditions; and
we can partly trace its consequences, especially
the momentous one that when the mental object is a
movement of our own body, it realized itself
outwardly when the mental change in question has
occurred. But the change itself as a subjective
phenomenon is something which we can translate
into no simpler terms." (p.569)
In Locke we find that:
"the act of mind, whose proper name is willing or
volition, is a very simple act, and whosoever
desires to understand what it is, will better find
it by reflecting on his own mind, and observing
what it does when it wills, than by any variety of
articulate sounds whatsoever." (Essay, p.249)
And in Hume:
"the will... [is] the internal impression we feel
and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise
to any new motion of our body... this impression
is impossible to define." (Treatise, p.399)
(4) UNDERSTANDING JAMES
Having successfully extracted the full detail of
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James's theory, how can we understand the significant
differences in his account from that of the earlier
volitionists? There are two main features to be explained.
First, James allows voluntary motion without volition, while
the traditional account requires volitions as explanations
of voluntariness. Second, James locates two distinct mental
acts which may be involved in willing, while the traditional
account has only one. For James, these acts are 'attending
to the idea of one's movement', which he identifies as the
volition, and 'consenting to the reality of such an idea',
of which he is able to say very little.
The first point to establish is why James accepts the
possibility of voluntary movement without the need for
volition. To understand this is to grasp the basis of
James's whole approach to the nature of the will. James is
attempting to develop a theory of the will based upon
introspection; on the basis of the phenomenology of willing.
He is taking literally the words of Locke (quoted above),
that to understand what goes on when we will we had best
'reflect on our own minds' and observe what happens on such
occasions. Like the earlier volition theorists, James
supposed that volitions are objects of experience. It is
little wonder then that in trying to explain what happens in
most cases of voluntary movement, he sees no need for an
'express fiat' or 'volitional mandate'. The reason volition
makes no appearance on his account is that we are not
normally conscious of anything we would call volition when
we perform such actions. Thus James notes that
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"Whenever movement follows unhesitatingly and
immediately the notion of it in the mind, we have
ideo-motor action. We are then aware of nothing
between the conception and the execution." (p.522)
Since volition was a traditional concept for
understanding the will, James may have felt bound to locate
such a feature. But it is introduced at a 'higher level'
than ordinary voluntary movement, and is not considered
essential for voluntariness. At this 'level', James thought
that we could be conscious of something volition-like.
Hence, he suggests that:
"An anticipatory image of the sensorial
consequences of a movement plus (on some
occasions) the fiat that these consequences shall
become actual, _i_s the only psychic state which
introspection lets us discern as the forerunner of
our voluntary state." (p.501; my emphasis)
James identifies volition w
hesitant about action; a fea
thought of the movement is requi
thought of what we want to do.
mind, and since we are all
concentrate on what we are doing
can relate from 'introspective
act which James calls a fiat, or
The third feature of James'
introspective approach. His need
is grounded in introspection:
th what happens when we are
.ure additional to the mere
ed; we must attend to the
This attending is an act of
familiar with having to
in order to get it done, we
experience', to this mental
volitional mandate.
theory also fits with his
for this further mental act
"Often when an object has gained our attention
exclusively, and its motor results are just on the
73
point of setting in, it seems as if the sense of
their imminent irrevocability were enough of
itself to start up the inhibitory ideas and to
make us pause. Then we need a new stroke of effort
to break down the sudden hesitation which seizes
upon us, and to persevere. So that, although
attention is the first and fundamental thing in
volition, express consent to the reality of what
is attended to is often an additional and quite
distinct phenomenon." (p.568)
But why should such hesitation require a new stroke of
effort, an effort of a different kind, rather than a
repetition of the earlier effort; the volitional mandate?
Presumably, James feels that attending to the thought
of one's movement is not always sufficient to produce that
movement, in which case, attending twice would be no more
successful than attending only once. What is required is a
different mental 'push' to carry through the movement. Of
course, James can say little about this additional
phenomenon. He cannot call it a volition because he has
already played that card, and traditionally there is no
precedent for two types of volition. Ironically, he is left
in the familiar volitionist position of being unable to say
anything more about the nature of this feature. Although,
'the reader's own consciousness tells him of course just
what these words ...denote' (p.568).
It should be evident at this stage that James's
introspective approach to the analysis of action, combined
with his apparently prior commitment to the existence of
volition, leads to a theory that is flawed in two important
respects. Firstly, he is unable to provide an adequate
account of the voluntariness of simple ideo-motor actions,
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because there is no introspective ground for supposing the
presence of volition in such cases.
Furthermore, his introspection leads to a theory which
is cumbersome and uneconomical, since he is compelled to
introduce 'significant' acts of mind to explain how and what
we feel under different circumstances in action.
Such difficulties as we find in James's account can be
overcome if we drop the presumption that volition is
introspectible. Thereby its absence from consciousness in
simple cases of action is to be expected, likewise its
absence from every other instance of action. After all, why
should we accept that what we are subjectively conscious of
in different action-situations, is any accurate indication
of the nature of action? Certainly, the prime function of
volition is to explain the nature of action; to explain how
movements come to be voluntary. The need for such a device
is evidenced by the inadequacy of James's account of the
voluntariness of simple ideo-motor actions. But this does
not commit us to volition as a subject of consciousness.
Still, it may be asked why we should suppose that volitions
exist if we cannot be aware of them. The obvious answer is
that we must posit their existence because we need them to
explain what we take to be the case, viz. that there is a
fundamental difference between actions, those movements that
are in our power, and non-actions, which occur regardless of
our mental attitudes.
We can still suppose that what we experience when we
act may be explained psychologically, but there is no reason
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to suppose that such explanations are all that can be
offered by way of analysis of action. Certainly, James's
account is evidence to the contrary.
In the following chapter, we shall meet Prichard's
attempts to put the concept of volition on a surer footing.
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CHAPTER 4 : PRICHARD ON ACTION AND VOLITION
U) ARGUING FOR VOLITION
Even after reading the views of James, Reid, Hume and
others, it may not be obvious that volitions are objects
with which we are all familiar. Despite the self-assurance
of such writers that volitions are part of our everyday
experience, one might be led to ask why we should believe in
the existence of volitions at all. Certainly, if there is
any room for doubting their reality it will not suffice to
be told that we are all familiar with volitions.
Curiously, none of the writers thus far discussed
offers argument to substantiate the view that volitions
exist, let alone underlie all our actions. They appear
content to commit themselves to volition and thereby treat
its occurrence as undisputed fact. Presumably, they could
see little reason for doubting the reality of volition,
although the justification for such a belief is not
immediately evident.
James's approach may have held more promise for
securing a ground for the concept of volition. After all, if
we are all familiar with such occurrences then surely
introspection is the way to verify their existence. Yet,
James's account helps little in establishing that volitions
exist. If anything, James is uncertain of the precise nature
that such a creature should have, and ends up with a
complicated, convoluted and clearly unorthodox account of
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the part volitions play in action.
There is little doubt that James's introspective
abilities are as good as anyone elses, so we can only
suppose that introspection is of no practical aid in
isolating volitions. The nature and existence of volitions,
would, one assumes, be far less contentious if we were
indeed all conscious of such a feature. Although there is
room to argue that the lack of concensus on volition
indicates that many fail to appreciate what they are
actually aware of, more plausibly, we might suppose that we
are not aware of volitions at all.
On this point, Melden aptly notes that
"unless I can recognise... [volition] by having
some description in mind that applies to such acts
and only to these, it is at best a simple begging
of the question to insist that all of us really
understand what is being referred to; in fact it
is an implied charge of dishonesty directed at
those who refuse to give their assent." (Melden,
1961:47)
Evidently then, what is required is argument rather
than assumptions that volitions exist and have a role to
play in action.
An argument to this effect can be gleaned from the
writings of H.A. Prichard, who in many respects advocated an
orthodox volitionism. In particular, Prichard's volitionism
is orthodox in that, unlike James, he construes volition as
a ground for voluntary movement. Thus, for Prichard,
'willing' is something in which we all indulge whenever we
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perform an action. Furthermore, like the earlier volition
theorists, Prichard regarded volition as a part of common
experience. He describes willing as 'an activity of whose
nature we are dimly aware in doing the action and of which
we can become more clearly aware by reflecting on it'
(Prichard, 1969b:189). In addition, 'while we know the
general character of that to which we refer when we use the
word 'willing', this character is sui generis and so
incapable of being defined, i.e., of having its nature
expressed in terms of the nature of other things' (op. cit.,
p.189). These Prichardian views are clearly reminiscent of
Locke, Hume and Reid (See Chapter 3, Section (1)).
From many of Prichard's comments it appears that he
does not feel obliged to prove the existence of volitions.
Thus, he remarks, that when we think of ourselves as having
done some action, we are thinking of ourselves as having
performed an activity of some kind, and 'it almost goes
without saying, a mental activity of a certain kind...'
(p.189). Prichard supports this remark with further comment:
"that we are aware of its special nature is shown
by our unhesitatingly distinguishing it from other
special mental activities such as thinking,
wondering, and imagining." (p.189)
While we may unhesitatingly accord that thinking, wondering
and imagining do not fit the role that is purportedly played
by volition (or willing), it is not so evident as Prichard
suggests, that willing is an activity on a par with these
familiar 'mental' pastimes.
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We may be surprised then to find Prichard drawing the
conclusion that 'where we think of ourselves as having done
a certain action, the kind of activity of which we are
thinking is that of willing." This may surprise us on two
counts. Firstly, that the existence of willing be introduced
as a conclusion, and secondly, that he should conclude not
merely that willing takes place when we act, but that our
acting consists in this willing.
In the present chapter, I shall go into the detail of
Prichard's argument to see why he advocates the existence of
volition, and also why he adopts the unorthodox view that
willings are the only actions we perform.
The primary source for Prichard's views is his article
'Acting, willing, desiring', in which he presents ideas
developed from his earlier article 'Duty and ignorance of
fact'. From the former we can discern the following main
theses:
(1) The thing meant by an action is an activity.
(2) The agent's activity does not consist in causing a
change, nor in bringing something about.
(3) The agent's activity consists in willing.
(4) To act is really to will something.
These represent the main steps in Prichard's argument. For
convenience of reference, I shall term them theses (1) - (4)
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respectively.
Thesis (3^) : The thing meant by an action is an activity.
Prichard offers little to clarify this view. He claims
that it is true 'whether we speak of a man's action in
moving his hand, or of a body's action such as that of the
heart in pumping the blood, or that of one electron in
repelling another' (p.188). Presumably, what he has in mind
is that in every such case, the initial change (activity) is
required in order to produce the result which is the hand
movement, the heart beat, or repelling of an electron. This
is underlined by his comment that in acting, we cause-
something (op. cit.).
Support for thesis (1) comes from the causal analysis
of action which Prichard discusses in 'Duty and ignorance of
fact'. Here lie considers action as 'bringing something
about':
"we have in the end to allow that we mean by ['an
action' or 'doing something'] ...originating,
causing, or bringing about the existence of
something, viz. some new state of an existing
thing or substance, or more shortly, causing a
change of state of some existing thing."
(Prichard,1969a:19)
"by 'moving our hand' we mean causing a change of
place of our hand; by 'posting a letter' we mean
bringing about that a letter is in pillar-box; and
so on." (loc. cit.)
Since doing an action is thus conceived of as 'bringing
something about' it is easy to see why it should be analysed
in terms of an activity. When the heart pumps blood, or an
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electron is repelled, something is brought about, and this
is to be explained in terms of some activity which does the
bringing about, or is responsible for the resultant change.
Thus, logically, whenever some change C is brought about,
there must have been some activity A, the occurrence of
which brings about, and thereby explains the change C.
Since action is to be analysed on a par with such
changes, Prichard naturally concludes that whenever someone
acts, e.g., moves his arm, doing this action must consist in
some activity which has the agent's arm movement as an
effect. So, it is on the basis of this causal analysis of
action as the bringing about of some change that Prichard
can derive the thesis that to act is to perform an activity.
Thesis (2^) : The agent's activity does not consist in
causing a change nor in bringing about an effect.
Prichard's main argument for this view is found in
'Acting, willing, desiring', where he asks, 'is there such
an activity as originating or causing a change in something
else?' (p.188). He concludes that there is no such activity
on the grounds that the activity presupposed in any instance
of causing or originating must be distinct from the causing
or originating. Thus, neither a man's activity in moving his
hand, nor the sun's activity in attracting the earth jij3 nor
consists in causing the respective movement. Although it may
not be clear, what underlies Prichard's argument are the
distinctions between cause, causing, and effect. Thus, we
would say that when the earth is attracted by the sun, the
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effect is the earth's movement toward the sun. The cause is
something to do with the sun; it is something the sun does,
presumably associated with its mass, that is cause of the
earth's movement. Still, this cause, which Prichard would
call the activity, is not identical to the causing of the
earth's movement. The causing, originating, or bringing
about embodies both cause and effect. There is no instance
of the sun causing the earth to move, unless the sun has
'acted' so as to result in some earthly movement. And since
the only candidate for 'activity' is the cause in such a
sequence, and since this is clearly not the same as the
causing, Prichard's point is established. The activity in
any instance of action is not the originating or causing of
the change in question.
From such considerations it follows that the activity
will be identified with whatever is the cause in a sequence
describable as the originating, causing, or bringing about
of some change. Hence, in Prichard's example, the agent's
activity when he performs the action of moving his hand, is
whatever the agent does to produce the hand movement. In
other words, what the agent does, is the cause of his
movement. The next question that arises is how Prichard
concludes that this activity (the cause in action) is to be
identified as 'willing'.
(2) AGENT'S ACTIVITY
Thesis (3) : The agent's activity consists in willing.
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Clearly, this is a major progression in Prichard's
argument and as such it is far more contentious and faces
greater obstacles than the earlier theses. The main
consideration offered by Prichard relies on a distinction
which he draws between direct and indirect actions:
"we should distinguish those actions in doing
which we originated some new state directly from
those in which we did this only indirectly, i.e.
by originating directly some other state by
originating which we indirectly originated the
final state." (op. cit, p.187)
Prichard cites moving or turning one's head as an
example of direct action. Curing a toothache by taking
aspirin, and killing someone by exploding a charge
underneath him, are his examples of indirect action. The
latter variety is the easier to grasp since we are familiar
with doing one thing as a means to another, whether it be
swallowing aspirin to relieve pain, or scolding a child to
make him behave. Prichard admits that direct action is less
easily assimilated. On the face of it, moving one's head, or
raising one's arm are actions we perform directly; there are
no obvious deeds which one executes in order to move one's
head or raise one's arm. At the same time, moving one's body
is just the sort of action one would perform in order to
bring about actions which are thereby reasonably seen as
indirect. Imagine taking aspirin, curing a toothache,
improving a child's behaviour, or killing a friend, without
moving some part of one's body as a means to such an end.
Yet, according to Prichard, if challenged, we should have to
allow that even in these instances cited as direct actions,
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'we did not originate directly what the instances suggest
that we did, since what we did originate directly must have
been some new state or states of our nerve cells, of which
we are ignorant' (p.187).
The suggestion that one does not directly act in
executing a bodily movement may not give immediate cause for
concern. We can simply deem such actions indirect, like
curing a pain, or killing a friend. But we must remember
that not all actions can be indirect, for such actions can
only be performed if there is some direct action which is
done as a means to the indirect. In Prichard's words,
"we should insist that in doing any action we
must have originated something directly, since
otherwise we could not originate anything
indirectly." (loc. cit.)
So, if we are content to describe our voluntary
movements as indirect actions we are committed to supposing
that we perform such movements by doing something else,
where this other deed merits the title of 'direct action'.
On the defensive, we might ask Prichard why our
voluntary bodily movements should not qualify as direct
actions. His answer, already mentioned, is that we must
admit that in these circumstances what we originate directly
is something other than such movements. This something is
performed as a means to the execution of our voluntary
movements. As candidate for what we do directly in such
instances, Prichard cites 'some new state or states of our
nerve-cells', but why should we consider this direct action?
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Prichard's reasons are clear. In order to move one's limbs
or any other part of one's body, it is necessary that
changes take place within the body itself. Consequently, if
one is to move one's limbs then one must bring about the
internal bodily changes necessary for this movement. It
would seem to follow therefore, since I must affect such
internal bodily changes in order to move my body, that my
voluntary bodily movements cannot be direct actions.
Instead, my affecting the necessary internal changes will
qualify as direct. Unless, that is, there is some earlier
change which must be brought about in order to bring about
these later internal changes necessary for bodily movements.
Let us grant for the moment that Prichard is able to
establish that there are such direct actions, of whose
precise nature we are probably ignorant. How does this
assist his thesis that whenever we act our activity consists
in willing?
For the next step in Prichard's progression we must
return to 'Duty and ignorance of fact', where he points out
that where we think of some past action of ours as indirect,
that is, as one in which we indirectly brought about some
particular thing, e.g. curing someone's illness,
"we think it fair to ask ' How did we do the
action?' We take the question to have the
intelligible meaning: 'What was that by the direct
production of which we indirectly produced what we
did?'; and we can give some sort of answer. But we
can also ask a question verbally similar, where we
think of some past action as one in which we
directly brought about something, where e.g. I
think of myself as having moved my hand... In such
a case, of course, the question cannot be of the
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same kind, because ex hypothesi I am not thinking
of the action as one in which I caused some
particular thing by causing something else, so I
cannot be asking: 'By directly causing what did I
cause what I did?' The legitimate question is:
'What was the activity by performing which I
caused my hand to move?" (p.32)
By this line of argument Prichard suggests that
whenever we execute a direct action we do so by performing
some activity which brings it about. This may seem
paradoxical. After all, how can we suppose that my raising
my arm is a direct action if I must perform some other
activity in order to raise my arm? Does this not indicate
that this putative direct action of arm raising is really
indirect?
Here it is easy to misunderstand Prichard's conception
of direct action. We must bear in mind that he has analysed
action as bringing about some change. This means that, while
for indirect action such an action is the result of a
bringing about, i.e. of another action, direct action is not
the result of any other bringing about. Nevertheless, direct
action is still a bringing about. This means that raising
one's arm, if construed as direct, will be the bringing
about of one's arm rising. Hence, it is required by this
analysis of action that even direct action be construed as
involving an activity which brings about some change. It is
for this reason that Prichard talks of performing an
activity in order to bring about a direct action. Despite
initial appearances to the contrary, this does no violence
to the directness of such an action.
Granted that the execution of a direct action involves
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the performance of an activity in order to bring about some
change, we are naturally led to inquire after the nature of
this activity. Not surprisingly, Prichard has an answer to
this query:
"an answer would be 'willing the existence of the
movement." (p.32)
This would be the case where we regard moving one's hand as
a direct action, but we have seen that Prichard acknowledges
that even in such instances we have to allow that we did not
directly originate what the instances suggest that we did.
(p.187) Perhaps we should regard appropriate internal bodily
changes as direct actions, rather than our voluntary bodily
movements. Would this affect Prichard's resort to willing as
the activity involved in direct action?
Apparently Prichard is not over concerned with deciding
4
where to draw the line which demarcates direct from indirect
actions. What is important for his purposes is the principle
that 'in doing any action we must have originated something
directly' (p.187). This principle, combined with the
analysis of action as performing an activity, results in the
need to locate an activity which is fundamental to direct
action. Clearly, even if we draw the line of direct action
at the level of bodily movements, the required activity must
be more fundamental than the movements which are its
results. Yet, if we make this assumption, Prichard faces the
possible objection that the activity in direct action is not
willing, but the internal bodily activity necessary for the
bodily movements which we are considering to be direct
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actions.
The problem is that if we regard voluntary bodily
movements as direct actions then, following Prichard, we
must suppose there to be some activity essential to these
actions, which brings about or results in these bodily
movements. Furthermore, since these direct actions are of
the level of overt movements it should follow that the
related activity will be of a different order from such
movements. This gives some plausibility to the view that
internal bodily changes necessary for our voluntary bodily
movements should be construed as the activity in question.
Certainly this may accord with Prichard's contention that'
'when we think of ourselves as having moved our hand, we are
thinking of ourselves as having performed an activity of a
certain kind... an activity of whose nature we are dimly
aware in doing the action and of which we can become more
clearly aware by reflecting on it' (p.189).
In the face of such an alternative we may suppose that
it does not 'go without saying' that the activity performed
is 'a mental activity of a certain kind', viz. willing.
Nevertheless, there are difficulties involved in the view
that this activity consists in the internal bodily changes
necessary for our voluntary movements. We must admit that it
is primae facie implausible to place the locus of action at
the level say, of muscular contractions. Certainly, this
would make it more appropriate to say 'My muscles raised my
arm' rather than 'I raised my arm', but this would not
accord with what we take ourselves to mean by 'I raise my
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arm' .
Additionally, there is a crucial objection to
construing these internal changes as our activity in direct
action. It is accepted that such changes are necessary for
our bodily movements, but not only for these movements when
we execute an action. Thus, if my arm is raised in an
instance which is not an action, the same internal changes
must occur if my arm is to rise. This means that the locus
of action cannot lie with such internal changes for their
occurrence or non-occurrence cannot serve to distinguish
genuine cases of voluntary movement from mere bodily
movements (non-actions). So we must find some alternative to
fit Prichard's scheme, which can be considered an activity
necessary for instances of action, and only instances of
action. Returning to Prichard's way of posing the problem,
the guestion may be put: 'What was the activity by
performing which I caused my hand to move?'
While Prichard is quick to adopt the view that this
activity is the mental activity of willing, we should note
that he has no logically tight move to this conclusion. He
makes no obviously valid deduction to the view that the
activity in question is that of willing. Indeed, in response
to the question 'What was the activity by performing which I
caused my hand to move?' he notes that ' an answer would be
'Willing the existence of the movement'' (p.32; my
emphasis). The most that can be said for Prichard's solution
is that it looks like an apposite answer to the problem
question, but in the absence of any viable alternative his
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response should not be undervalued. Certainly, willing would
constitute an activity, and it would not bear the same
relation to my arm movement in case this movement was
non-actional. Prichard would thereby analyse 'I raise my
arm' as 'I willed the occurrence of my arm rising, which
willing resulted in my arm rising.' Which is to say that my
arm raised because I willed it to rise. Prima facie at
least, this does no violence to our ordinary conception of
what is involved in doing such an action. So, Prichard's
answer fits the bill, and what is more it has no obvious
rival. This makes it unreasonable not to accept the
plausibility of thesis (3), viz. the activity we perform
whenever we do an action, is that of willing.
We have seen that in order to substantiate thesis (3),
Prichard relies on the idea that we can sensibly ask of our
voluntary movements, how they were performed. Construing
these voluntary movements as direct implies that there is no
other action by doing which one brings about one's
movements. Consequently, the sense which Prichard attributes
to the above question is 'by performing which activity does
one cause such movements?' This, in turn, justifies our
seeking an activity which is logically prior to the
movement.
(^) MELDEN AGAINST PRICHARD
In "Free Action", Melden argues that the question form
'How did one do X?' cannot be appropriately applied to
voluntary movements. His reason for this view is that when
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one, for example, raises one's arm, one does not do so 'by
performing another doing which has the motion of one's arm
as effect, one simply raises one's arm' (Melden, 1961:65).
This is apparently in direct opposition to Prichard's view
that 'what I called 'moving my hand'... consisted in a
particular activity of another sort of which the change of
place of my hand was an effect' (p.32-33).
It is not easy to pinpoint the precise conflict between
Melden and Prichard on this issue. Thus, for example, Melden
comments that 'I raise my arm not by doing anything else at
all. I simply exercise my primitive ability to raise my arm'
(op. cit., p.39). But if this encapsulates his point of view
he may yet accord with Prichard. While Prichard maintains
that in raising one's arm there is some activity one
performs that results in the arm raising, he would accept
that raising one's arm is a primitive ability. To describe
raising one's arm thus is not to deny the Prichardian thesis
of activity-causing-movement, rather it is to reiterate the
view that voluntary movements are direct actions, which in
turn is to say that in performing such an action, there is
no other action by means of which one performs the voluntary
movement. This is what Melden is at pains to emphasise when
he notes that 'when I move my arm there is no Y that I do by
means of which this X (moving my arm) is done.' (p.39) So
long as X is construed as the agent's action (voluntary
movement) this merely restates Prichard's characterisation
of direct action. The immediate appearance of conflict
between Melden and Prichard arises from the claim that when
I perform a direct action I perform some activity which
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results in my movement. Thus, when I move my arm, there is
some Y that I do whereby this X (my arm movement) is
produced. We might term this the Prichardian thesis P.
It is evident both to Prichard and Melden that my
action of raising my arm is not something I do by doing
something else. Nevertheless, it will not do to treat the
conflict between the two as merely apparent, for Melden does
specifically depy P. Thus, he states categorically that
"no attempt to bridge the gap between the
physiological happening described as the movement
of one's arm and the action described as moving
one's arm by any device such as the introduction
of causes, mental or physiological will do. One
does not move one's arm by performing another
doing which has the motion of one's arm as effect-
one simply raises one's arm." (Melden, 1961:65)
Melden's procedure for arguing against the application
of the question form 'how does one do X?' to voluntary
movements is to discount two likely responses to this query.
Firstly, he vehemently denies that one raises one's arm by
contracting certain muscles. This is not a view with which
Prichard would be associated, though he would agree that the
muscle contractions are causally necessary for the bodily
movement. Thereafter, Melden argues that one cannot raise
one's arm by willing, because the concept of volition does
not coherently permit such a view. So, the Prichardian
approach is rejected because of the 'logical incoherence
involved in the doctrine of acts of volition' (p.52). Thus,
Melden's case for rejecting Prichard's thesis P, depends
upon criticisms forwarded against the concept of volition
93
itself. Since the viability and coherence of volition is to
be considered in detail in later chapters, we shall have
occasion then to discuss Melden's arguments (see Chapters 5
and 9).
While Melden may be in part justified in his view that
'philosophical talk about acts of volition involves a mare's
nest of confusions' (p.55), we need not suppose that these
are confusions that cannot be cleared up. So, in lieu of our
detailed discussion of the nature of volition, we can set
aside Melden's misgivings over Prichard's analysis of
action, and return again to Prichard.
Before passing on to Prichard's thesis (4), we might
ask whether there are likely to be any further objections to
his argument thus far. To review: we have considered how he
arrives at three theses, viz. (1) The thing meant by an
action is an activity; (2) The agent's activity does not
consist in causing some change; and (3) The agent's activity
consists in willing.
Thesis (1) is derived from the causal analysis of
action, via the idea that to do an action is to bring
something about, or cause some change. Like thesis (1),
thesis (2) follows from Prichard's analysis of what it is to
bring something about or cause some change. Interestingly,
thesis (3) is not derived with such strict logic. By
applying the analysis of action to direct actions Prichard
shows that in such cases there must be some activity of the
agent which is logically basic even to action we think of as
direct. Thereupon, in elucidation of what such activity
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might be, he suggests willing. It is largely the absence of
any other likely candidate that gives credence to Prichard's
suggestion. Apparently, some activity must 'underlie' every
instance of action, and must be somehow fundamental to such
instances. This activity will in fact constitute the locus
of action, for it will distinguish actions from all other
occurrences. This is the role traditionally played by the
concept of volition. It is not surprising then, that there
is no obvious opponent to fill the role.
From this, it appears that the only scope for doubting
Prichard's position is either to deny the causal analysis of
action as bringing about, and thence deny Prichard's notion'
of activity, or to suggest an alternative answer to his
question: 'what was the activity by performing which I
caused my hand to move?' If one gets so far as to pose this
question, it is very difficult to conceive of a more
apposite response than Prichard's own. Can we then find
cause to doubt the Prichardian analysis of action?
In a discussion of Prichard's theory of action (Aune,
1974), Bruce Aune anticipates an objection from those who
adhere to a concept of 'agent-causation'. Such adherents
will refuse to accept the analysis of 'doing an action' in
terms of an activity of the agent bringing about some
change, for this would be simply event-causation, to which
inanimate objects are susceptible. Yet if we construe 'doing
an action' other than in the sense of event-causation we
must suppose that the change is brought about not by some
activity of the agent, but, in some irreducible sense, by
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the agent himself.
Aune pinpoints the difficulty with this approach:
"to say that John... caused his hand to move...
is not to say that he was the irreducible cause of
his hand's motion; if he were, then, since he
existed yesterday, his hand should have moved the
same way yesterday too. After all, if A is the
irreducible cause of B, then whenever we have A,
we should have B as well. Clearly, if John did
move his hand at a certain time, then there must
have been something about him at the time that
accounts for the occurrence then, of his hand's
movement. In this respect the case of John does
not differ from that in which we say that an empty
car knocked over a lamppost: the car, like the
man, must 'do' something (in this case, strike the
post) that causes the result to occur." (p.101)
Prichard's contention that there is some activity present in
every case of bringing about, whether by an agent, an
electron, or the sun, is nothing more than a logical
consequence of our notion of causation. Clearly, the idea
that agents are irreducible causes when they act, is not a
serious rival as an analysis of agent's bringing things
about. Event-causality, with its activity requirement is far
more credible; which leaves us in a position to consider
Prichard's fourth thesis.
Thesis (4) : To act is really to will something.
(4) PRICHARD'S CONCLUSION
Before discussing how this thesis is arrived at, it is
worth noting the unusual implications of this view. If we
suppose, with Prichard, that to do an action is to will
something, this means that familiar examples of what we
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ordinarily regard as actions, such as raising one's arm, or
signalling a turn, turn out not to be actions at all. In
fact, we are left with the view that the only actions we
perform occur inside ourselves, for willing is not something
external to the agent. Prichard does acknowledge the unusual
content of this view. He envisages cases where an agent
performs an activity of willing, without this willing
causing any physical change, and notes that 'in such cases
our activity would not ordinarily be called an action'
(p.193). Although the oddity of Prichard's view is most
evident when we think of such examples of willing with no
physical results, Prichard adds that such activity is 'of
the same sort as what we ordinarily call and think of as an
action' (loc. cit.). Presumably this is his way of saying
that his analysis of doing an action as willing some change,
is what we really mean by acting, for it certainly is not
true that we ordinarily think of actions as things agents do
in their heads. Prichard would reply that the way in which
we ordinarily refer to actions takes account of the effects
that we suppose are produced by the activity of willing.
Thus he notes that
"what I called moving my hand really consisted in
setting myself [willing] to move it, and that I
referred to this activity as moving my hand
because I thought it had a change of place of my
hand as an effect." (p.32)
In this way Prichard may explain the fact that we find
his account a little peculiar. It is simply that we tend to
refer to our actions in terms of the effects of our activity
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of willing, and so are apt not to appreciate that the
willing is the essential ingredient.
One might seek to defend Prichard on this matter. It
might be said that what we ordinarily think of as actions
are not totally disqualified from being actions on
Prichard's scheme. They will still be actions of a sort.
Thus, posting a letter, scolding a child, and raising one's
arm would be indirect actions. And since indirect actions
are dependent upon the stricter sense of direct action, this
is the sense in which the familiar actions are not actions,
they are simply not direct actions.
The trouble with this defence is that it does not
accord with Prichard's views. If he were to say that our
familiar actions were simply not direct actions, and this is
all that is meant by saying that willing is action, this
would imply that willing is direct action; but Prichard does
not believe this to be the case. Willing is not itself
direct action, rather it is the activity one performs in
doing an action directly. Thus, Prichard supposes that
voluntary bodily movements are direct. Apparently, in
claiming that to act is really to will something he denies
the status of action to all except willings; thereby, he
excludes both direct and indirect actions.
One strange implication of these facts is that Prichard
denies his initial position that things done directly or
indirectly are still actions. Furthermore, what he now
wishes to call action, namely, willing, does not figure at
all in the scheme of direct and indirect actions, which
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leaves one wondering how it can be legitimately classed as
action. We shall have occasion to raise this query again
later.
Returning for the present to the detail of Prichard's
thesis (4), we can see that it is related in important
respects to what has gone before. In fact, thesis (4) can be
seen as a conclusion which follows from Prichard's earlier
theses (1) and (3). Thus, given that the thing meant by an
action is an activity (thesis (1)), and that the agent's
activity consists in willing (thesis (3)), there can be no
denying the conclusion that the agent's action consists in
willing (thesis (4)). This also appears to match Prichard's'
method of arriving at the view expressed in this last
thesis. In consequence, any misgivings we have with thesis
(4) must reflect on the details of theses (1) and (3).
I confess to finding Prichard's thesis (4) intuitively
implausible and would suggest that his strange view arises
from his failure to note an equivocation in connection with
thesis (1). Let us think again about the propriety of the
first thesis.
In particular, it is not clear to me how Prichard
establishes that the agent's activity in performing an
action, i_s his action. Does he have any grounds for
asserting such an identity?
From our discussion of thesis (1) we have seen that
Prichard supports this view by reference to the causal
analysis of action. Thus, considering action as causing some
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change, or bringing something about, he is able to deduce
that in acting (causing a change; bringing something about)
there must be some activity of the agent which results in
the change or the thing brought about. This is derived from
the nature of 'bringing something about1, or of 'causing a
change', such that whenever some change C is brought about
(caused), there must be some activity A, which does the
bringing about (causes), and is thus responsible for the
resultant change.
It is with this in mind that Prichard concludes that
'unquestionably the thing meant by 'an action' is an
activity', for he notes that 'this is so whether we speak of
a man's action in moving his hand, or of a body's action
such as that of the heart in pumping the blood, or that of
one electron in repelling another' (p.188).
It does seem to follow from Prichard's analysis of
action, that, as he puts it, 'When, e.g., we think of
ourselves as having moved our hand, we are thinking of
ourselves as having performed an activity of a certain
kind...' (p.189). But is it clear that this conclusion is
equivalent to thesis (1), viz., that the thing meant by an
action is an activity? I would suggest that there is reason
for thinking not.
To see this we must pay close attention to the analysis
of action in terms of 'bringing something about' or 'causing
some change'. From this analysis it follows that in action
there is some activity performed by the agent. But it cannot
be concluded that the agent's action simply jus this
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activity.
When I raise my arm, I perform an action. My action is
that of raising my arm. I describe my action thus, because
it involved my arm rising. My raising my arm must 'include'
this arm rising, otherwise it would be simply false to say
that I raised my arm. Just as one cannot make an omelette
without eggs, so one cannot raise an arm without an arm
rising. Yet from Prichard's analysis of action we must
accept that in doing such an action as raising my arm, I
perform some activity. Clearly, this activity does not
'include' the arm rising. Since the activity I perform
cannot 'include' this arm rising, it follows that my action"
is not identical with my activity.
In response, it will not do to say that while my action
of raising my arm is not identical with my activity, yet the
activity is fundamental to the action of arm raising, hence,
since I cannot raise my arm without performing this activity
of willing, this activity is the more fundamental action.
The trouble with this is that we have no reason from
Prichard's analysis, to treat this activity as an action.
Furthermore, we arrive at the existence of such an activity
on the assumption that what we analysed was itself an
action. So, at best, this activity can be a component of
one's action. How can it qualify as action in its own right?
This argument could be put in another way. According to
the analysis of action, the relation of the agent's activity
to his arm's rising is that of cause to effect. Given that
the requisite activity takes place, it is a matter of
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(contingent) causal necessity that the arm rise. Yet, from
the description of the action as raising one's arm, given
the occurrence of this action, it is a matter of logical
necessity that the arm rise. Indeed, by equating the agent's
action with his activity Prichard would be left with the
oddity that the agent could 'raise his arm', in the sense of
activity, without his arm rising.
A resolution of these difficulties may be sought by
noting, with Bruce Aune, that verbs have different meanings
in their transitive and intransitive uses. Thus:
"In 'Y's hand moves'... [the verb] connotes a
motion of Y's hand, but in 'X moves Y's hand' it
alludes to an event or activity that causes Y's
hand to move. Prichard's contention is that when
'moves' connotes an action, it is used in the
latter sense: it means 'does something that causes
a movement'." (op. cit., p.99)
Applying this to raising one's arm, Prichard may say that
'raising' means 'does something that causes a rising'. But
does this entitle him to identify the agent's action of
raising his arm with the activity in question? So long as
the agent's activity is construed as that of producing a
particular effect, such as an arm rising, this seems
appropriate. After all, if my activity is producing the
effect of my arm rising, then it follows (logically) that my
arm must rise. Hence, the logic of the agent's activity thus
construed, matches that of the action described as raising
his arm. This identification of activity with action looks
promising.
The only trouble with this interpretation is that it is
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not the view Prichard adopts. He is not prepared to describe
producing an effect (causing or bringing about some change)
as an activity. Thus,
"though we think that some man in moving his
hand, or that the sun in attracting the earth,
causes a certain movement, we do not think that
the man's or the sun's activity _i£5 or consists in
causing the movement." (p.188)
For Prichard the agent's activity is not his causing or
bringing something about, his activity is whatever he does
that causes or brings about some effect. The problem is that
Prichard himself seems prepared to describe the agent's
action as that of bringing about some effect. Thus, he'
admits that a man in moving his hand causes a certain
movement (p.188). Indeed, it is this initial stance that
enables him to conclude that in acting one performs an
activity. Significantly, it should also follow from this
analysis that the activity one performs in doing an action
is not identical to the action one performs. Rather it is a
component of one's action. The action consists in bringing
about some effect by means of such an activity; from this we
cannot conclude that the action Jjs this activity. It follows
therefore, that Prichard is misled in his identification of
agent's action with his activity. Though it may be true that
bringing about or causing some change is not an activity,
one should conclude from this that one's action are not
one's activities. While on the face of it this may sound
paradoxical, it is not problematic if properly understood.
Before discarding thesis (1), and thereby thesis (4),
103
we might ask whether there is any other reason why Prichard
should believe that the thing meant by an action is an
activity. This is difficult to answer from a consideration
of Prichard's writings, since he does not discuss the issue
in any detail. On this point Aune is also restrained:
"I cannot say exactly what Prichard meant by the
word 'activity', though he no doubt restricted its
application to events and occurrences that, in
contrast to what might be called 'passivities',
are regarded as causes rather than effects." (op.
cit., p.98)
This accords with Prichard's comments that an obligation
must be an obligation to be active as opposed to be affected.
(p.31). But why suppose that actions are such activities? As
we have seen, it is one thing to say that in acting one must
be active (perform some activity), and another thing
entirely to say that to act simply _is to perform some
activity.
Perhaps a rationale for Prichard's view can be sought
in the idea that it is only in his activity that the agent
is truly active. Only here is he in control; after all, the
rest is happenstance or causal upshot of his activity. We
might suppose therefore that it is only at the level of
one's activity that agency is exercised. Here alone is the
domain of agent's control. Would this justify our treating
the agent's activity as the 'genuine' action?
Certainly, it appears that only at the level of willing
(activity) can one be sure of doing what one wants to do.
Beyond this activity, the agent has no influence over what
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happens. Whether his body moves, or his arrow hits the
bull's-eye is dependent upon causal vagaries outside of his
control. Even so, is it plausible to construe the agent's
activity as under his control? There may be a tendency to
equate what the agent can do at will, with what he can
control, but the agent's activity is not something that he
can do 'at will*. Although presumably according with his
desires, aims, and intentions, the agent's volition is not
something over which he has control in this sense. It is not
something he can do if he wills, for he cannot will to will.
Such descriptions apply to capacities beyond the level of
will. Thus, one can have more or less control over the
direction in which one's arrow flies when shot from our bow,
and have influence over the degree of movement in one's arm
when one raises it. But it only makes sense to talk of
control or influence where this can be a matter of degree.
It is only where there is need to take account of vagaries
such as external causal influences, that we can talk of
exercising control over what happens. Thus, one can have
control over firing one's arrow only if there is some
tendency, attributable to influences outside of our will, to
miss one's target. Yet at the level of one's activity of
willing, one cannot be more or less successful or accurate,
hence, willing (this activity) is not something one
controls. This is not the domain of the agent's ability to
influence events, rather, this domain covers the outcome of
such activity, and concerns one's ability to make what one
produces accord with one's wishes. So, Prichard's wish to
equate action with activity cannot gain support from such a
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view.
What then are the lessons that we can learn from
Prichard's account of action? The main points are Prichard's
causal analysis of action as bringing about, which entails
that in doing an action one performs an activity whereby
some change or effect is produced. Most significant of all
is that this account gives us reason to believe in volition,
for willing is the obvious candidate for the activity one
performs in doing an action.
It is important to stress that Prichard has not,
strictly speaking, given us an argument to prove the
existence of volition, Rather, he gives us reason to suppose
that volitions (willings) occur, and underlie all our
actions. This is important, because if, as I shall argue,
volitions are not items of common experience but theoretical
postulates, the most that can be achieved by argument is to
render such postulation reasonable.
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CHAPTER 5_ : VOLITIONS AS ACTIONS
(I) ACTS OF VOLITION
Although considerations from Prichard's analysis of
action make it reasonable to posit volition as fundamental
to action, there remain queries as to the precise nature of
volition. Already, we have had occasion to challenge the
traditional view that volition is a conscious introspectible
element in action. In supposing it essential to action,
puzzles arise as to the status of volition; whether volition
is itself action, and the relation of volition to familiar'
examples of action; in particular, whether actions are
events caused by volition. It is time to delve deeper into
these issues, since each proves problematic for orthodox
volitionism.
The first trouble with volition is that it is
represented as being an executive act. It is what we do
initially when we want to do something else. So, if we are
to raise an arm, open a door or sink a submarine, these
actions require that we first will to bring about such
consequences.
According to Ryle:
"Volitions have been postulated as special acts,
or operations, 'in the mind', by means of which a
mind gets its ideas translated into facts. I think
of some state of affairs which I wish to come into
existence in the physical world, but, as my
thinking and wishing are unexecutive, they require
the mediation of a further executive mental
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process. So I perform a volition which somehow
puts my muscles into action." (Ryle, 1949:62)
This accurately represents Prichard's account of the will:
"When, e.g., we think of ourselves as having
moved our hand, we are thinking of ourselves as
having performed an activity of a certain kind, an
activity of whose nature we are dimly aware in
doing the action and of which we can become more
clearly aware by reflecting on it. And that we are
aware of its special nature is shown by our
unhesitatingly distinguishing it from other
special mental activities such as thinking,
wondering, and imagining. If we ask 'what is the
word used for this special kind of activity?1 the
answer it seems has to be 'willing'." (Prichard,
1969b:189)
Similarly, Hume states that 'the mind wills a certain event:,
immediately another event, unknown to ourselves, and totally
different from the one intended is produced: This event
produces another equally unknown: Till at last, through a
long succession, the desired event is produced' (Hume,
Enquiry, p.66)
So volitions are seen as special acts by means of which
we perform ordinary everyday actions such as raising an arm,
opening a door or sinking a submarine. They are special, and
differ from these more familiar actions by being executive.
Thus, to perform any ordinary action we have first to
perform an act of volition.
But this is peculiar, since volitions are supposed to
make sense of the distinction between actions and other
events. How can volitions fill this logical role if they
themselves are construed as actions?
If an event qualifies as an action through being
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produced by a volition and volitions, in turn, are
themselves actions, then they too must be produced by
volitions, which being actions, must be produced by further
volitions, and so on. This leads to an unacceptable regress,
such that no volitions, and hence, no actions ,could ever
occur, for they would require the prior completion of an
infinite regression of volitions.
Can this problem be overcome? There seem to be two
available strategies. Either we deny that volitions are
themselves actional, or we characterise them as actions by
some criterion other than that of 'produced by a volition'.
The difficulty with the latter approach is that it
leaves us with a less than full account of the nature of
action. In trying to understand the difference between
actions and non-actions it suggests that the former are
produced by volitions, but there are some actions, namely
volitions, which are not so produced. This means that we do
not know how all actions so qualify, for we do not know what
makes a volition an action; hence the mystery has only been
moved one step further back.
Unfortunately, the temptation here is to have recourse
to indefinables, as when Prichard adds:
"we also have to admit that while we know the
general character of that to which we refer when
we use the word 'willing', this character is sui
generis and so incapable of being defined, i.e. of
having its nature expressed in terms of the nature
of other things." (loc. cit.)
It seems that the 'general character' of volition that we
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can know is that it gives rise to other actions, but the
aspect of its character that we cannot comprehend is what
makes it itself actional. Certainly, to avoid the regress of
volitions producing volitions, we would have to understand
the nature of volition 'in terms of the nature of other
things'. The trouble is that to deny that such understanding
is possible simply leaves the problem unsolved, and must
lead us to ask why we should regard volition as an act in
the first place. V7hy not adopt the alternative strategy and
deny that volitions are actions?
The obvious response is to say that volitions occur
first in the sequence of things that we do. As Hume notes,
we will, and eventually it comes about that the state of
affairs desired is produced. In other words, volition is a
means to the action that we wish to perform. So, most
ordinary actions are performed 'indirectly1, by first
performing some other action, namely a volition, which we do
directly. This is why Prichard recommended that we should
"...distinguish those actions in doing which we
originate some new state directly from those in
which we did this only indirectly, i.e. by
originating directly some other state, by which we
indirectly originated the final state." (op.cit.,
p.187)
He adds that
"what we... originate directly must have been
some new state or states... of the nature of which
we are ignorant [though] we should insist that in
doing any action we must have originated something
directly, since otherwise we could not originate
anything indirectly." (loc.cit.)
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We shall have occasion to say more about this notion of
direct action in the following chapter, in the meantime it
is important to note that it is this 'originating directly1
that Prichard calls 'willing'. Thereby, he argues that in
order to perform any action we must perform an act of will,
for acts of will are the only actions that we can perform
directly.
Here we have reason for supposing that volitions are a
species of action. We need something we can describe as
'direct action', and clearly, we do not will by first
performing some other action, nor indeed, do we will to
will. We will directly, and since an act of will is prior to'
every other action, in volition, we have our 'direct
action'.
Of course, we have already seen that this move leaves
us with actions, namely volitions, which qualify as action
differently from all other actions. For volitions are not
produced by volitions. But is Prichard's argument a good
one? It invokes the supposition that volitions are
themselves actions, in particular, direct actions, but must
we accept the need for such actions?
Clearly, there are many things we do for which we must
employ other actions as means. Thus, to use Prichard's
examples, we may cure our toothache by swallowing aspirin,
and may kill another person by pressing a switch which
explodes a charge underneath him. But is this true of all
ordinary actions? What of such actions as moving or turning
one's head? In such cases, must we perform any other action
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in order to achieve the moving or head turning? It is not
obviously so. Certainly, many things must take place if I am
to move my head or raise my arm; various muscles must tense
in conjunction with the firing of a great many nerve cells,
amid hectic activity in select areas of one's brain. But
none of these would ordinarily qualify as actions by virtue
of the fact that they must occur if I am to move my head or
raise my arm. So, even if volitions must occur in order for
these actions to take place, the volitions do not for this
fact, qualify as actions.
It is not at all obvious that we must view all actions
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'outside the level of volitions' as indirect; performed by
means of acts of will. Neither is it obvious that volitions
must be construed as actional. Certainly, willing is
something I do, but this does not make it an action, for
many things are 'doings', whilst not being actions.
The main reason for supposing that volitions are not
actions remains: otherwise we are unable to explain what an
action is, as distinct from a mere happening. Melden puts
this point forcefully:
"Grant for a moment that an event labelled an
'act of volition' produces a muscle movement,
there is a difference surely between an act of
volition occurring and my performing such an
act... who can say that volitions may not occur
through no doing of the subject...? If so, willing
the muscle movement is not enough, one must will
the willing of the muscle movement, and so on ad
infinitum. Here someone may retort impatiently:
'When I will a muscle movement, I will it and that
is the end of the matter; there is no other doing
by virtue of which this act of volition gets done-
I simply will the movement of the muscle.' But
even if this reply were correct it would not serve
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to explain what an action is as distinguished from
a mere happening- it explains the 'action'... in
terms of an internal act of willing, and hence all
it does at best is to change the locus of action."
(Melden, 1961:45-6)
By not viewing volitions as actional we are relieved of
the need to explain how they qualify as actions, and we do
not lose the explanatory power of the concept of volition to
explain the difference between actions and other events. The
account still says that this difference lies in the fact
that actions are those produced by volitions, even if
volitions are not construed as actions in their own right.
But then isn't this simply a variety of causal theory, which
names volitions as the causes? If so, what is there to
choose between a non-volitional causal account, and one such
as we are considering?
(2) VOLITIONS AS CAUSES OF ACTIONS
The view under consideration is that actions are those
events produced by volitions. This clearly represents the
essential nature of actions as located in the events which
give rise to them; which is the characteristic of the causal
theory of action. For such a theory locates the essential
difference between actions and non-actions in the events
which cause them. If it presents actions as those events
which are caused by volitions the volition theory is a
variety of causal theory. But do volitions cause actions?
Ryle refers to
"the doctrine that overt actions... are results
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of counterpart hidden operations of willing..."
(Ryle, 1949:63)
Similarly, Richard Taylor states that
"according to the volitional theory an observable
act simply _is a bodily movement caused by a
certain kind of change in the mind called a
'volition'." (Taylor, 1966:66)
Interestingly, the view that volitions cause actions
seems to be confined to critics of the volition theory.
Prichard denies that what we will is an action. Instead, he
construes an action as the act of willing, or, perhaps, this
willing in conjunction with its effects. This means that the.
effect of willing could never be an action, for if an action
is the willing of something, then the willing of an action
'must in turn be the willing of the willing of something
else, and so on'. (Prichard, 1969b:64; this point is
clarified by Bruce Aune in Aune, 1974:110-111.)
Prichard is by no means alone in denying that volitions
cause actions. Lawrence Davis, in his book 'Philosophy of
Action', suggests that this false assumption gives rise to
many of the usual objections to the volition theory:
"Many have assumed that volitions are supposed to
precede and cause actions... Volition theories
seemed to say that an action such as moving one's
arm qualified as an action because the arm's
motion was caused by a volition. Why should this
genesis qualify the arm movement as an action?
Unless it was assumed that volitions were
themselves actions- it was accepted as plausible
that a limb motion caused by an action would
itself be an action; so it seemed that volitional
theories allowed no answer other than causation by
another volition. In this way volitional theories
of action were made to appear ridiculous, as
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requiring an infinite regress of volitions,
preceding any bodily movement that counted as an
action." (Davis, 1979:38-9)
We see that there are grounds for denying not only that
volitions are actions, but also that volitions cause
actions. As Hugh McCann correctly notes:
"volition cannot be conceived as merely
accompanying the actions performed by means of it.
Rather it is essential to them, being the key
element in the process necessary for the result of
those actions to count at all as changes brought
about by the agent." (McCann, 1974:467)
This idea, that volition is a key element in action, rather
than an accompanying cause, is an important one, to which we'
shall return shortly. First, a final comment on the mistaken
view that volitions cause actions.
By appealing to our familiar talk of willing it should
become evident that we do not suppose that actions are the
results of volition. In the arm raising example, there is
clearly a difference between my raising my arm and my arm
rising. The former is an action while the latter is merely a
bodily movement. What part would we suppose volition to have
in the production of each? What does one will to do in an
instance of raising one's arm? Does one will one's raising
one's arm? Surely not. We do not will ourselves to do
things, rather we will the things that we do. Hence, we do
not will ourselves to raise an arm; we will the arm to rise.
Clearly, the arm rising that we will is not the action of
raising one's arm, for, ex hypothesi, these are distinct. We
will the movement, not the action. In McCann's words:
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"what is willed must be that a change or sequence
of changes of certain types occur... [which] are
the projected results of the actions the agent
undertakes through the volitional act." (loc.
cit. )
We see therefore, that in this important respect, the
volition theory differs from the causal theory of action.
For volitions are not causes of actions. But what then is
the relation of volition to action if not that of cause to
effect? Looking again at raising one's arm, we suggest that
the volition causes the arm rising, not the action of
raising the arm. This movement of the arm stands in relation,
to the action of raising the arm as its 'result', which
relation holds between an action and the event which
logically must occur if the action is to be performed. This
idea (which derives from Von Wright, .1963: 39ff.) is
explained by Stoutland in his 'Basic actions and causality':
"M cannot have moved his arm unless his arm
moved; the event which is the movement of his arm
is the intrinsic result of the action which is his
moving his arm. Every action has an intrinsic
result, which is part of the way we specify the
action, but only part because an action cannot be
identified with any [such] event." (Stoutland,
1968:470)
Volitions cause those events which are 'results' of
actions, and thereby, performing an action consists in
bringing about such a result, viz. by willing the result one
thereby performs the action. On this account, actions are
still characterised by their relation to volitions, though
this relation in more complex than that envisaged by causal
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theorists, who wish to characterise action in terms of its
causal genesis in reasons, beliefs, desires and the like.
Now that we can see the key difference between the proposed
volitionism and the causal approach the next logical step is
to subject this volition theory to some scrutiny.
(2) THE STRUCTURE OF ACTION
On the account being outlined, actions are
characterised 'intrinsically' in terms of volitions.
Thereby, we have an instance of action whenever an
'action-result' is produced by a volition. In turn,
'action-result' is explained as a specific event whose-
occurrence is the logically necessary condition for the
occurrence of a specific action. Thus construed, an action
is never identical to its result, nor are actions what
volitions cause. An action is the bringing about (causally)
of an action-result, by volition. I have expressed this by
identifying the action with the causing of the result.
Though it may appear obscure, this notion of a causing
is quite straightforward. Whenever one event causes another,
a causing has occurred. The causing is the successful
bringing about of an effect by a cause. My story is that
actions form a subclass of the class of causings.
A criticism that strikes one immediately is that this
way of characterising actions suggests a logical
misdemeanour, for in the attempt to understand the nature of
action we are presented with a scheme to characterise
actions as the causing of action-results by volitions. Yet,
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how are we to understand 'action-result' if not in relation
to action? Furthermore, the concept of volition seems also
to invoke the concept of action, for what distinguishes one
volition from another if not the action that it is intended
to produce? Can we accept an account of action which is so
apparently circular and uninformative?
Although this looks to be a serious criticism, in fact
it does not cut very deep. The present account of action is
not circular in any way which is vitiating, nor indeed is it
uninformative.
Clearly, to comprehend 'action-result' we must,
appreciate what may count as action. But we already have
this appreciation. We know very well that arm movings,
window smashings, moon landings and the like, are
action-results, for we know that people have the facility to
move their arms, smash windows, and land on the moon. It is
this facility we call the ability to act. Our attempt to
elucidate action does not presuppose ignorance of what may
be regarded as actions, for the purpose is not to discover
what actions there are. It is not a search for actions, for
we have no doubt that actions exist; we know just where to
find them and can recognise them easily.
The main purpose of any philosophical theory of action
must be to clarify the nature of action. It must make
clearer what an action is, in terms which relate
specifically to what we ordinarily understand as action.
Consequently, it is entirely apt that such an enterprise
should use concepts which depend upon our prior
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understanding of the range of actions. Its aim is to analyse
actions; to arrive at a deeper understanding of what binds
together all the different things we call by this name.
Clearly, with this aim in mind, we may legitimately
employ concepts such as 'action-result' and 'volition', so
long as these are considered coherent notions in their own
right. That they relate to, and depend upon our familiar
understanding of action is only to be expected, and is no
indication of logical foul-play. Nevertheless, it remains to
be seen whether the key concepts employed in this enterprise
stand up to close scrutiny.
Since we are attempting to elucidate the nature of
action in terms of volition it follows that the difference
we suppose to exist between the mere occurrence of an event
and someone's producing such an event is to be explained in
relation to volition. In other words, the difference between
actions and mere happenings must be a difference in the
relation of these events to volitions. This seems to match
the volition theory as Melden conceives of it:
"What then is the difference between my muscles
being contracted and my contracting my muscles? A
familiar doctrine is that in the latter case I
will my muscles to move; in the former case there
are causes other than the act of volition. So I
move my muscles by performing an act of volition
which in turn produces a muscle movement."
(Melden, 1960:71; page reference to White, 1970.)
Against such a view Melden forwards a strong objection:
"Grant for a moment that an event labelled 'an
act of volition' produces a muscle movement; there
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is a difference surely between the occurrence of
such an event and my producing it. We saw that
there is a difference between the occurrence of a
muscle movement and my moving that muscle; ...But
equally there would seem to be a difference
between the occurrence of an act of volition and
my performing such an act. Who can say that
volitions may not occur through no doing of the
subject and in consequence of interior mental
events deep within the hidden recesses of the
self? If so, willing the muscle movement is not
enough; one must will the willing of the muscle
movement, and so on ad infinitum." (loc. cit.)
We shall see that this resembles a Rylean argument,
where a regress is claimed on the view that volitions are
themselves voluntary. In turn, it will emerge that Ryle's
regress argument fails, in the meantime we can consider
Melden's argument.
According to Melden, volitions are invoked to explain
the difference between the mere occurrence of events and the
performance of such events by an agent. Yet, if such a
difference may persist at the level of volitions then the
theory is further required to explain how the mere
occurrence of a volition differs from the performance of an
act of volition. Either this explanation is proferred in
terms of volitions, in which case a regress is invoked, or
the essential difference between actions and mere
occurrences remains unexplained.
It would appear from this argument that an explanation
of the difference between actions and mere events cannot be
provided in terms of volition. But this is so, only if we
grant that at the level of volitions there may be a
difference between the performance of such an event and its
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mere (non-performed) occurrence. Could we doubt this
difference?
If there are volitions, then they are presumably things
that we do; we talk of acts of volition after all. But as
acts they differ crucially from all other actions. Even if
we grant that volitions are a species of act, it does not
follow that a volition may occur as a mere (non-performed)
event. A good reason for supposing that volitions cannot
happen in such a fashion comes from considering
action-results.
When we consider any familiar action, raising one's
arm, for example, its action-result is easily appreciated,
viz. one's arm rising. And if we consider this result in
relation to the action we can see that the difference
between action and action-result is precisely the difference
between action and mere occurrence. Hence, when we ask about
the difference between action and mere event this is really
the same as asking about the relation of action to
action-result. In other words, it is to ask what is special
or different about those instances of action-results that we
want to deem as actions.
The answer I am offering to this question is that
actions are instances of action-results caused by volitions.
But then Melden asks about the occurrence of volitions
themselves. What of the difference between the performance
of a volition and its mere occurrence? To ask this is to ask
after the difference between the act of volition and its
result, and such a question can only make sense if we are
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able to distinguish between the supposed action and its
result. Otherwise, we have no distinction between action and
mere happening. So what of volitions? What is the
action-result of my willing to raise my arm? When I raise my
arm the action-result is the arm going up, so when I will to
raise my arm the action-result is what? My willing to raise
my arm? The occurrence of my willing to raise my arm? But
these are one and the same. The result of my willing cannot
be that a willing occurs, for the occurrence of my willing
simply i^s my willing.
Clearly, we cannot in this case distinguish between an
act of volition and its action-result. But what does this
prove? In effect, it shows that Melden's argument against
the volition account fails. For the problem that Melden
envisaged, that of explaining the difference between
performing an act of volition and the mere occurrence of
such a volition, does not arise. There can be no such
difference, hence, there is nothing to explain.
In defence of Melden, it may be thought that I have
overcome his argument by begging the question against him.
After all, Melden did not pose the problem in terms of
actions and action-results. He only asked about the
difference between actions and mere occurrences. Have I not
avoided this problem by foisting these different terms upon
him and manipulating them to suit my purpose?
In response, I can only reaffirm that the difference
between actions and mere occurrences is precisely the
difference between actions and their related results. Thus,
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in Melden's own example, he asks after the difference
between moving one's muscle and the mere occurrence of a
muscle movement. This is the same as asking the difference
between the action of moving one's muscle and its result,
for the result of such an action is the occurrence of just
such a muscle movement. Consequently, his question of the
difference between the mere occurrence of a volition and the
performance of an act of volition is justifiably considered
in terms of action and action-result, with the inevitable
conclusion that in this case, there can be no difference.
Anticipating the volitionist's response to his earlier
argument Melden adds the following:
"someone may retort impatiently: 'VThen I will a
muscle movement, I will it and that is the end of
the matter; there is no other doing by virtue of
which this act of volition gets done- I simply
will the movement.' But even if this reply were
correct it would not serve to explain what an
action is as distinguished from a mere happening.
It explains the 'action' of raising the arm in
terms of an internal action of willing, and hence
all it does at best is to change the locus of
action." (Melden, 1961:45-6)
Though I have not, I hope, 'retorted impatiently', I
certainly maintain that there is no other doing by virtue of
which one wills. Is it true then that my explanation does no
more than change the locus of action from raising one's arm
to the act of volition, thereby leaving unsolved the mystery
of the difference between action and mere happening?
On the contrary, this mystery does not remain on the
account offered, for their is no scope to distinguish
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between action and mere happening at the level of volition.
Furthermore, this does not simply conceal the problem for an
explanation is given as to what distinguishes actions from
mere happenings. The presence of volitions in actions
differentiates them from mere events.
We must note too that 'acts of volition' are
essentially different from other actions in not having
action-results. In fact, volitions do not qualify as actions
on the present account. For to be such, a volition would
have to be the causing of an action-result by another
volition, which it clearly is not. Hence, volitions are not
actions. This also means that in providing this form of
explanation for action we are not merely changing the locus
of agency. Neither are we left with the mystery of what
distinguishes actions from mere happenings at this level,
for their is no distinction between 'performing' a volition
and a volition 'merely happening'.
Yet this brings to light a further puzzle about
volition. Given that there is no distinction between
performing a volition and the volition's mere occurrence,
this raises the question of how volitions come about.. I have
suggested that there is nothing we do (in the sense of
action) whereby we bring about volition. So do volitions
simply happen? It seems reasonable to suppose that volitions
have natural origins, which may be physiological or
psychological in nature. Generally, when someone wills and
thereby acts, they have acted for some reason or other. Such
a factor may well be instrumental in producing volition.
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Nevertheless, though vague, the explanation of how volitions
occur is not crucial to our understanding of what counts as
action, for volitions are not themselves actions in need of
explanation. Of course it remains to be explained in what
sense willing is something we do. This shall emerge from the
following chapter. In the meantime, so long as we appreciate
the key role of volition in the nature of action we are in a
position to appreciate where action begins and what
differentiates actions from mere events. An action has been
performed wherever an action-result occurs as the effect of
volition. This production of an action-result by a volition
is what I have called 'a causing'; the successful bringing
about of an effect by a cause. Hence, actions are causings.
(4) ACTIONS, CAUSINGS AND EVENTS
Although this idea that actions are causings may be
unfamiliar, it has at least been considered and rejected by
Prichard who explicitly denies that causings can be actions.
According to Prichard, when we perform any action we
engage in an activity, but while causing a change may
require an activity, it is not itself an activity. Hence,
since actions are activities and causings are not, actions
cannot be causings. Prichard puts his case in the following
passage:
"Unquestionably the thing meant by 'an action' is
an activity. This is so whether we speak of a
man's action in moving his hand, or of a body's
action such as that of the heart in pumping the
blood, or that of one electron in repelling
another. But though we think that some man in
125
moving his hand, or that the sun in attracting the
earth, causes a certain movement, we do not think
that the man's or the sun's activity i_s or
consists in causing the movement. And if we ask
ourselves: 'Is there such an activity as
originating or causing a change in something
else?', we have to answer that there is not. To
say this, of course, is not to say that there is
no such thing as causing something, but only to
say that though the causing a change may require
an activity, it is not itself an activity."
(Prichard, 1969b:188-9)
Prichard's argument is not altogether clear, but I
think we can understand what he has in mind. His central
contention is that there is no such activity as causing
something. He wants to say not that things are not caused,
nor that there are no such things as causings. Rather,,
causing is not an activity. When one body causes another to
move, the body which causes the movement indulges in some
activity; which presumably would be the concern of the
scientist. Saying that one body causes another to move is to
say that body A does something which has as a result, the
movement of another body, B. Prichard's point is that
whatever body A does, is the activity which results in the
movement of body B. But A's causing B to move is not some
extra activity of A's over and above whatever it is that A
does in order to produce the movement in B. Neither is A's
causing B to move identical to the activity of A that causes
B to move; it is not A's causing B to move that causes B to
move, thus, A's causing B to move is not any activity of A.
Thereby, Prichard concludes that A's causing B to move
is simply an alternative way of talking about the situation
where A does something which has the effect of moving B. The
causing is not itself an dclivily, and since to act is to
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engage in an activity, it follows that actions cannot be
causings.
In this expanded form, Prichard's argument seems to
show that whatever actions may be, they are not causings.
Still, I am not inclined to accept this result, and under
closer scrutiny we can appreciate that Prichard's argument
does not validly reach its conclusion.
Firstly, I would accept Prichard's view that to act is
to engage in an activity. What I must show is that causing
can be an activity, and thereby, that actions, being
activities, may be causings.
Prichard concludes that causing a change is not an
activity, on the grounds that whatever the cause does to
bring about the effect is an activity which is not identical
to the causing of the effect by the cause, viz. it is not
the cause's causing the effect which causes the effect. This
much is clearly valid. The causing is not identical to the
activity of the cause which produces the effect.
Prichard also concludes that the causing is no further
activity of the cause. Again, this seems to be true, for the
causing is not something that the cause does, over and above
producing the effect. Yet from these considerations Prichard
cannot validly conclude that the causing is not an activity.
He can only conclude that the causing is not an activity of
the cause; which view I also endorse. To see that this is
not inconsistent with the account I propose, of actions as
causings, we have to look again at the structure of action
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as I represent it.
Here, an action is the bringing about, or causing of an
action-result by a volition. Of this scheme, Prichard would
say that the causing of a result by a volition is not
identical to the activity of the volition which causes the
result. Moreover, the causing is not an activity of the
volition over and above its activity which causes the
result. This much I accept. But does this mean that the
causing is not an activity at all? No, this only shows that
the causing is not an activity of the volition. In itself,
this is to be expected. The causing 'includes' both cause
and effect, so can hardly be an activity of the cause.
Still, the causing may be regarded as an activity. But an
activity of what? Surely, causing an action-result is
properly described as an activity ojf the agent, and not of
his volition?
Prichard is mistaken in thinking that the activity
which is action must be an activity of whatever causes arm
movements and the like. Indeed, it is this oversight which
leads him to the inevitable conclusion that action is
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something that springs from volition. For given that action
is an activity, Prichard leaves himself no option but to
identify action with the activity of the will which produces
bodily movements and other effects. In this light it is not
surprising that he is led to conclude that
"where we think of ourselves or of another as
having done a certain action, the kind of activity
of which we are thinking is that of willing
(though we should have to add that we are thinking
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of our particular act of willing as having been
the doing of the action in question, only because
we think it caused a certain change) and that when
we refer to some instance of this activity,... we
refer to it thus not because we think it was, or
consisted in, the causing [of a particular result]
but because we think it had a certain change of
state as an effect." (op. cit., p.190)
Thus, Prichard was led to construe 'willing' as the only
true form of action, with all else mere causal upshot of the
activity of our volitions.
In contrast, we may reasonably construe the agent's
action as an activity 'on a higher level' than the activity
of his volition which produces action-results. Thus, the
agent's action is the activity of raising his arm by
willing, it is not merely the activity of volition, for by
itself this does not constitute action.
Perhaps the fairest comment we can make of Prichard's
view is that the central notion upon which it rests, that of
action as activity, is far from perspicuous. We noted
earlier (in Chapter 4) that the sense in which he uses
'activity' is rather nebulous. As a result, it may be
difficult to do full justice to his objection. In contrast,
Brian 0'Shaughnessy presents a more cogent argument against
the view that actions are causings.
0'Shaugnessy's critique of this position centres on his
suspicions about the concept of a causing. Thus, he asks:
"But what is 'a causing'? ...it can hardly be
some third distinct event, a distinctive
causing-event, sandwiched between any two causally
linked events. This would be to suppose it just
another link in a causal chain- one that threatens
to multiply itself to infinity. For if every event
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has a cause so has the causing-event; and so on
indefinitely. Therefore it cannot be a distinctive
event. And it cannot be either of the causally
linked events. Indeed, it simply is not an event
at all." (0'Shaughnessy, 1973:383-4)
This argument would appear to have something in common with
Prichard's criticism of actions as causings. The main thrust
of 0'Shaughnessy's case is the contention that a causing
cannot be identified with either the cause or the effect in
any causal sequence, nor can it be considered an event
distinct from these two. There being no other alternative,
O'Shaugnessy concludes that causings cannot be events at
all.
The first of 0'Shaughnessy's points is clearly correct.
In any causal sequence, the causing is not identical either
with the cause or the effect. It cannot be the cause for
this may occur without the effect, in which case there is no
causing. And similarly, the causing cannot be the effect
alone for this may conceivably occur without the cause. The
causing is apparently neither the cause nor the effect. But
what then is it?
01Shaughnessy1s second point is that the causing cannot
be a third event distinct from the cause and the effect. If
it were, being an event, it must also have its cause. But
then we would have a further causing-event distinct from the
original causing-event and its cause, which in turn must
also have its own cause, and so on. As 01Shaughnessy notes,
either we accept the generation of infinitely many events
where we originally supposed there were only two, or we deny
that causings are events distinct from cause and effect. The
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potency of 01Shaughnessy's argument must leave us asking
once again, what is a causing?
According to the details of causings already presented,
they would appear to be composites of cause and effect, such
that there is no causing unless there occurs a cause that
takes effect. So, we only have a causing when we have both a
cause and related effect. The question is whether this
account of causings treats them as events. There is some
temptation to say that it does. After all, we might refer to
the wind blowing the leaves from the trees, which is surely
a causing. The wind blowing is the cause, while the leaves
being removed from the trees is the effect. Yet, our'
reference is not to either of these events alone. It is to
the particular combination of these two events. Perhaps it
would be more apt to refer to the wind blowing the leaves
from the trees not as an event in its own right, otherwise
we invoke 0'Shaughnessy1s infinite generation of events, but
as a sequence of events. This is far more plausible than
treating it as a particular event.
Supposing that a causing is a sequence of events
entails that it is not an event; a sequence of events is no
more an event than a flock of seagulls is a bird. But can we
suppose that actions (being causings) are not events?
In 0'Shaughnessy1s eyes, if causings are not events in
their own right they cannot be identified with actions. As
he notes:
"[This] ...leaves us with the claim that the act
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is not an event. But that is certainly
unacceptable. After all, we know it has
event-effects, such as the breaking of an electric
light globe, and event-causes, such as deciding or
coming to believe that now is the time for the
intended act; and we know it has an unrepeatable
position in space-time, and was constituted
through the on-going of an activity of raising an
arm. What more do we need if we are to demonstrate
that it was an event?" (op. cit., p.834)
Thus, 01Shaughnessy locates reasons for thinking of actions
as events. If they were not, they could not have events as
their effects, nor as their causes. And actions do appear to
have 'unrepeatable positions' in time and space. Does this
not prove that they are events?
Clearly, it only does so if it is solely events that
have event-causes and effects and unique spatio-temporal
location. But this does not appear to be the case. Firstly,
consider position in space and time. An occurrence of the
wind blowing the leaves from my garden trees (a causing, and
hence not an event), takes place over a specific
time-period, and in a specific place. There is no obvious
reason why causings generally should not be accorded with
'unrepeatable positions in space-time'. Such a feature is
not uniquely true of events, hence the fact that it is true
of actions does not establish that they are events. What
about their possession of event-causes and event-effects?
As a result of the wind defoliating my trees, many
events might ensue. I might be angered? I may be awe-struck
at the workings of nature; a neighbour's sleeping cat may
disappear under fallen leaves. Similarly, such a causing
might result from a sudden change in air pressure at high
altitude, or an explosion at a nearby factory. Do such
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examples show that causings have both event-causes and
event-effects? If so, then either causings are events after
all, or we must reject 01Shaughnessy's contention that
possession of such a feature is a hallmark of events.
It is tempting to accept that causings do have such
causes and effects, but I do not believe this to be the
case. Strictly speaking, such events are causes or effects
not of the causing, but of the cause or the effect that are
its components. Thus, the change in atmospheric pressure
causes the wind to blow fiercely through my garden. This
effect (of the change in atmospheric pressure) causes the
leaves to fall from my trees, which in turn causes my bout
of anger.
We can say that the wind blowing the leaves from the
trees (the causing) resulted from the sudden change in air
pressure, or that my bad temper was caused by the wind
blowing the leaves from my trees (again, the causing). So it
is apparently permissible to talk of the causing both as
cause and effect of events. But I would suggest that this
does not show that the causing is itself an event. Rather,
such causal talk is a shorthand or elliptical way of
detailing more than one causal relation. Thus, to say that
the causing resulted from a sudden change in the atmosphere
informs us not merely of the immediate effect of this change
(i.e. the wind blowing as it did), but also of its more
distant effect (i.e. the defoliation of my trees).
So, although causings are not events, we may sensibly
talk as if they have event-causes and event-effects. Given
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that we speak of actions as having such causes and effects,
is it plausible to construe actions as not events? There is
reason for thinking so.
If we consider an action, such as my moving my arm,
this may have as a result, the breaking of a precious
Chinese vase. Clearly, the breaking of this heirloom is an
event, but what of my action of moving my arm?
It is obvious that the movement of my arm constitutes
an event. Indeed, this event can be seen as the immediate
cause of the vase breaking. But this arm movement is not my
action. There is a logical difference between my arm moving
and my moving my arm. On my account of action, I suggest
understanding my moving my arm as on a par with the wind
blowing the leaves from my trees. In each case, the
description is of no mere event-occurrence, but of an
event-seguence. Moving my arm can be seen to consist in a
sequence of two causally related events, my willing the arm
movement (which is the cause), and the arm movement (which
is its effect).
Thus, we can construe actions as causings (causal
sequences of events) and interpret statements which purport
to ascribe event-causes and event-effects to actions
precisely as I have suggested for other causings. To say
that my action of moving my arm caused the vase to break, is
elliptical. It conveys the fact that the vase broke as a
result of the arm movement (this was its immediate cause),
and this, in turn, was caused by my willing the arm movement
(this was the more distant cause of the vase breaking).
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Understood in this way it makes perfect sense to talk
of actions a_s i_f they have event-causes and effects. But
this does not signify that actions are events. (I note that
Kent Bach has recently argued that 'actions are not events
but instances of... the relation of bringing about (or
making happen), whose terms are agents and events' (Bach,
1980:114). This has obvious parallels with my own account.)
Despite its counter-intuitive air, there is no logical
absurdity in the view that actions are not events. Instead,
actions, like other causings, are sequences of causally
related events. So, in opposition to O'Shaughnessy, we are
able to reaffirm the view that actions are causings, with
the clarification that these are not events.
Before moving to consider how the account of actions as
causings accommodates the concept of basic action, it is
worth noting a corollary of my view that actions are not
events. This gives a new perspective on the vexed question
of whether reasons may be causes of actions, for strictly
speaking, actions do not have causes. Only events have
causes and actions are not events.
It will be true nonetheless that actions have causally
necessary conditions, even though no causal conditions could
be sufficient for action. Thus, while there are both
necessary and sufficient causal conditions for the
occurrence of any event A, and also for its effect, event B,
there are no causally sufficient conditions for A causing B.
The causal conditions may ensure that event A occurs and
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also that event B occurs, they cannot ensure (by causation)
that A will cause the occurrence of B.
So we can appreciate that actions, being causings, are
not caused. Thus, neither reasons nor anything else can be a
cause of action.
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CHAPTER 6 : BASIC ACTION
(.L ) DAVIDSON AND PRIMITIVE ACTION
We shall see that Prichard's distinction between direct
and indirect actions has re-emerged in the writings of later
philosophers, who believe that positive lessons can be drawn
by attending to this relation between direct and indirect
action.
The insight behind Prichard's distinction is the fact
that events are often attributed to agents as their actions
because these events have resulted from, or been brought
about by, other of that agent's actions. Thus, if I throw a
stone, I perform an action, and if the stone I throw breaks
a window, then I have broken a window. Breaking the window
will be my action because it resulted from my throwing the
stone that broke the window. So, Prichard urges that
"we should distinguish those actions in doing
which we originated some new state directly from
those in which we did this only indirectly, i.e.
by originating directly some other state by
originating which we indirectly originated the
final state." (Prichard, 1969b:187)
But what is the importance of this distinction?
We have seen that Prichard employs it as a stage in his
analysis of action. His reasoning being that indirect
actions only count as actions by virtue of their relation to
direct actions. Hence, to fully appreciate the nature of
actions we have to attend to direct actions; for it is clear
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that these qualify as action by some criterion other than
their relation to other of the agent's actions.
This logic, combined with the causal account of action
as bringing something about, led Prichard to support the
View that agents typically perform an activity of willing
whenever they do an action. This was Prichard's analysis of
direct action. So we can see Prichard's distinction as
directed toward an understanding of what makes something an
action. The distinction helps because it separates one class
of actions (indirect), from another (direct). This can be
regarded as progress because we are able to appreciate why
indirect actions come to be deemed actions? it is because of
their relation to direct actions. So, for a complete
understanding of the nature of action the inquiry should
turn to direct actions, and how these qualify as actions.
Of course, one might ask why we should believe in the
existence of direct actions at all. But it is clear that
indirect actions 'require' direct actions. Not all action
can be indirect, for such actions only come about if there
is some direct action which is performed as a means to the
indirect. This is why Prichard says
"we should insist that in doing any action we
must have originated something directly, since
otherwise we could not originate anything
indirectly." (p.187)
Davidson also appreciates that
"not every event we attribute to an agent can be
explained as caused by another event of which he
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is agent: some events must be primitive in the
sense that they cannot be analysed in terms of
their causal relations to acts of the same agent."
(Davidson, 1971:10)
If we supposed that every action could be analysed as
an event causally related to another of the agent's actions,
this would imply that there could be no first action in such
a series. For this would be to suppose that for every event
attributed to an agent as his action, he must have performed
an earlier action; which would mean that no one had
performed what was for them a first action, i.e. no 'direct'
or 'primitive' action. Unless we are prepared to accept that
each agent has a past history of actions, with no beginning,
we must accept the alternative. In which case we have a
proof of the existence of direct or primitive actions.
These actions, which Prichard termed 'direct', have
come to be known variously as 'primitive', 'basic'*, or
'simple'** actions. (* Danto, 1965; ** Feinberg, 1965; In
what follows I shall treat these terms as interchangeable.)
Direct actions do not result from any other of our
actions; they are actions that we do without doing anything
else. So, we might expect that if we follow a series of
indirect actions back to the originating causing actions,
these may well be bodily movements. (This is the view that
Prichard seemed to favour, though he quickly moved to an
identification of action with the activity of willing.) To
take a few examples: if I embarrass a friend by waving to
him across a busy room, I cause his embarrassment by waving
my hand, but I do not wave my hand by performing any other
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action prior to my hand waving. It seems that I just wave my
hand.
Similarly, I may secure a free transfer for the
opposition's goalkeeper by scoring the fourth goal against
trim; I score the goal by deflecting the ball off the
referee? I deflect the ball by hitting it with the outside
of my right foot; and I hit the ball by swinging my leg
forward in a particular manner at a particular instant; but
I do not swing my leg by means of any other prior action, I
simply swing my leg. Waving my arm and swinging my leg, look
like prime candidates for direct actions, since, to use
Danto's words:
"when an individual M performs a basic action a.,
there is no event distinct from a that both stands
to a as cause to effect and is an action performed
by M. So when M performs a basic action, he does
nothing first that causes it to happen." (Danto,
1965:45; page references to White, 1970)
Examples of voluntary bodily movements, such as those above,
seem appropriate in this context. Melden appears to have it
right when he says:
"One does not move one's arm by performing
another doing which has the motion of one's arm as
effect- one simply raises one's arm." (Melden,
1961:65)
From our earlier discussion of Prichard we have seen
that there may be difficulties with the view that voluntary
bodily movements qualify as basic or direct action. Can it
be established that such movements are basic actions?
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Davidson, for one, takes a strong line, and argues that
"if we interpret the idea of a bodily movement
generously, a case can be made out for saying that
all primitive actions are bodily movements"
(op.cit. , p.11).
Although he maintains that primitive actions are bodily
movements, Davidson's precise views on the relation of
primitive actions to their agents is not easy to discern
from his writings. He allows that when an agent performs a
primitive action such as pointing his finger, it makes sense
to say that he causes his finger to move. This seems odd,
for if the finger moving is a primitive action, the agent
does this without doing anything else as a means. Yet, if
when he moves his finger, he must cause his finger to move,
this suggests that his moving his finger requires this prior
act of causing. And if such a prior act is necessary for the
action of finger pointing, this latter action cannot be
primitive. Davidson appreciates that his view may face this
problem, so he considers the following objection.
In order to point my finger I make certain muscles
contract, and this in turn may require that I make certain
events take place in my brain, but if it is true that I
cause my finger to move by bringing about these internal
events, then surely these events, and not the finger
movement, must be primitive. Obviously, if these events are
primitive actions this conflicts with Davidson's thesis that
all primitive actions are bodily movements.
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Davidson's reply to this criticism is that
although it may be true that I cause my finger to move by
contracting muscles and perhaps cause these muscles to
contract by making events occur in my brain, this does not
show that pointing my finger is not a primitive action, for
it does not show that I must do something else that causes
it. He points out that doing something that causes my finger
to move does not cause me to move my finger, it is moving my
finger (p.11). It may not be immediately clear how this
defends Davidson's position.
Clearly, he relies on the claim that my bringing about
certain internal bodily events is not my doing something
else, other than moving my finger. This allows that I may
cause my finger to move without doing anything that causes
me to move my finger, but it suggests that I may cause the
primitive action without doing anything else but perform the
primitive action, as when he says 'doing something that
causes my finger to move... is moving my finger' (loc.cit.).
There appears to be a tension in Davidson's account.
Primitive actions are actions that we perform without use of
any prior action; our primitive actions are not caused by
any other of our actions. Yet, Davidson seems to admit that
we may cause the bodily movements which are our primitive
actions.
If we are to make sense of Davidson's position we must
interpret him differently. To this end, the important
distinction is that he makes between causing my finger to
move, and causing me to move my finger. The significance of
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this is that although the internal bodily events may cause
the finger movement, they do not cause my moving my finger.
My finger may move without its being a case of my moving it.
It is only in the case where I move my finger that a
primitive action occurs. The primitive action in question is
not simply the bodily movement, that is, the finger
movement. Rather, the primitive action is my causing the
finger movement. Hence, Davidson's insistence that my
causing my finger to move is not my being caused to move my
finger; it is my moving my finger.
We are now in a position to see that Davidson's account
is initially misleading. Despite his claim that primitive
actions are bodily movements, he identifies these actions
not with bodily movements simpliciter, but these movements
in relation to their causes. Since it is essential to the
conception of causality that one can, in principle, isolate
the event taken as cause from that taken as effect, Davidson
cannot say that in calling these movements primitive
actions, he is providing us with alternative descriptions of
these bodily movements. The primitive action is the instance
where I move my finger as opposed to any instance where my
finger merely moves, and Davidson insists that causing the
latter is not causing the former. Since the former is the
primitive action and the latter the bodily movement, if
causing the one is not causing the other, then they cannot
be one and the same. Hence, the primitive action is not the
bodily movement.
Perhaps we can get a clearer picture of the situation
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in question. Certain internal bodily events cause someone's
finger to move in a manner we commonly regard as pointing.
Davidson tried to tell us that the bodily movement in such a
case could be a primitive action, but I have shown that this
is not consistent with his general position which should
lead him to regard primitive actions as causings of bodily
movements, as opposed to their being simply, bodily
movements. Davidson seems to adhere implicitly to this
latter view, although explicitly, he appears to deny it.
Pursuing this position further, we might ask what is meant
by talk of 'my causing my finger to move'?
{2) ACTIONS AS CAUSINGS
Davidson allows that internal bodily events cause the
finger movement, but since the occurrence of the cause of
(any) event A need not be sufficient for the occurrence of
A, logically, the cause of the finger movement may occur
without the finger moving. The occurrence of the cause of
the finger movement does not entail the occurrence of the
finger movement. Nevertheless, the situation is different if
we consider the occurrence of a^ causing of A, as opposed to
the occurrence of the cause of A. The occurrence of a
causing of A entails that A occurs. Thus, the occurrence of
a causing of my finger movement, entails that my finger
moves. It follows that a causing is not merely the
occurrence of a cause.
From this, it should be clear that in identifying
primitive actions with particular causings of bodily
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movements, Davidson is not committed to accepting that
whatever causes such a movement is a primitive action. He is
no more identifying primitive action with the causes of
bodily movements than he is identifying them with the
effects of particular internal bodily events.
Given then that a primitive action is a certain causing
of some bodily movement, and that a causing is the
occurrence of a cause that takes effect, someones'
performing a primitive action must be their bringing about
(causing) a particular effect. A causing of the finger
movement is any case where the finger movement was caused to
occur, so, specifically, my causing my finger to move is a
case where the finger movement is caused to occur by me. So,
the primitive action of my moving my finger, is my finger
movement being caused to occur by me.
It emerges that the notion of causing one's own bodily
movements is central to this conception of primitive action.
Obviously, if we are to understand the nature of such
actions we must appreciate the respect in which a person can
be a cause.
This notion of agents as causes is slightly peculiar.
We often speak of people causing things or bringing them
about, but what do such locutions mean? We may mean that
some action of the agent had such-and-such a consequence, or
that something done by the agent, not necessarily an action,
had a particular effect. Note however that in either case,
when we speak of the agent's causing such-and-such, we talk
in a misleading way. To say 'John caused the crash' seems to
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be on a par with saying 'the puncture caused the crash', but
although both sentences share the same surface structure,
they do not have the same deep structure.
Normally, when we use cause and effect language we
relate one event, as a cause, to another event, as its
effect. Thus, the usual form of causal statement, 'A caused
B', relates two events A and B. This is the form of the
latter of the above two sentences, 'the puncture caused the
crash', but it is not the form of 'John caused the crash'.
When we say the puncture caused the crash, we identify one
event, the occurrence of the puncture, as the cause of
another, the occurrence of the crash. But in saying 'John
caused the crash', we make no explicit reference to two
events, one the cause, the other the effect. In this case
the crash is still the effect, but John himself is not the
cause, because John himself is not an event. (See Aune's
criticism of agent-causation in the previous chapter.) In
the present case, something John did, some event in which
John figured, must have been the cause. Then the sentence
'John caused the crash' is not of the form 'A caused B',
rather its form is elliptical for 'some event related to
person P, caused B'. This event, related to some person,
will be either his action or some event which is not his
action, but in which his body figured. In this light we can
reconsider the question 'how do we cause our own movements?'
An agent's performing a primitive action is his causing
the bodily movement B (see figure 1), and this causing
consists in his bringing about B by means of the internal
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event or events A.
figure 1
primitive action (i.e. a causing)
I A causes B I
The agent can be said to cause B either if A is another of
his actions, or if it is merely an event in which his body
figures. Obviously, A will always be an event in which the
agent's body figures, since it is an internal bodily event,
so he must cause B in at least this sense. But can the agent
cause B in the sense that A is one of his actions?
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Davidson is quite positive that he can. In contrast,
Chisholm suggests that although an agent may be said to make
certain cerebral events happen when it is these events that
cause his finger to move, making these cerebral events
happen cannot be said to be something that he does in the
sense of action (Chisholm, 1966). To this, Davidson comments
that so far as his intuition goes, such cases of making
things happen are cases of agency, (op.cit., p.12) Thus,
Davidson maintains that A (in figure 1) is also an action of
the agent.
Now if primitive actions are bodily movements that we
cause ourselves, and we cause these movements by performing
earlier actions by making events occur inside our bodies,
then once more it looks as though we perform our primitive
actions by performing some prior internal action. But to
think this would be to repeat an earlier mistake. The
internal bodily events that Davidson deems cases of agency,
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do not cause primitive actions. They cause only bodily
movements, which are not identical to primitive actions.
Nevertheless, Davidson's contention that the events that
cause our bodily movements may also be our actions, seems
very dubious. Given that such internal events are cases of
agency, then the contraction of my arm muscles when I move
my arm, must be an action of one sort or another.
Specifically, it must be a primitive action or the effect of
such an action. In either case, we will be moving far from
the view that primitive actions are of the level of bodily
movements, unless 'bodily movement' is extended to cover
such internal bodily movements as muscle contractions, and
whatever occurs in brain events!
By treating primitive actions as causings of bodily
movements rather than as identical to the caused bodily
movements, Davidson has already avoided a regress; if
primitive actions are identified with voluntary bodily
movements, and agents cause their primitive actions. In
which case, the causing of such actions would be more
primitive than the alleged primitive bodily act.
So, Davidson identifies primitive action not with such
voluntary movements, but with the causing of such movements.
Still, despite its subtlety, this position may not be
secure, for there is another regress to which it succumbs.
Another diagram will help to make this clear.
figure 2_
CAUSINGl
I eventl causes event2 1 causes event3 |
CAUSING2
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We may suppose that event3 is a bodily movement which
the agent causes in the relevant sense; event2 is the
specific muscle contraction(s) that directly cause the
bodily movement. Ex hypothesi, event2 is caused by the
agent, hence, this causing (causing2), is a primitive
action. But, if we allow that event2 is caused in turn by
eventl (certain cerebral occurrences), and that this also
constitutes a case of agency (as Davidson contends), then
the relation between eventl and event2, and that between
event2 and event3, is the same. In which case, if causing2
is a primitive action we may suppose that causingl is too.
Also, this line of argument can be repeated if we go back
beyond eventl to its internal cause, event0, and so on,
beyond this event. So, a regress occurs with each earlier
causing qualifying as a primitive action; which clearly
violates Davidson's account of primitive action.
Of course, we might suppose that Davidson was too hasty
in allowing that the internal bodily events that cause one's
movements are, in their own right, instances of agency. The
very reasonable alternative is that these are events which I
cause, only in the sense that my body figures in their
occurrence.
The manoeuvre here is to deem A (in figure 1) an event
in which the agent's body figures, hence an event which he
causes, but not one of his actions. Still, if we turn again
to figure 2, we can see that this change does nothing to
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affect the regress argument. If event3 is caused by the
agent, other than by one of his actions, and this entitles
us to regard causing2 as a primitive action, then, since the
same relation holds between event2 and its cause, this
should render causingl a primitive action too. So, it would
seem that Davidson's conception of primitive action is
ultimately unacceptable.
Apparently, if we are to make sense of this way of
construing primitive action we require a characterisation of
such actions that would render causing2 (in figure 2) a
primitive action, but disqualify causingl from being an
action of the same agent.
(3_) THE ACTION-RESULT PROBLEM
A fruitful attempt to specify the nature of primitive
action is made by Hugh McCann in 'Volition and basic
action'. (McCann, 1974) Here, he argues for a thesis closely
allied to that of Prichard; that a resort to volition is
advantageous for our understanding of the relation between
agent and primitive or basic action.
McCann presents his argument in the context of what he
calls 'the action-result problem'. This he explains as
follows:
"When an action is one of bringing about a
certain change that change may be called the
result of the action in question. Hence the result
of raising my arm is that my arm goes up; that of
killing Smith is that Smith dies." (p.452)
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He adds that
"results have a number of important features...
they are intrinsically tied to action. A result is
always a change of a sort an instance of which is
logically required for an action of the kind in
question to have occurred at all. Thus raising my
arm requires that my arm goes up and killing Smith
requires that Smith die. This feature of results
is what distinguishes them from other changes a
person might bring about in performing an
action... Results, then are events which are
necessary for those actions whose results they
are." (loc.cit.)
While results are logically necessary for actions, they
are not sufficient for those same actions. Thus, while my
arm rising is necessary for my raising my arm, my arm may
rise without it being the case that I raised my arm. The
result is not sufficient for the action whose result it is.
It is this feature of results that gives rise to what
McCann calls 'the action-result problem'; which is the
problem, in this example, of explaining what it is, when
someone raises his arm, that makes the motion of his arm the
result of an action of arm-raising. This form of question
may be raised over any instance of action which has a
result. One can always ask what it is that makes that event
(the result), the result of such an action. As McCann puts
it:
"The general problem of answering such
questions... is the problem of providing an
account of how it is, when events and processes
qualify as results of human actions, they do so
qualify." (p.453)
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It seems that progress can be made in resolving this
problem by noting that as well as results, actions have
consequences, (cf. Stoutland, 1968) These are changes one
brings about through action, but which, unlike results, are
not intrinsically tied to the actions themselves. We must
appreciate that while the intrinsic connection between
action and its result prevents the result also being a
consequence of that same action, it may often be the case
that the result of one action is the consequence of another
action of the same agent. Thus, for example, my action of
moving my arm to strike the vase from its stand, has a
result (my arm moving to the vase), and a consequence (the
smashing of the vase on the floor). In addition, the vase
breaking is the result of my action of smashing the vase.
So, the vase smashing may be the consequence of one action
of mine, and the result of another.
This is an instance of a pattern of action in which one
action, B, causes the result of another action, A, of the
same agent, but does not cause A. Whenever this pattern is
exemplified, McCann describes A as a causally non-basic
action, and B as causally more basic than A. McCann
considers this pattern as especially useful in dealing with
the action-result problem, since, as he puts it,
"it allows us to explain how the result of the
less basic action A came to occur at all, and to
explain it in terms of action on the part of the
agent. Thus, if killing Smith involves a causally
more basic action of shooting him, we can appeal
to the shooting to explain Smith's death. And
since the cause is an action, the explanation
places the death in an action context. Besides
merely accounting for the death, it shows why it
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qualifies as an act of killing, for the
explanation amounts to a description of how the
agent brought Smith's death about, and bringing
about this result _is the action of killing Smith."
(p.455)
McCann concludes that 'when an action A involves a causally
more basic action, the fact that it does provides a solution
to the action-result problem for A. The result of A
qualifies as a result because it is brought about by
performing the causally more basic action B.' (pp.455-6)
This reference to the causal basicness of actions is no
mere coincidence. We shall see that McCann is led to
consider the precise nature of causally basic actions; these
being what Davidson termed 'primitive', and Prichard,
'direct' actions.
We can see that McCann's action-result problem (of
saying, when an event qualifies as the result of an action,
how it so qualifies), is resolved for a particular action
and its result if we can relate them to a causally more
basic action of the same agent. In other words, an event
qualifies as the result of an action of agent M, if that
event is the consequence of an action of agent M.
Although this insight into causally related actions
offers us a form of response to the action-result problem,
we are left with the possibility that the causally more
basic action may itself have a result. In this case, the
problem arises again with regard to this action and its
result. Although we may locate a causally more basic action
to resolve this new instance of the problem, it can
're-emerge', in a regress, with each successive causally
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more basic action having its
McCann notes that such
is, there must be a causally
own result to explain.
a series must have an end, that
(most) basic action. Otherwise,
"if every action encountered in this type of
analysis involves both a result and a causally
more basic action, one would have to bring about
an infinite series of further changes in order to
bring about any change or set of changes at all.
Men cannot do this, but they perform actions with
results all the time. Hence the analysis of such
actions in terms of the causal pattern must
eventually terminate in an action that does not
involve such a sequence." (p.456)
Clearly, the actions which commence such a causal sequence
will be causally basic, which is to say that the results of
such actions, if they have results, are not effects
(consequences) of other of the agent's actions. We see
thereby, that McCann's approach to this action-result
problem, leads him to the familiar conclusion that there
must be direct, primitive or basic actions, which are
causally fundamental to other of an agent's actions.
Consequently' McCann is also faced with the task of
explaining the nature of such actions, that is, of
explaining the sense in which the agent performs basic
actions, if this does not require the performance of some
yet more basic act on the part of the agent.
McCann's action-result problem leads him to interesting
conclusions. It is clear for causally basic actions, that,
if they have results, these events are not consequences of
any more basic action. Yet it is difficult to envisage any
actions (certainly at the level of bodily movements), that
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do not have results. In which case, we are able to raise the
action-result problem again; unless we suppose that there
may be causally basic actions that do not have results. As
McCann says.
"no action that consists in bringing about a
bodily change can be causally basic unless we have
an alternative device for solving the
action-result problem." (p.457)
After rejecting a 'reasons as causes' approach to solving
this problem (pp.457-463), McCann argues that treating
thinking as action affords a solution to the action-result
problem. His reasons for this view being that thinking
typically qualifies as action, and thinking does not have
results in the action-sense. Furthermore, by introducing the
concept of volition as a particular mode of thought, he is
able to present 'volitional thought' as causally basic
action.
To begin with, there may be some doubt that thought
counts as action. McCann assumes that it 'characteristically
counts as action', and claims that
"the chief benefit is that it makes possible a
solution to the action-result problem, for this
problem does not arise about thoughts. Unlike acts
of moving a finger or flexing a muscle, thoughts
do not have results." (p.463)
This latter point is illustrated by reference to the mental
act of thinking of the number 1:
"Here there is no event I bring about which is
logically required for the act's occurrence, yet
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not sufficient for it, as the motion of my finger
is in the case where I move it." (loc.cit.)
Although the content of the thought is distinguishable
from the thinking of it, the content (the number 1) is not
an event, hence not an event that is brought about in
thinking of the number 1. Neither can the result of my
thinking of the number 1, be that I think of this number,
for, that I think of it is not an event distinct (and
necessary but not sufficient) for my thinking of the number
1. That I think of this number simply i_s my mental act of
thinking of this number. Clearly, the thought cannot be its
own result. It appears therefore that thoughts would have no
results. So, McCann concludes,
"that acts of thinking do not have results means
there can be no action-result problem about
thinking. If there is no result to be
distinguished from an action, there can be no
question as to what makes it a result. It follows
that all acts of thinking must be causally basic."
and adds that,
"the main point of theoretical importance about
volition should now be obvious. For volition too
is thought, and hence not possessed of a result...
unlike raising an arm, volition involves no event
about which such a question can sensibly be asked.
Consequently, volition must be causally basic if
it occurs at all." (p.466)
Obviously, if all familiar cases of action with results,
have volitions as their causally basic actions, we have a
solution to the action-result problem. This problem will not
arise for volitions as actions, for volitions, in keeping
with thoughts generally, do not have results.
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Looking in detail at McCann's arguments we can see
similarities between the strategy he employs and that
employed by Prichard. One significant feature is that McCann
does not argue for the existence of volition any more than
did Prichard Rather, he suggests that belief in volition
affords a means of resolving the action-result problem. In
similar vein, Prichard suggests that belief in volitions
enables us to comprehend the logical structure of action.
Actually, the reasons each finds to invoke volition,
are similar. McCann seeks to explain how events come to be
action-results, and does so via the concept of causal
basicness. This means that an event's being an action-result
is explained in terms of its causal relation to another
action of the same agent. Essentially, this is Prichard's
conception of indirect action, such that an event bearing
the causal relation to another of the agent's actions
thereby qualifies as indirect relative to this earlier
action.
McCann's search for a solution to the action-result
problem is a search for causally basic action, that is, for
action which does not have a result caused by another action
of the same agent. In these terms, causally basic action
will correspond to Prichard's direct action, which is action
that one does without doing any other action as a means.
Above all else, the feature that McCann shares with
Prichard is his wish to construe volition as action. In this
respect, the principal difference is that unlike McCann,
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Prichard does not equate volition with direct action
(causally basic action). Indeed, this gave rise to one of my
objections to Prichard's account of volition as action; to
the effect that volition, if action, must count either as
direct or indirect action.
We may suppose that McCann's strategy offers a way of
reinstating the Prichardian view of volition as action.
Thus, McCann may say that Prichard did everything right
except in his failure to appreciate that volition must be
causally basic, and must therefore count as direct action,
being the means one employs in order to do anything else
whatsoever.
In consequence, although Prichard never details the
action-result problem as such, we may see McCann's account
as essentially similar to Prichard's. Do we thereby have an
adequate account of basic action?
The most appealing aspect of McCann's account is not
only that it gives us reason for belief in volition, but
that it resolves the action-result problem in a precise and
neat way. In particular, the resort to volitions as actions
which have no results, enables McCann to answer the
action-result issue by means of a single principle; the
relation of causal basicness.
It is clear from McCann's analysis that this relation
solves the action-result problem for any action-result that
is caused by another action of the same agent. Also from
this analysis, it follows that there must be causally basic
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actions. (A line of argument familiar from both Prichard and
Davidson.) These causally basic actions are correctly
characterised as actions whose results are not consequences
of any other actions of the relevant agent. In McCann's
view, volitions fit this role because, in keeping with other
'modes of thought', they do not have results.
Clearly, if an action has no result then it is not an
action with a result caused by another action of the agent.
That is, it is not a causally non-basic action. Hence, it is
a causally basic action. This is how McCann concludes that
volitions would be basic actions, and would resolve the
problem over action-results.
Despite its apparent plausibility, I shall suggest that
there is an alternative account of basic action which is
preferable to McCann's.
(4) BASIC ACTION AND RESULTS
By definition, causally basic actions are those whose
results are not caused by any other actions of the same
agent. For this reason, we may be a trifle uneasy about
accepting volitions as causally basic. After all, it is not
as if volitions have results not caused by other actions.
Volitions simply have no results at all. In all strictness
therefore, we might prefer to look for basic actions amongst
those actions that do have results.
McCann would oppose this on two counts. Firstly, if
causally basic actions have results then the action-result
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problem remains outstanding for the results of these
actions. Secondly, volitions are readily construed as
actions with no results. The force of this first point is
that denying volition as basic action requires that we
invoke an additional principle to explain how the results of
(non-volitional) basic actions come to be the results of
actions at all. So, for simplicity of explanation, perhaps
we should prefer McCann's solution, since it invokes only
one principle to resolve the action-result problem, viz.,
the relation of causal basicness.
The force of McCann's second point is less evident: if
volitions are construed as action and not as causally basic,
we have difficulty of knowing what to say of the causal
status of volitions as actions. In short, we would reinstate
Prichard's difficulty of portraying volition as action, but
neither direct nor indirect action; thereby conflicting with
his comprehensive classification of actions into direct and
indirect.
For McCann, a similar problem arises if we treat
volition as action yet insist that causally basic actions
have results. The classification of actions as causally
basic or non-basic is comprehensive and does not allow a
third category of action, volition, which is neither
causally basic (since it has no result), nor causally
non-basic (since it has no result caused by another action).
While we can appreciate the motivation for McCann's
position, we should also note its principal drawbacks.
Although the solution he offers to the action-result problem
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is admirable in its simplicity, by relying on a single
principle of causal basicness and resorting to volitions as
actions without results, McCann is then left with a
significant question unanswered, viz. 'how do volitions
qualify as actions?1
In effect, McCann answers the related question, 'how do
non-basic actions qualify as actions?' His solution to the
action-result problem enables us to see that non-basic
actions are actions in so far as they are the bringing about
of an action-result by another action of the same agent.
In answering the action-result question, McCann goes
some way toward answering a related problem about action
itself. This is expressed in the question 'when an action is
attributed to an agent, how does it qualify as his action?'
McCann's account of how events qualify as action-results
implicitly details how actions are attributable to agents.
Thus, 'the death of Jones' qualifies as an action-result
because Jones's death is caused by my action of pulling the
trigger of a gun. And in turn, 'killing Jones' qualifies as
my non-basic action because it was my action of pulling the
trigger that had Jones's death as a consequence. This
response makes sense of all causally non-basic actions, for
they are attributable to an agent by virtue of their being
the bringing about of action-results by other of his
actions.
While McCann's principle of causal basicness adequately
resolves the action-result problem, it is not sufficient to
resolve this related problem. For it remains a puzzle as to
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how causally basic actions come to be attributable to
agents. Thus, McCann has additionally to explain how
volitions qualify as actions. Before discussing how this
issue may be resolved, a look at a further problem in
McCann's account.
To his credit, McCann appreciates that his construal of
thinking as action will ultimately have to be defended. In
the absence of this defence, we may still indicate one
aspect of this view that is likely to be problematic.
While McCann may, with some justice, treat thinking as
action, and likewise, regard all volitions as thoughts, it
is not reasonable to construe all thoughts as volitions. I
take this to be a matter of commonsense; indeed, McCann does
not demur on this point. Nevertheless, this fact is
inherently troublesome for McCann's position.
If thought is action, and not all thoughts are
volitions, then there are some non-volitional actions which
lack results. In other words, those thoughts which are
actions, but not volitions, do not have results. What then
do we say about the causal status of these actions? It would
appear that they qualify as causally basic actions too,
which means that McCann has a further detail to explain,
viz. how these non-volitional causally basic actions come to
be actions.
We have seen that causally non-basic actions so qualify
by virtue of their ultimate causal link to volition (i.e. to
causally basic action). But for non-volitional thoughts
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construed as actions, it is not possible to explain their
action-status by reference to volition. Such thoughts cannot
be actions by virtue of being caused by volition, for this
would render them causally less basic than volition, which,
ex hypothesi, they are not.
Furthermore, this would mean that in order to think
these non-volitional thoughts one would first have to will
them by means of a volitional thought. Presumably, all such
thoughts are conscious, so we should be aware of thinking
two thoughts whenever we think a non-volitional thought.
When I deliberately think of pruning my roses I am not
conscious of having to think some volitional thought first,
in order to think of the pruning. While we may be active in
thinking at least some non-volitional thoughts, it is not
plausible that we must always think a volitional thought
first in order to think these others.
We can see that McCann's strategy for dealing with the
action-result problem leaves open two important issues. It
remains to be seen firstly, why volitions count as actions,
and secondly, how non-volitional (but actional) thoughts so
qualify. This is worth bearing in mind since the main
incentive to adopting McCann's approach is its alleged
explanatory power.
Significantly, there is an alternative treatment of
causally basic action, to which allusion has already been
made. Since causally basic actions are those actions whose
results are not the consequences of any earlier actions, we
may defy McCann and insist that basic actions must have
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results.
A consequence of making this manoeuvre is that I am
also left with two details to explain. In this case, I am
required to say how the results of causally basic actions
come to be action-results, also, I must account for the
actional nature of volition. After all, if causally basic
actions are actions with results, and volitions are actions
without results, what is the relation of volition as action,
to causally basic action? Volitions cannot be causally more
basic actions, for they cannot be more basic than basic
actions.
My response to the latter of these two details is
straightforward. There is no problem in explaining the
relation of volitions to causally basic actions if we
suppose that volitions are not actions. If volitions are not
actions, their relation to causally basic action is simply
one of causation. This means that causally basic actions
will be whatever actions have results directly caused by
volitions. Since volitions are not regarded as actions they
are no 'threat' to the status of these causally basic
actions.
Of course, the action-result problem re-emerges for my
causally basic actions, for they too have results. As McCann
notes:
"if the appeal to causally more basic actions is
ruled out, we must solve the action-result problem
in these cases by different means." (p.456)
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Obviously the relation of causal basicness solves the
action-result problem only for actions of a 'higher level'
than my causally basic actions. In this case we have no
causally more basic actions; hence the need for a further
principle to deal with these action-results. How then do the
results of causally basic actions so qualify?
My answer bears some relation to McCann's response. In
effect, these events qualify as the results of causally
basic actions because they are caused by the agent's
volition. This is not to say that they qualify as
action-results in virtue of their being caused by a more
basic action. Volition is not itself action, but is the key
concept for understanding the nature of action. McCann
accurately locates the solution to the action-result problem
in volition, but viewing volition as action is more
problematic than it is helpful.
We have already noted the unanswered questions that
arise for McCann, given his assumption that volitions are
actions. His position leaves him in a vacuum when it comes
to saying how volitions and non-volitional actional thoughts
qualify as actions. Obviously my alternative stance removes
the first of these problems. In addition, the second is less
of a problem. Non-volitional thoughts can qualify as actions
if they are caused by volitions; which, since volitions are
not actions, presents no worries about the causally basic
status either of the volitions or the resultant thoughts.
Furthermore, the aforementioned puzzle of our
non-volitional thoughts requiring volitional thoughts, is
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dissolved if we apply the moral derived from our discussion
of James's account of the will. Volitions are not
introspectible, hence are not conscious thoughts.
Returning to my additional principle for solving the
action-result problem: this is no more than the recognition
that an event's being caused by a volition constitutes
action. There is no need to regard volitions as actions in
order to explain action-results. The bringing about of
events by volition counts as action because of the 'special
nature' of volition, not because volitions are actions.
On McCann's account, it is because volitions are
actions that events they cause qualify as results, it is not
because of the unique nature of volition, but because of the
nature of action; which on this account remains a mystery.
As to why an event's being caused by volition should
constitute action, I attribute this to the fact that
volition is literally the 'putting into action' of our
desires, beliefs and purposes. So, it is this fact that
accounts for an event's being an action-result; if it is
caused by volition. The key to understanding action-results,
as well as the nature of action, is volition.
The special nature of volition is no more than that it
renders subsequent events actional, without itself being
action. This should not strike us as peculiar. After all, we
know that the account of how events qualify as actions
cannot repeatedly be in terms of earlier actions. Somewhere
there has to be a resort to non-actions that nevertheless
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account for the action-status of their effects. This is the
appropriate role for volition, for it is not appropriate to
treat volition as action.
(5) VOLITION AS NON-ACTION
Still, more must be said in support of treating
volitions as non-actions. Certainly, earlier volition
theories regarded volitions as actions (cf. my chapter on
the 'traditional' account), in addition, McCann offers
further comment in defence of this view. His main point
being that
"the explanatory power of the theory, a power not
even approached by the alternatives usually
offered, gives good reason for believing volition
does indeed constitute the causally basic action
occurring when actions that have results are
performed." (op.cit., p.470)
Despite this claim, we have seen that treating volition as
action leaves more problems unsolved than does my
alternative, which denies action-status to volitions.
Consequently, on the basis of explanatory power we should
opt for this latter account.
In fact McCann recognises this as a rival to his own
view, and comments:
"There would be little to object to the use of
the term 'action' to cover only deeds that have
results, provided this were understood to imply no
more than that volition and other acts of thinking
do not have them. But the danger is that it would
be taken to imply much more: for example, that
volition is not truly conduct, that it is not
intentional, that we are not responsible for it,
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and that there is no sense at all in which
volition is 'controlled'. But volition is conduct
in all the usual senses and has all the
characteristics usually taken as crucial to
action, with the single exception that it lacks a
result" (p.471).
In other words, McCann feels that the only possible grounds
on which volition could be denied as action, is the fact
that it has no result. But, I am denying more than this in
deeming volition non-action.
I should not wish to deny that volition (or willing) is
something one can be said to do, nor that in some sense it
may be voluntary. This far, I agree with McCann, although he
equates 'being voluntary' with 'being an action', as when he
asks whether 'we should think of [volition] and other mental
acts as not being voluntary, and hence not constituting
action' (p.471).
In opposition to McCann, I suggest that volition can be
voluntary yet not an action. It is true that voluntariness
is essentially involved in action, but while voluntariness
may be evident in action, it does not follow that whatever
is voluntary is action. Thus, in cases of voluntary
movement, such as my moving my arm, the movement can be
classed as voluntary, and this would be in virtue of its
being produced by the agent's volition. Yet the arm-movement
is not my action, it is merely the action-result. The fact
that this movement is not action does not imply that it is
not voluntary; events which are not actions can be
voluntary, hence, volitions, though voluntary, need not be
actions.
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In reply, McCann may argue that this is not the
full-blooded sense of voluntariness that he wishes to apply
to volition (and action). In this stronger sense of
'voluntary1, volitions will be voluntary because they are
under the control of the agent. This is the sense in which
he 'performs' a willing.
Earlier, in the context of our discussion of Prichard,
I disputed the view that volitions are actions and argued
that one does not have 'control* over one's willing.
Clearly, what one can control, one can do 'at will', but
this is not applicable to volition. Volition is not
something one can do _ij: one wills to do it, for one cannot
will to will! Hence, volition is not something one has 'in
one's power'. Normally one can move arms, legs, head,
tongue, and other parts of one's body, a±. will. These deeds,
one can control; not volitions. So what of McCann's claim
that volitions are intentional?
In an earlier paper, McCann explicates the notion of
intentional doing;
"What a person does is done intentionally
provided it is done with some intention. [Thus]
...when a person exerts himself to raise his arm,
he exerts himself with the intention of raising
his arm. This is signified by the 'to' in the
description of the doing. 'He exerted himself to
raise his arm, but did not exert himself with the
intention of raising his arm', is
self-contradictory." (McCann, 1972:243)
McCann would apply this to volition too. When one wills to
raise one's arm, the 'to' indicates that the willing is
performed with the intention of raising one's arm. Thus, it
169
would be self-contradictory to say 'he willed to raise his
arm, but he did not will with the intention of raising his
arm.' Hence, willing is intentional; which proves that it is
action.
The sense in which agents do things intentionally can
be unpacked further by reference to the concept of
'teleological basicness', which McCann employs in the
aforementioned article. In the case where Smith kills Jones
by shooting him,
"Smith will have performed the act of shooting
Jones a_s a means to killing him. This would be
especially so in cases where the killing is
intentional insofar as a person B's as a
means to A-ing, his action B is viewed by him as
ancillary to his action A; it occupies a place
subordinate to A in his purposes, and is done by
him with the intention of A-ing. Actions that are
viewed in this way by their agents may be said to
be teleologically more basic than the action to
which they are considered ancillary." (pp.237-238)
From this it should be clear that if, when one wills to
raise one's arm, the willing is intentional, it should be
'teleologically more basic' than the arm-raising. This is in
keeping with McCann's account of intentional doing, and
teleological basicness, such that, if not teleologically
basic relative to another doing of the same agent, the deed
cannot be intentional. This is important, for I shall
suggest that ordinarily, willing would not qualify as
teleologically basic, and that in consequence, it should not
be construed as intentional.
To appreciate this, note the conditions McCann requires
of the teleologically basic doing B. In particular, 'in so
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far as a person B's as a means to A-ing, his action B is
viewed by him as ancillary to his action A', and 'B occupies
a place subordinate to A iri [ the agent' s] purposes. ' Thus,
1 actions that are viewed in this way by their agents may be
said to be teleologically more basic...' (my emphasis).
Clearly it is crucial to this concept of teleological
basicness that the action construed as a means, be viewed as
such by the agent himself, and form part of his purposes. If
this is not the case, then not only will action B not be
teleologically more basic than A, but B will fail to be
intentional. For it is only when B is teleologically more
basic than A that the agent can truly be said to do B in
order to A.
We can apply this lesson to volitions. When one wills
to raise one's arm, the willing is intentional, and is
teleologically more basic than raising one's arm, only if
one conceives of this willing as a means to raising one's
arm, and the willing forms part of one's purposes. Is this
ordinarily the case?
It seems to me that when one raises one's arm no
thought is given to the processes required for this action.
The average man-in-the-street does not have 'as part of his
purposes', willing to raise his arm; this man has no
conception of willing at all, for he ordinarily has no
conception of doing anything a_s a means to raising his arm.
Hence, willing is not ordinarily viewed in this light, and
does not qualify as teleologically more basic than actions
of arm-raising. Furthermore, willing cannot be construed as
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intentional, for agents ordinarily have no conception of
such a doing when they act.
We have still to respond to McCann's claim that when
one wills to raise one's arm, the 'to' indicates that the
willing is performed with the intention of raising one's
arm. Remember that this view is substantiated with the claim
that 'he willed to raise his arm, but he did not will with
the intention of raising his arm', is self-contradictory.
What we must appreciate is that there is a non-teleological
sense in which one wills in order to act. This is simply the
sense in which willing brings about the desired
action-result. Thus, willing is required for arm-raising not
teleologically, but causally. One cannot raise one's arm
without the causally necessary conditions being satisfied.
But one need not conceive of these conditions, view them as
part of one's purposes, or even have an inkling of what they
may be, in order to raise one's arm (in the teleological
sense). Still, there is this clear sense (of causal
necessity) in which one must will iri order to raise one's
arm. The following example may help us to appreciate that
something's being required as a causal means does not make
it a teleological means.
If I telephone my grandmother in Australia, I use the
phone as a teleological means to speaking with her. Of
course, unknown to me, this telephone call may require the
use of sub-oceanic cables, which use is causally necessary
for my conversation. There is a clear sense therefore, in
which, if I am to speak to my grandmother, I must employ
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these cables as a means. But it is equally clear that using
such a means does not form part of my purposes, for I may be
unaware of its existence, let alone its necessity. It
follows that I do not employ the sub-oceanic cables as a
teleological means to speaking with my grandparent, even
though I use them as a causal means to this end.
From this we can appreciate that McCann's statement 'he
willed to raise his arm, but did not will with the intention
of raising his arm', is equivocal. If 'he willed to raise
his arm' is interpreted teleologically then it implies that
the willing was intentional. But we need not see willing as
ever being a teleological means to anything. Hence, the
appropriate interpretation of 'he willed to raise his arm'
is in terms of causal necessity. The willing had to take
place in order that the action be performed, but the willing
does not figure in the agent's purposes. So, 'he willed to
raise his arm, but did not will with the intention of
raising his arm' is, properly understood, not
self-contradictory, but invariably true. For the 'to'
indicates a causal, not a teleological means to action,
while 'with the intention of' indicates a teleological, not
a causal means.
From this, it should be apparent that McCann's view of
willing as intentional is not well-founded, furthermore, it
is not counter to commonsense to deny this view of volition,
for it is not denied that one wills in order to do whatever
one does (in the action sense). Volition is not intentional,
nor do we use volition as a teleological means to ordinary
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action. This is in keeping with my account of volition as
non-action.
Whether my view of volition is preferable to McCann's
as a solution to the action-result problem may be assessed
in one other respect. According to McCann, his approach is
especially apt because 1 it allows us to explain how the
result of the less basic action... came to occur at all, and
to explain it in terms of action on the part of the agent'.
(p.455)
Obviously my account is equally able to explain how the
results of basic actions come to occur; they occur because
they are caused originally by the agent's volitions. But
what of McCann's second consideration?
Since, on my view, volitions are not actions, it could
be said that I do not explain the occurrence of
action-results 'in terms of action on the part of the
agent'. This comment seems fair when applied to actions I
deem causally basic, for these actions have results that are
not caused by earlier of the agent's actions. Instead, these
results are caused by volitions.
While in an obvious sense, the occurrence of such
results is not on my scheme explained in terms of the
agent's actions, they are still placed in an action context.
For bringing about such a result by volition _is basic
action, and it is volition that makes the context an
actional one, even though volition is not itself action.
Consequently, there is no drawback in the fact that some
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action-results are not caused by earlier actions of the
agent. On the contrary, I have argued that this is
advantageous from a theoretical viewpoint, since it enables
us to explain much more than McCann's alternative.
(6) BASIC ACTION AND THE REGRESS ARGUMENT
Enough has been said to establish my alternative to
McCann's account as an adequate response to the
action-result problem. One major difficulty remains. The
resultant account of basic action as the bringing about of
an action-result by volition, bears close resemblance to the
earlier rejected version derived from Davidson.
In that case, basic action was represented as a causing
(of some event) which is not itself caused by any earlier of
the agent's actions. As my account would have it, a basic
action is the bringing about (causing) of some action-result
(event) by volition (which is not an earlier action of the
agent). Does this similarity mean that my version of basic
action falls to the same regress that defeated Davidson's
account? We must look again at figure 2.
figure 2_
CAUSINGl
eventl causes | event2 causes event3 [
CAUSING2
We are supposing that causing2 is the basic (or primitive)
action. The regress argument presents its problem on the
grounds that the relation holding between event2 and event3,
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which is taken to render causing2 a basic action, is matched
by the relation between eventl and event2. Hence, this
relation should render causingl a basic action too, and
likewise for causing0, before causingl. This, in essence, is
the regress argument detailed earlier.
Fortunately, this regress argument is mistaken. The
mistake is in supposing that causing2 counts as a basic or
primitive action because event3 is produced other than by
another action of the agent. Certainly, this is the basis of
the primitive nature of causing2, but this fact alone does
not establish its action status. The idea underlying
primitive action is that it will be action not caused by any
prior action of the same agent. Hence, the issue of whether
a particular causing counts as action, is both distinct
from, and logically prior to the question of its being a
primitive action. From this, it follows that while, if
causingl (in figure 2) was an action this would disqualify
causing2 from being primitive, the non-action status of
causingl does not disqualify causing2 either from being
primitive or from being action.
Thus, even if the relation of eventl to event2 is the
same as the relation of event2 to event3 (i.e. the latter is
caused by an event other than an action), this does not
imply that causingl counts as primitive action if causing2
so qualifies. To think this, is to suppose that the
action-status of causing2 (and not merely its primitive
status) derives from the causal origins of event3. On the
contrary, whether causing2 is an action is decided
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independently of its being primitive. After all, it can only
be primitive if it is an action, while it can be an action
without being primitive.
Since we are able to supplement Davidson's account of
primitive action, with a resort to volition which is not
itself action, this will enables us to characterise those
events which are causally basic, in a precise fashion.
Specifically, actions are bringing things about, where this
originates in volition, and causally basic actions are
instances where the bringing about is done directly by
volition.
In conclusion, it is appropriate to treat volition as
fundamental to action generally, though not itself action.
This enables us to resolve the action-result problem,
provide an account of basic action, and in general terms,
help to detail the nature of action itself.
Our next step is to consider how volition is related to
the concept of trying, and whether 'trying' is itself
important to the concept of action.
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CHAPTER 7_ : TRYING AND WILLING
U) VOLITION AND EFFORT
Recently, some writers "have suggested that a better
understanding of the concept of trying sheds important light
on the nature of action. (Davis, 1979; Gorr, 1979a; Hornsby,
1980; McCann, 1972, 1975; 0'Shaughnessy, 1973.) Several
major questions emerge about the relation of trying to
action. One can ask whether every instance of action
involves an instance of trying; whether tryings form a
unique class of doings (bearing a special relation to
instances of action); whether tryings are themselves
actions; and whether tryings bear any relation to willing.
In this chapter I shall propose answers to each of these
questions. To begin, we might ask why we should suppose that
the concept of trying is important.
In the first place, it may seem appealing to relate
trying closely with willing. Thus, according to Reid, when
we will to do a thing, 'the volition is accompanied with an
effort to execute that which we willed' (Reid, p.63). And is
'trying' not synonymous with 'effort'? When one wishes to
move a heavy rock it is necessary to exert some effort to
achieve this end. Surely one's trying to move the rock
consists in this effort?
One worry about this is that the effort involved in
rock shifting is clearly physical in nature. It is muscular
effort, going into pushing the obstacle. But is such
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muscular effort the same thing as effort of will? The
latter, one assumes, connotes something akin to
concentration, or effort 'at the level of consciousness',
rather than effort at the level of one's muscles. Yet, if we
contrast this effort of will with physical effort, puzzles
arise as to the nature of effort of will and also the
relation it might bear to volition.
Reid is not illuminating on this relation, for he does
not discuss the connection between volition and effort of
will, although he appears to distinguish the two when he
describes the latter as 'accompanying' the former. But if
effort of will is not some physical exertion, what else
could it be other than volition or will itself?
For William James, there is no distinction between
effort of will and the volition itself. He thus resolves
both of our puzzles with one answer: volitions are efforts
of will. Our earlier discussion of James (Chapter 3)
revealed a tripartite account of the will, but only two of
these parts constitute volitional occurrences; the other
part being 'simple ideo-motor action', which occurs with no
'express fiat' or 'volitional mandate'.
The two aspects of volition characterised by James are
firstly, 'attending to the thought of one's movement' and
secondly, 'express consent to the reality of what is
attended to'. It is interesting to note that James also
refers to these aspects respectively as 'the effort of
attention' (p.562), and 'the effort to consent' (p.568).
Thus, both types of volitional occurrence are described as
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'states of effort' (p.568). Hence, the volition ij; the
effort.
An apparently similar equation of volition with effort
is adopted by Prichard in his 'Duty and ignorance of fact'
(Prichard, 1949a). Here, Prichard represents willing as
'setting oneself' or 'exerting oneself' to do something
(p.32ff).
The significance of such alleged identity between
willing and exertion or effort to our present inquiry lies
in the fact that 'making an effort to do something' or
'exerting oneself to do it', seem synonymous with 'trying'
to do that thing. So we can see James and Prichard as
(tacitly) identifying willing with trying.
Before elaborating further on the notion of trying per
se, we may ask why we should think of willing or volition as
a species of effort. In James's case, the answer is easily
grasped, for his account of the operation of the will is
almost mechanistic in conception. The fundamental variety of
voluntary movement is simple ideo-motor action, in which
movements result directly from our 'naturally impulsive'
thoughts of such movements. Actual volitional occurrences
are only required when there is some resistance to the
impulsive nature of our thoughts. Thereby, the role of
volition is that of overcoming such resistance, and how is
resistance overcome but by effort? Since volitions fulfil
this function, James reasonably construes them as 'strokes
of effort'.
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On the other hand, Prichard's reasons for treating
volition as 'exerting oneself' to do something are not
apparent, although he is unhappy about the 'artificiality'
of the term 'will', when applied to the special activity one
performs in action (op. cit., p.33). In Prichard's later
work he reverts to talk of 'willing' in preference to
'setting oneself' and 'exerting oneself'.
There does seem to be some rationale for the equation
of willing with effort and thereby, with trying. Certainly,
if we must will in order to do any action then even if we
fail to do what we wish, we have made an effort to do it, in
the willing. This surely counts as trying to do the action
in question.
Yet, given this plausibility, the identification is not
straightforward. We noted earlier that not all effort is
readily viewed as 'effort of will'. If it is at the physical
or muscular level it seems to be the wrong sort of effort
altogether. But does this damage the claim that willings are
efforts, and thereby, tryings?
It certainly indicates that if willings are to be
regarded as efforts they can only be a species of effort,
for it is clearly implausible to construe physical efforts
as acts of will. So, even if every willing is some sort of
effort, not every effort is a willing. Similarly, this
reflects on the relation of willing to trying. My physical
effort to move the rock is not my effort of will, yet may
reasonably be described as my trying to move the rock.
Hence, even if every willing is a trying, not all tryings
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are willings.
So long as we are prepared to support a Jamesian view
of the operation of willing, the picture of volitions as
strokes of effort is apt, but since James's account has
already been considered and dismissed, we cannot plausibly
continue to regard volitions as, literally, efforts of will.
The only remaining justification for deeming volition a
stroke of effort would involve an extension of the meaning
of 'effort' or 'exertion'. In other words, calling volition
a stroke of effort, or an effort of will, can only be a
metaphorical use of the term. Thereby, its logic should not
lead us to seek anything on a par with physical effort or
exertion.
In response, it may still be said that willing i_s
effort of will, because it requires or involves mental
concentration and exertion in order to achieve the desired
end. Thus, in attempting a complicated long-division with
pencil and paper, one is likely to experience just such
concentration and effort. An effort of will is precisely
what is required to overcome the difficulty one encounters
in such tasks, hence volition i_s exertion of will.
The first trouble with this view is that not all
actions involve such an experience of effort or intense
concentration. This is precisely what led James to suppose
that only some actions require a volitional occurrence. But
we have seen the problem this leaves; how can non-willed
movements qualify as voluntary? It is quite likely that one
can perform less complicated long-divisions with no feeling
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of effort or concentration. Yet we should not say that such
calculations are unwilled. Consequently, whatever we may
occasionally feel in acting, is no sure guide to the
intrinsic nature of action as such. Since this association
of effort does not lead us far in understanding either
willing or trying, it may help to consider an apparently
paradigm example of both trying and willing.
(2) TRYING AND FAILING
In the case of a patient with an anaesthetised or
paralysed arm (such as cited by James, op. cit., p.105) we
may suppose that he both wills and tries to raise his
desensitised arm, although no limb movement may result.
Indeed, if this patient is blindfolded and asked to raise
his arm he may believe that he has complied with the
request, although his arm fails to rise. It is difficult to
explain the patient's mistaken belief if we do not suppose
that he succeeded in doing something. So it is plausible to
suggest that he willed his arm to rise, and thereby tried to
raise it, but did not succeed because of the effect of
anaesthesia on his arm muscles. In this way, his willing his
arm to rise, and thereby, his trying to raise it, may lead
him to believe that he has done what was asked of him.
Certainly, he appears to have done all that would ordinarily
be required of him in order to raise his arm, and he is
unable to tell that the arm does not rise, because he can
neither see nor feel the limb in question. So, if he knows
that he has done all that is normally required in order to
raise his arm, and cannot know that his arm does not
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respond, it is natural that he will believe himself to have
raised the arm. He has reason to believe it will rise, and
no reason to suppose it does not.
In such an instance, we seem to have the action of arm
raising minus the arm rising. So we might expect to shed
light on Wittgenstein's query as to what remains when we
subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I
raise my arm (Wittgenstein, 1953: I, para.621).
On first view it is tempting to say that the patient
raises his arm only it does not go up. But this will not do.
An arm raising without an arm rising is as logically absurd
as an omelette without eggs. In each case, the latter is a
logically necessary condition for the former. Instead, in
reply to Wittgenstein's question we may propose that what
remains upon subtraction of the arm rising is the agent's
willing his arm to rise, and his trying to raise his arm. Of
course it is not yet clear whether this would be one thing
or two, but we may suppose that in willing his arm to rise
the patient thereby tries to raise his arm.
Godfrey Vesey has considered various replies to
Wittgenstein's query (Vesey, 1961; page references to
Gustafson, 1970). In particular, he details three
possibilities as to what is left over upon subtraction of
the arm rising:
(i) the patient tried to move his arm.
(ii) the patient did whatever would ordinarily have
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produced the movement, and
(iii) the patient willed the movement to occur.
Curiously, Vesey is unhappy with all of these replies. This
is surprising because all appear apposite in the envisioned
context. If the patient had not done something that might be
considered trying to move his arm, why should he be
surprised upon learning that his arm had not risen? Since he
was surprised, we suppose that he believed he had raised his
arm, and this belief is explained if we attribute to the
patient some doing other than raising his arm, that we can
describe as his trying to raise his arm.
Also, it appears that the arm would have risen if only
the anaesthesia had been absent. Hence, we should suppose
that all other conditions for the action were satisfied. In
other words, the patient must have done what would
ordinarily have produced the arm rising.
Both of these suppositions lead us to seek some doing
that we may identify as the agent's trying to raise his arm,
and as his doing what would ordinarily produce the arm
movement. The most plausible candidate is his volition. If
he willed his arm to rise this would ordinarily result in
the arm movement. His willing may be understood as an
attempt on his part to raise his arm, and, furthermore, as
usually understood, willing would give the patient the
'feeling of agency'. This would explain his false belief
that he had raised his arm.
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Why then does Vesey reject such replies? In his view,
it is unsatisfactory to say the agent's trying is left over,
since he may be unaware of any difficulty in raising his arm
(op. cit., p.43). If the patient experiences no resistance
to his arm moving, how can we say that he had to try to move
it? As Vesey puts it:
"from the patient's point of view it is not as if
he had to try to move his hand, but as if he could
actually, and easily, move it..." (p.43)
So, the patient cannot have tried to raise his arm unless he
met with some resistance, and thereby failed.
There is no doubt that the subject in question
experienced no resistance to his moving his arm, but does
this entitle us to conclude that he did not try? We commonly
distinguish occasions when something can be achieved without
difficulty from others where obstacles or resistance
preclude success. Ordinarily, we would say that in cases of
the former type, the objective is achieved without having to
try■ While, in the latter type of case, we would say that
the agent could only try, since the obstacles were not
surmountable. Granted this conventional usage, Vesey's
comments are appropriate, for talk of trying ordinarily
indicates the presence of known difficulty or resistance to
the proposed action. But this is not all there is to trying.
(_3 ) A SECOND MODEL FOR TRYING
In response to Vesey's rejection of trying, Robert
Imlay argues that there is a second model for trying, not
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acknowledged by Vesey, which he believes to be a correct
answer to Wittgenstein's query (imlay, 1967). As Imlay puts
it:
"Vesey1s argument... would be conclusive only if
trying to do something had to be accompanied by an
awareness of empirical obstacles on the part of
the person who is trying. And although this is
true in terms of the model of trying to which
efforts of will conform, it is not true in terms
of the model of trying where saying that someone
has tried is just a more positive way of saying
that he has not succeeded in doing what he set out
to do." (p.125)
This conception of trying 'bridges the gap between what a
person thinks he is doing and the fact that he is doing
nothing' (loc. cit.). Indeed, Imlay describes it as an ad
hoc device to suit just this purpose. Furthermore, on this
model, the trying need not involve any doing.
So, according to Imlay, we can describe the
anaesthetised patient as trying to raise his arm, but this
is not to ascribe any doing in which the trying consists,
for to say that he tried is to say merely that he did not
achieve what he set out to do. There are, however, several
worrying aspects to Imlay's position.
Firstly, as Imlay himself notes,
"the question arises... as to how, if trying is
not a doing, we are to distinguish between...
[our] patient and the person who dissociates
himself right from the start from the
experiment..." (p.126)
How do we differentiate between two subjects where
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neither raises their arm, but only one is anaesthetised?
Supposing the first does not raise his arm solely because of
the anaesthesia, whereas the other does not raise his arm
through lack of interest in doing so. Can we describe both
as trying to raise their arm? Presumably, this ascription
applies only to the patient whose arm is paralysed. Yet does
this trying not consist in something he does? Is this not
what differentiates his case from that of his apathetic
companion? Imlay has the following response:
"Any sense of strangeness there might be is...
dispelled once we concentrate not so much on the
fact that the two people did not raise their arm
but on the fact that James' patient failed to
raise it while the other person in effect refused
to raise it. For this difference... reflects their
fundamental difference in attitude toward the
experiment." (p.126)
To this, he adds that 'it is the positive attitude of James'
patient towards the experiment as much as anything else that
leads us to say that he tried and failed to raise his
arm..." (loc. cit.).
This is an odd state of affairs, for it is alleged that
the attitude of the patient toward the task he is asked to
do, combined with the fact that he is unable to comply with
the request, render it appropriate to say that he tried and
failed. But suppose our patient realises that his arm is not
rising because of the anaesthesia, and knows also that its
effects are short-lived. Thereby, he might continue to try
to raise his arm at regular intervals in the belief that he
will eventually be successful.
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While there is nothing odd in this scenario it presents
peculiar difficulties for Imlay's notion of trying. In the
first place, since describing the patient as trying requires
some pro-attitude on his part, it is difficult to see what
trying at regular intervals would amount to. Must we suppose
that the patient only ceases to try when he ceases to
maintain his favourable attitude toward raising his hand,
and thereby tries once more when this attitude returns?
Surely, his pro-attitude toward raising his arm may obtain
throughout the duration of the anaesthesia; in which case,
he would not cease trying for an instant. Furthermore, such
favourable attitudes need not be within the patient's
control. Just as he might grow depressed and unable to work
up enthusiasm for the doctor's experiments, likewise, he may
find himself unaccountably well-disposed to having his arm
go up when requested to raise it. Oddly, this would render
his trying to raise his arm outwith his control.
In addition, there is a second, and perhaps more
peculiar consequence of Imlay's position. If the patient in
the above scenario only tries in Imlay's sense, he will
never succeed in raising his arm, for this trying is not
doing anything. And if the patient does nothing as an
attempt to raise his arm, we should not expect success. Yet
we know for sure that if he genuinely persists in trying to
raise his arm, it will eventually rise. He will eventually
be successful. This surely indicates the absurdity of
Imlay's account of trying, for on this view trying to raise
the arm is not doing anything, but attempting to raise one's
arm by doing nothing cannot possibly succeed. Indeed, its
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success is logically precluded. A trying that cannot succeed
is absurd (cf. Margolis, 1960:96-7; McCormick and Thalberg,
1967:43-4). Hence, either our patient cannot try to raise
his paralysed arm or his trying to do so must consist in
some doing which might (logically) be successful.
Although Imlay claims that our patient performs no
doing when he tries (and fails) to raise his arm, the
incoherence of this view is implicit in the manner in which
it is expressed. Thus, 'saying that someone tried is just a
more positive way of saying that he has not succeeded in
doing what he set out to do' (p.125). But if this trying
involves no doing, what can we describe as the agent's
'setting out' to raise his arm? Again, it is only when there
is something which can be so described that it makes sense
to say that the agent failed, or did not succeed in what he
set out to do.
Imlay's account of trying will not stand as a response
to the Wittgenstinian query, for if the patient does nothing
then he does not try to raise his arm. This is reflected in
Imlay's inability to explain the patient's belief that he
raised his arm. How is this accounted for, on the
supposition that he did nothing?
There is however, one important lesson to be drawn from
Imlay's stance against Vesey, for he is correct in that
Vesey's argument is conclusive only if trying has to be
accompanied by an awareness of some resistance on the part
of the agent (p.125). Although Imlay fails to provide a
coherent alternative account of trying; one which lacks this
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feature of perceived resistance; there may yet be such a
trying.
(4) OMNIPRESENT TRYING
Although we ordinarily speak of someone trying when we
actually anticipate resistance to their achieving what they
set out to do, or, generally, when we have doubts about the
likelihood of their success, this may not preclude the
possibility that one tries whenever one performs any action.
Thus, Brian 0'Shaughnessy argues that the possibility of
'divergent cognitive attitudes' toward any proposed action
makes it appropriate to describe agents who are themselves
neither in doubt nor difficulty over the success of their
intended actions, as trying to do what they intend
(O'Shaughnessy, 1973:365-8).
By 'divergent cognitive attitudes' is meant simply the
possibility that someone (not necessarily the agent) may
have reason to doubt the likely success of the agent's
enterprise. What is important about this argument is that
the mere possibility of doubt on anyone's part renders it
appropriate to describe agents as trying whenever they
perform an action, or set out to do so. The force of the
argument is put succinctly by Hugh McCann, in denying that
one tries only if one sets out and fails, or an obstacle is
present, or the agent has doubts about his likely success:
"The trouble with this is that the third disjunct
can be satisfied in an onlooker, who has nothing
to do with the attempt. If I am the only one who
doubts that you can touch your toes, I can
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correctly say you will try to do so. But you are
the only one who tries; trying is something you
do. And what an agent does cannot be a function of
how a mere onlooker happens to view the
proceedings." (McCann, 1975:425)
Hence, the possibility of doubt with respect to any intended
action, indicates the presence of trying, as something the
agent does. (cf. also Gorr, 1979a:243ff; Davis, 1979:16ff;
and Hornsby, 1980:33ff; all of whom detail arguments akin to
the above.)
If we are thus able to conclude that trying is always
present whenever one acts or sets out to act, does this
enlighten us in the context of our anaesthetised patient?
Certainly we may reject Vesey's misgivings over describing
this patient as trying to raise his arm, but are we yet
entitled to apply this ascription? After all, it is not
clear that the subject is able to do anything about raising
his arm, so why should we say that he can try?
It seems that this ascription will only be appropriate
if we can locate some doing of the subject which is
reasonably seen as a trying on his part, to raise his arm.
If he were totally paralysed and unable to exert any
physical effort whatever toward moving his arm, this might
be taken as indicative of his inability not merely to raise
his arm, but also an inability to try to do so.
This is the view adopted by Richard Taylor (Taylor,
1966:82ff) who feels that
"if there is nothing whatever... a man can do in
192
the way of trying to move his... [arm]- if he is
as helpless with respect to this as the rest of us
are with respect, say, to suddenly reducing our
bulk to that of an acorn- then it would be idle to
insist that he might nevertheless at least try."
(p.83)
Still, we might wish to describe our patient as able to
will his arm to move. In which case, this willing might be
construed as trying to raise the arm, even if it produces no
physical response in the patient's body. After all, if he is
unable to try to raise his arm, it is difficult to see how
he could discover this disability. Supposing him able to
will the arm movement, and thus able to try, would enable
the patient to learn that his arm is paralysed through his
failure to raise his arm. Taylor, however, sees no need to
resort to willing as trying. Thus:
"If one insisted that he was trying to open a
door, and it was apparent that he was performing
no bodily action at all- grasping nothing,
exerting no effort, and so on- then he could not
be telling the truth. If he said that all he was
doing was 'just trying', that is, trying without
actually doing anything except just mentally
trying, then at best his 'trying' would consist
only of concentrating on the door, perhaps wishing
it might open, or vividly imagining it opening...
But no mental doings of this kind can count as
trying to do anything." (p.81)
As to how our patient finds out that his arm will not move,
Taylor points out that
"no one ever learned that he could not wiggle his
hair by trying and failing; yet we do certainly
know this. It cannot be maintained, then, that no
one could know this, unless he had tried and
failed- for no one has ever tried it, and no one
even knows how to try it, and yet everyone does
know that he cannot do it." (loc. cit.)
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Apparently, this is Taylor's response to the argument
that the patient must be capable of trying to raise his arm
if he is able to learn that it is paralysed. After all, if
he can learn of his inability to do something, without
•having first to try and fail, then there is no compulsion to
/' believe that the patient must be able to try to raise his
arm, if he is to learn of his reduced capacity for arm
moving. But this response depends upon treating our
paralysed arm example as on a par with Taylor's hair
wiggling. Are these similar cases of learning without the
need for trying?
According to Taylor they are. He maintains that we know
that we cannot wiggle our hair and do not discover this by
trying and failing, and that the paralysed man 'knows in the
same way that he cannot move his... [arm]', he just finds
that he cannot do it (p.84). This naturally leads us to ask
how the subject 'finds' out that he cannot raise his arm.
Taylor's response?
"How he finds out is again beside the point; we
need not in any case, suppose that he finds it out
from something else that he finds, namely, from
the failure of his... effort of trying." (loc.
cit.).
Taylor claims that our paralysed subject does not find
out that his arm will not rise by trying to raise it and
inferring from the fact that it does not go up. Instead, he
just knows that it will not move, as he knows that his hair
will not wiggle at his command. But this analogy is far from
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plausible. If the patient makes no inference from a trying,
then should he not be aware that his arm is paralysed the
instant this is so? Yet experiments indicate that subjects
can be mistaken in thinking that their arm operates normally
when it is in fact paralysed.
Clearly, the patient need not know of his inability
until asked to raise his arm by the experimenter. Does he
not thereupon infer his paralysis from his failure to raise
his arm?
Of course, we must locate this trying as some doing of
the subject. In this respect, Taylor is correct in noting
that 'trying to do one thing consists of actually doing
something else' (p.81). Again, the most plausible response
is to suppose that the patient's trying to raise his arm
consists in his willing the arm to rise.
(5_) WILLING BUT NOT TRYING?
An unusual alternative to this view is advocated by
Michael Gorr in his article 'Willing, trying and doing'
(Gorr, 1979a). Although he is unhappy with Taylor's approach
to the problem, Gorr does accept that the patient may not
try to raise his arm, in order to discover his paralysis.
Instead,
"The paralytic acquires knowledge of his
paralysis by discovering his inability even to try
to move his body; this inability he in turn
discovers by observing that his willing to move
his body fails to result in the kinaesthetic
sensations characteristic of trying. The
paralytic's knowledge, in other words, is the
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result not of an inference from an unsuccessful
trying, but of an inference from an unsuccessful
willing." (p.247)
But why should we separate trying from willing? Gorr's
position is the result of a thesis he defends in the
-aforementioned paper, viz:
(i) 'Trying consists in the muscular activity
required for bodily movement.' (p.246)
Obviously, if we construe trying to make a bodily movement
as the activation of appropriate muscles, since such
activity is ruled out when one's arm is paralysed, trying to
raise one's arm under such circumstances is also precluded.
So it is in keeping with Gorr's position that our patient
could not learn of his paralysis through trying.
Nevertheless, while Gorr's view that performing the
muscular activity required for bodily movement amounts to
trying to move one's body, is entirely plausible, it does
not entail that such muscular exertion is all that might
constitute trying. So, when Gorr suggests that the patient
learns of his paralysis through unsuccessful willing, why
not suppose that such willing (in the absence of muscular
activity), is trying to raise his arm? Although this willing
is not a trying on Gorr's conception of trying, there is no
obvious reason for denying this status to volition, as well
as to the muscular activity required for bodily movements.
Gorr's reason for declining this option is easily
found, for as well as thesis (i), above, he also maintains
that
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(ii) 'we cannot coherently identify volitions with
doings of any sort.1 (p.247)
Given the fact that, as Gorr agrees, tryings are doings, if
volitions are not doings, then they cannot be tryings.
Volition is understood by Gorr to be
"a mental event that functions to bring about the
occurrence of things we can be said to do and
thereby, explains the intentionality or
purposiveness that distinguishes a doing from a
mere happening." (p.246)
It is for this reason that he does not wish to construe
willing as a doing. If it is to be used to explicate the
notion of a doing, then volition cannot itself be a doing.
Gorr regards doings as events appropriately related to
volitions, hence volitions themselves may not be done.
Obviously, if tryings are doings and volitions are not,
then willing cannot be trying. So Gorr details the paralysed
patient as learning that his arm is immobilised through
willing it to move, not through trying to move it. Thus,
according to Gorr the patient will appreciate not only that
he cannot raise his arm but also that he is unable to try to
raise it. This is in keeping with his account of trying as
muscular activity.
Nevertheless, there are two aspects to Gorr's story
that give cause for concern. In the first place, it seems
peculiar that our patient can discover his paralysis by
willing if this willing is not something he does. Does this
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mean that the patient has to wait around for the appropriate
volition to happen, before he is able to appreciate that it
does not have its usual effect? Surely, if he is capable of
discovering his paralysis he can do so by instigating a
test, rather than waiting for an opportune happening, which
would be his willing the arm to rise?
The second worrying feature of Gorr's account is that
it seems to exclude the possibility of trying to contract
one's muscles. After all, if trying consists in the muscular
activity necessary for bodily movement, this entails that
one can only try to do what requires muscular activity as a
means. Clearly, contracting one's muscles is not something
one does by contracting one's muscles, hence, according to
Gorr, one cannot try to do such a thing.
In response, Gorr may say that there are varieties of
trying other than that involving muscular activity. Thus,
one can try to open a door by charging it with a shoulder.
But muscular activity would count as the fundamental (or
perhaps, causally basic) species of trying. So, how would
one contract one's muscles?
A likely response is that one might try to activate,
say, one's arm muscles, by moving one's arm. V7hile initially
plausible, this is problematic. In order that I try to
contract my arm muscles it is not necessary that I succeed.
So, if trying to contract them may consist in moving my arm,
I do not have to succeed in moving the arm in order to have
tried to contract my arm muscles. So long as I have done
something that amounts to trying to move my arm, in order to
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contract my arm muscles, then I have tried to contract those
muscles. Thus, while I may try to contract them by moving my
arm, it is not necessary that I move it. I could try to
contract the arm muscles by trying to move my arm. But then,
in what would trying to move my arm consist?
If I may try to contract my muscles by trying to move
my arm, and trying to move the arm is nothing more than
activity of the appropriate muscles, then trying to contract
one's muscles would ultimately consist in contracting those
very muscles. This is the view that Gorr's approach leads
to; this is a view that I take to be paradoxical.
If I can only try to 0 by 0-ing, this means that I can
never try and fail, for here, trying to do one thing does
not consist in doing something else, which is contrary to
the logic of trying.
We see therefore that the result of Gorr's thesis (i)
is that one could not try to contract one's muscles; unless
there is something more fundamental than muscular activity
that could be employed as means to this end. The natural
candidate is willing. But this possibility is excluded by
Gorr's thesis (ii). Given that we should wish to retain the
possibility of trying to contract one's muscles, at least
one of Gorr's theses has to be rejected.
Surely the most plausible move is to allow that trying
to contract one's muscles, as well as trying to do other
things, may consist in willing them. Yet this means not only
that Gorr's thesis (ii) must go but also his thesis (i). In
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other words, if one may try to contract one's muscles by
willing them to contract, this entails the falsity of
(i) Trying consists in muscular activity.
and
(ii) We cannot identify volitions with doings of any
sort.
The second of these theses must also be rejected because
willing can only be trying, if it is also a doing. Does this
mean in consequence, that volition cannot serve to explicate
the concept of a doing, as Gorr fears?
I believe Gorr is confused on this point too, for there
may be scope for a distinction between things we do that are
actions, and things we do that are not. In this case, we
might construe willing as a non-actional doing, and employ
it in explicating the concept of action (the other sort of
doing). Of course, this depends upon the viability of such a
distinction. I shall attempt to demonstrate its
plausibility.
(6) TRYING AS ACTION
In 'Trying, paralysis and volition' (McCann, 1975),
Hugh McCann argues that 'to try is to engage in action, and
indeed in action that is necessarily intentional' (p.430).
He lists four reasons for supposing trying to be not merely
a doing, but action:
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(1) Trying is not a passive occurrence, but something
we do.
(2) It is something we know we do, when we do it.
(3) Trying is something we are held responsible for
doing or not doing.
(4) Trying is always intentional; one who tries always
acts with the intention of doing what he is said to try
to do. (pp.430-1)
In summing up, McCann notes that, 'if all this is true, then
trying has all the earmarks of intentional action. Hence, we
can only conclude that even in cases of paralysis, to try to
act is to act intentionally (p.432).
We have already seen that McCann regards volition as
action, it is natural therefore, that in equating trying
with willing he should construe trying as action. He is
almost correct. This seems to put me in a difficult position
since I have opposed the view that to will is to act, yet I
accept that willing is a form of trying. Can these two
theses be compatible?
In order to demonstrate that my overall position is not
only coherent but preferable to that adopted by McCann, we
must consider the claim that trying is always action. For
this is where McCann goes wrong.
McCann's first pointer to the action-status of trying,
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is the claim that trying is always something we do, and not
a passive occurrence (p.430). What is not clear to me is
that this forms a comprehensive dichotomy; with doings that
are actions (hence, active) on the one hand, and mere
occurrences that are not actions (hence, passive), on the
other. The trouble with this classification is that all
doings are classified as intentional in nature, which they
are not. Furthermore, the non-intentional doings, which I
shall detail, are distinct from other occurrences aptly
described as 'passive'.
To understand my conception of non-actional,
non-intentional doings, we must return to the notion of
trying. When one tries to do something, this trying always
consists in doing something other than that which one tries
to do. Thus, if I try to close the door by shoving it with
my knee, my trying consists in the means I employ to secure
what I wish to achieve, in this case, shoving the door with
my knee. But from our discussion of basic action we learned
that there are at least two ways of classifying the means
that we employ in doing things. Thus, my shoving the door
may be a teleological means to closing the door; it will
also be employed as a causal means to this end. Clearly,
being a means of either type is compatible with being a
means of the other type. As in the above example, where my
shoving the door with my knee is (ordinarily) both a
teleological and a causal means to closing the door.
The principal difference between these two sorts of
means is of crucial significance. Something can only be a
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teleological means if it is conceived of by the agent as
part of his plan for achieving his goal (cf. McCann,
1972:235-249). In this sense, my shoving the door is a
teleological means, because I shove the door with the
intention of closing the door. From our earlier discussion
of willing as a means, we know that volition is a causal
means to bodily movement, but not a teleological means (see
previous chapter). Since willing is ordinarily not something
agents are aware of doing, it cannot form part of their
purposes in the sense required of a teleological means.
Nevertheless, volition still stands as something employed as
a means to bodily movement, and, for that matter, as a means
to muscular activity. I submit therefore that willing is
something the agent does (in the sense of causal means) in
order to contract his muscles or move his body. Furthermore,
there is no reason why this doing should not count as trying
to do the thing in question.
To summarise the recent arguments: we have considered
and rejected Gorr's suggestion that our paralysed patient
wills his arm to rise, without trying to raise it. Despite
Gorr's attempts to equate trying with muscular activity,
there is every reason to suppose that if our patient can
will his arm to move, he can thereby try to move it. This is
especially so, since willing can plausibly be understood as
something one does. Despite Gorr's fears over this admission
we are still able to employ the concept of volition in
explicating the difference between actions and other events,
for while it i_s a doing, volition is not an action.
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Against McCann, I have argued that willing as a doing,
can be a trying without being intentional. It can be viewed
as a trying because it is always employed as a causal means
to bodily movements; it is not intentional because it is
never employed as a teleological means to such movements.
In effect, I contend that there are two types of trying
(as there are two types of means). Only trying which
involves some teleological means will be intentional; only
such a trying will be action. Thus far I have met two of
McCann's four pointers to the action-status of trying. These
are (1) trying is always a doing, and (4) trying is always
intentional. My response has been, firstly, that willing is
a doing; but for that, not action. Secondly, that not all
trying is intentional, for it may involve use of a causal
but not a teleological means. This describes willing, hence
willing is trying without acting.
Before moving on to consider McCann's remaining two
pointers, more must be said in defence of my claim that the
doing one performs in willing can count as a trying. The
objection I envisage is that calling the use of a causal
means 'trying' is an extension of the meaning of this term,
for by 'trying' we mean the use of a teleological means. How
can willing be trying if the agent who wills is not even
aware that he has done so? Can I be trying to do something
without appreciating in what my trying consists?
This is an important criticism of my account of willing
as trying. Indeed, a similar line of attach may be directed
against my claim that willing is a doing: is it compatible
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with willing being a doing, that the agent is not conscious
of willing?
But is there reason to think that trying must always be
the use of some teleological means? We already know that I
can telephone my grandmother in Australia by using
sub-oceanic cables as a causal means. If, perchance, I am
unable to connect with my grandparent, would not my trying
include all that went into getting a telephone to ring in
Darwin? In which case, at least in part, my trying to
contact my grandmother involved the use of submarine
telephone links of whose existence I was totally ignorant;
having assumed that Telstar or its second cousin would be
used to make the link. If this is so, then trying may
consist in the use of a causal means which is not a
teleological means to my goal. It appears to me that to
insist further that trying must involve teleological means,
is to fall back on verbal stipulation.
What then of my claim that willing is a doing? Once
again it is tempting to insist that to be a doing something
must form part of our conscious purposes. But it is readily
seen that sending electromagnetic signals over vast
distances is something I did in telephoning Australia. Yet I
did not consciously set out to do anything with
electromagnetic waves. I need not have met the concept
before, but transmitting such a signal is certainly
something I did, whether I was aware of it or not.
Consequently, there is precedent for describing our use of
any causal means as something we do. Since willing has been
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defended as such a causal means, willing is therefore doing.
The remaining pointers to the action-status of trying
that McCann details, are
(2) It is something we know that we do, when we do it,
and,
(3) Trying is something we are held responsible for
doing or not doing.
The first of these was looming in the background when we
considered the view that trying must always be the use of a
teleological means. There, we asked whether volition could
count as trying, if we are not conscious of willing. Surely,
we are always aware when we try to do something that we are
trying to do it? Does this not prove that to will is not to
try?
While I may be unaware of all that my trying involves,
I cannot fail to appreciate that I am trying. So, if I am
not aware of willing, how can this count as trying? McCann
is correct in noting that we generally know, when we are
trying to do something, that we are trying. He adds that
"our knowledge of what we are trying to do is
precisely the special kind of knowledge that is
normal for an agent engaging in intentional, overt
action." (op. cit., p.430)
A solution to this difficulty is to be found in a further
significant feature of volition, for it is the presence of
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volition in action that explains the agent's awareness of
acting. But what this means has to be carefully understood,
for it does not imply awareness of volition, a_s such, nor
does it preclude the possibility of non-actional trying.
In this vein, Lawrence Davis has suggested that agent's
awareness of acting should be explained by postulating
volitions (Davis, 1979). He represents volition as
"an event which is normally the cause of the
agent's belief that he is acting in a certain way,
and which normally causes such doing-related
events that make it true that he _is acting in that
way." (p.16)
In this way, since actions always involve volition, we can
understand the agent's knowledge that he is acting in terms
of the presence of volition. His willing not only causes
muscular activity or bodily movements, but, ajs part of its
nature, leads the agent to believe that he is active.
Effectively, when an agent wills, he feels that he has
done something. But this is not to say that he feels the
volition. Since the awareness derives from volition, if the
agent wills but this willing , unknown to him, fails to take
effect. he may well believe that he has done more than he
has in fact done. This is why our paralysed patient believes
(falsely) that he has raised his arm. He wills to raise his
arm, and he is unable to appreciate that his arm does not
move. Certainly, he is aware of doing something, but he is
mistaken as to what it is. He also knows what he was trying
to do, viz. raise his arm. And there is no doubt that he, at
least, tried to raise his arm. What he did was to will; this
207
willing was "his attempt at arm-moving.
So, contrary to what McCann contends, agent's awareness
of trying is not always indicative of his having acted,
although usually this is so. This awareness is not a
characteristic of actions, but of doings. Usually when he
wills, the agent's volition has some effect and in such a
case we have action. But when he tries to perform some
action, and this trying consists only in his willing, he is
nevertheless conscious of having done something. It is
because he has done something that he has this awareness; he
need not have acted. The willing is a doing, and as such has
the same agent-awareness one expects from action; the
awareness is due to volition, whether or not it has any
bodily effects; whether or not it is part of an action. The
presence of this awareness is no accurate guide to what one
has done, and does not indicate that willing is action. It
is the nature of willing that explains the 'feeling' of
being active; which is why we think of ourselves as doing
something, though it may be no more than willing.
All of this means that McCann's pointer (2), that
trying is something that we know that we do when we do it,
is true, but does not show that trying is always action.
Trying may consist in a doing that results in
agent-awareness, but is yet not an action; such is volition.
We are left with McCann's third pointer:
(3) Trying is something we are held responsible for
doing.
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Again, this is always true where the trying consists in
using something as a teleological means. But is this true of
willing as trying? There is reason to think that it is. But
to get this fact in perspective we have to look again at the
structure of action. We know that we are held responsible
for the actions we perform, so, if I make a rude gesture to
a traffic warden this is likely to be laudable or
despicable, as something I do. Similarly, I may be
criticised (or praised) for trying to make a rude gesture.
(I may fail because I am in France where the conventions for
rude gesturing are different.) Clearly, it is not necessary
that one's actions succeed in order to evoke praise or
blame. But why should trying be thus subject? It is not that
what the trying consists in is, in itself, laudable or
reprehensible, for it may be totally innocuous. Rather, it
is seen as part of what goes into doing a reprehensible or
laudable action. In the same way, since willing is part of
what is involved in any action, and since, like actions, it
is a product of the agent's aims, desires and beliefs, it
may be subject to praise and blame. Ordinarily, if I will my
arm to rise, then I set out to raise it. I am as much
responsible for this as for actually raising my arm. But
does this mean that willing must be an action? The short
answer is, 'no'. We may be held responsible not only for the
actions we perform, but for the sort of things we are
inclined to do. Thus, in the case where I tried to be rude,
I may be blamed for having such an inclination, not because
of what I actually did. Indeed, there is every reason to
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suppose that I would be blamed (or at least criticised) for
willing to do such a thing. Not because this willing is a
type of action worthy of praise or blame, but because it
represents a move on my part to do an action which is so
worthy.
So, willing is something for which we may be held
responsible, as we may be with anything that indicates the
sort of things we are inclined to do, but this does not mean
that willing must be action, for as a species of trying it
is obviously part of what is involved in acting, hence our
responsibility for it.
We see therefore, that McCann is wrong in construing
every trying as action. Willing can count as trying, be
something the agent does, and be something he is held
responsible for doing. Also, in willing, he will know that
he is doing something (though he may not know precisely what
he is doing). These facts do not show that willing is
intentional nor that it must count as action.
Before concluding our present discussion, we have to
consider one further thesis about trying, which is that
tryings have a special status with respect to performing any
action.
(7) TRYING AS CONATION
At least two writers
tryings are conceptually
should understand action
have proffered the view that
fundamental to action; that we
in terms of its structure as
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involving trying. Brian 0'Shaughnessy contends that
"when a man intentionally raises his arm, the
following happens. His arm rises; he tries to
raise his arm; and the latter event causes, along
acceptable bodily paths, the physical event of arm
rising." (01Shaughnessy, 1973:383)
He believes that 'an inner phenomenon... [of trying] is a
permanent constituent of physical action' (p.367). Jennifer
Hornsby agrees that tryings have such a special status, and
she characterises actions as 'tryings to move the body or
bring about bodily movements' (Hornsby, 1980:45). For both
of these writers trying is a 'substitute' for the
traditional concept of volition, in other words, tryings are
conations (cf. Hornsby, p.47).
This is a view that I do not endorse, for there is
nothing special about tryings as there is about willing.
Thus, pushing a door, firing a rocket, and even, willing can
all be tryings. All qualify as tryings for similar reasons,
but describing them thus tells us nothing about the nature
of such events. McCann has this matter in correct
perspective, as when he notes that 'trying'
"never names a unique species of action, but
rather functions always as a general name for the
business of going about... [some] performance..."
(McCann, 1975:436)
Thus, 'we speak of trying only when we have occasion to
distinguish this business from the actual complete
performance of an act' (loc. cit.).
Of course, we might suppose there to be no harm in
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calling the essential feature of action 'trying', especially
if willing can count as trying. Perhaps then, 'trying' will
do as well, if not better than 'volition'. Hornsby remarks
that
"Tryings are at an advantage here. "Try' is a
common enough word. And at least there is no
problem about showing that people sometimes try to
act, even if it takes a philosopher to find a
serious interest in showing that when we act we
always try to act." (p.47)
Yet, even if we show that we always try whenever we
act, this does not vindicate the view that tryings are a
type of event essential to action. Indeed, there is good
reason for supposing that trying cannot fill this role.
If trying were a special mental act (a conation), in
keeping with other such occurrences, it would have content.
Thus, the content, for example, of my trying to open the
fridge door would be the action of opening that door, for
this is what I try to do. The content of any trying would be
the action that it is a trying to do; one always tries to
perform some action.
This generates a problem when conjoined with the fact
that trying to do any action is necessarily involved in
doing that action. In order to do any action A, it is
necessary to try to A, and this trying is not merely a
prerequisite for A-ing, it is part of doing the action in
question.
The result of combining these facts is that in order to
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successfully do A, I must do all that is involved in doing
A. Hence, I must try to A, since this is part of doing A.
But since trying to A has as its content, the action A (and
all that A-ing involves), it follows that trying to do A is
trying to do all that is involved in doing A. Since part of
A-ing is trying to A, this means that trying to A is part of
the content of trying to A, so that trying to A requires
that one try to try to A (cf. McCann, 1975:435-6). Thus, the
supposition that trying is a special type of act fundamental
to action, leads to a vicious regress of tryings.
Significantly, this problem is avoided if we deny that
trying has content, but this is to deny it conation-status.
Instead of regarding trying as conation, and in keeping with
the position I have been defending, we can see trying not as
a particular sort of event, but as a way of describing
anything that is part of the business of performing an
action. In this light, trying would have no content, and
there is no risk of having to try to try to try, etc.
In addition, this type of regress cannot be generated
for volitions as conations, for although they would have
content, the content of a volition would not be an action,
but some bodily movement (an action-result). Thus, the
content of my volition when I will my arm to rise is not my
action of raising the arm, but the related event of my arm
rising. This means that although volitions have content, and
are part of what is involved in doing any action, since the
conterit is not the action (which includes the volition), no
regress can be generated.
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(8) HORNSBY AGAINST THE REGRESS OF TRYINGS
The regress argument given above should be adequate to
ensure that trying is not misconstrued as a special type of
event, but Jennifer Hornsby believes her position is immune.
So, I want to consider briefly her defence of trying as
conation, against this threatened regress.
Hornsby1s version of the regress argument runs as
follows:
"Since an action of 0-ing is an event of trying
to 0, someone's trying to 0 must be his trying to
try to 0. But again, his trying to try to 0, if
the content of a trying is an action, must be his
trying to try to try to 0..." (p.63)
Her first response to this argument is to say:
"It appears that the truth of 'Anything that is a
0-ing is a trying to 0' is used in this argument
to guarantee the replacement of '0' with 'try to
0' in the context 'try to _'. But compare the
claim that, in the presence of 'Anything which is
an F is a G', 'F' can be replaced with 'G' in the
context 'not _' . The result is that we may
conclude from 'Not Fx' that 'Not Gx', i.e. that we
have licensed the fallacy of Denying the
Antecedent. The onus is on the user of... [the
regress] argument to justify his step." (p.63)
This response is plausible only if we accept the
initial premise Hornsby has imposed on the regress argument,
viz. an action of 0-ing is an event of trying to 0. But it
is certainly false that every action is identical to a
trying to do that action. More reasonably, the trying is
anything that goes into doing the action, short of action
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itself. When a trying is successful it does not become the
action one is trying to do, it results in this action. So we
can forestall Hornsby's misgivings by replacing this premise
in the regress with the more acceptable alternative: every
action of 0-ing involves trying to 0 (or: every action of
0-ing is _in part composed of trying to 0) . This change to
the argument renders the sort of substitution criticised by
Hornsby, less alluring.
Although we may alter the regress argument to avoid
such a criticism, it is far from evident that my original
account of the argument relies on the sort of direct
substitution that Hornsby questions. Certainly, there is no
substitution simply on the basis that 0-ing is trying to 0.
Instead, the principle that trying to 0 is involved in 0-ing
is conjoined with another, that to try to 0 is to try to do
whatever is involved in 0-ing (on the assumption that
tryings have actions as content). It is the combination of
these two principles that licenses any substitution that
takes place. Consequently, the onus is on Hornsby to show
any implicit fallacy in this form of the regress.
Hornsby's main defence against this regress argument is
featured in an extensive footnote, and on this occasion she
considers yet another version of the argument, viz:
"If a. tries to 0, then try-to-0 is something a.
does. But if anything is something someone does,
then he tries to do that thing. So a tries to try
to 0." (p.64)
In her defence, she notes firstly, that she does not adhere
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to the second premise of this argument, unless 1 something
someone intentionally does' is meant in the antecedent (loc.
cit.). This is not an inspiring defence, since I_ would not
accept premise 2 in this form of the regress. It has been
argued that if someone acts then he tries to do that action,
/but not all doings are actions, hence not all doings require
tryings. So this premise, if not false, is at least in
doubt.
What about the revised premise suggested by Hornsby?
i.e. 'if anything is something someone intentionally does,
then he tries to do that thing.' This seems to be
acceptable, but does it suffice to generate the regress?
Obviously it does not, because the first premise is now
inappropriate. It is now no help that 'If a. tries to 0, then
try-to-0 is something a does', for the fact that someone
does something in trying to 0, does not establish that he
has acted. So we would require a change in this first
premise to correspond to the change in premise 2. Premise 1
would have to read: 'if a tries to 0, then try-to-0 is
something a intentionally does.' The trouble is that this
premise is now false. From our earlier discussion we know
that from the fact of someone trying to do something it does
not follow that they have intentionally done anything, for
trying need not be action.
The remaining details of Hornsby's defence pertain to
this rather anaemic version of the regress argument. I feel
it is sufficient to note that the regress formulations she
considers are not the healthiest specimens available. So far
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as I can see, Hornsby has little to offer that goes toward
meeting the rigours of the full-blooded version detailed
earlier. I conclude therefore that this argument is adequate
to defeat the view of trying as a specific type of event; a
conation.
To sum up: we have learned that despite Vesey's qualms
to the contrary, the patient whose arm is paralysed or
anaesthetised, is reasonably seen as trying to raise his
arm, and that this may consist in his willing the arm to
rise. Furthermore, given that trying is omnipresent in
action, it is true to say that the patient does 'what he
usually does', in trying to raise his arm, for he ordinarily
wills, as a minimal trying, to do whatever he wishes to do.
Against McCann, I have denied that trying must always
be action, on the grounds that volition can be a trying. (We
have already appreciated that volition is not action.) In
addition, trying is best understood as whatever forms part
of the process of doing any action, and not as a special
category of events; not as conation. Finally, Hornsby's
attempts to defend this latter view by fending off the
regress of tryings, do not adequately meet the problem.
Having gained a clearer perspective on trying and its
relation to action and volition, it is time to assess the
performance of the concept of volition against its critics.
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CHAPTER 8 : RYLE ON VOLITION
(1_) RYLE'S DILEMMA
A most severe attack on the volition theory comes in
Ryle's critique entitled 'The myth of volitions' (Ryle,
1949:62). Here, he offers an apparently damning criticism of
the role that volition is supposed to play in the
volitionist' s theory. According to proponents of this
theory, volitions make sense of the distinction between
voluntary and involuntary movements; which is in fact
presented as equivalent to the distinction between actions
and mere events. Voluntary movements are those which are
caused by volitions to bring about those movements, while
involuntary movements are the remaining movements, not
caused by volitions.
Against this view that the voluntariness of events can
be understood in terms of their being caused by volitions,
Ryle offers a dilemma. He asks:
"what of volitions themselves? Are they voluntary
or involuntary acts of mind?" (p.67)
He suggests that 'either answer leads to absurdities'. If we
suppose that volitions are voluntary, then, on this account
of voluntariness, they must been produced by a further
volition, and so on ad infinitum.
The alternative is to suppose that volitions are
involuntary. But here we are left with the peculiar idea
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that the voluntariness of actions may rest with involuntary
acts of will. It seems absurd to hold that at the heart of
every voluntary action is an involuntary mental act. Thus,
Ryle's dilemma seems to reduce to absurdity, the suggestion
that causation by volitions is the key to understanding
voluntariness.
A tempting way to respond to Ryle's argument is to deny
that volitions are either voluntary or involuntary; that to
suppose they are either is to commit a category mistake,
since volitions make things voluntary, and are not
themselves proper candidates for such a description.
To accept the validity of Ryle's question 'are
volitions voluntary or involuntary?', is to commit oneself
to answering either one or the other, and since either
alternative leads to unacceptable results on Ryle's dilemma,
it appeals to the volitionist to deny that either of these
answers apply. But this only works if it can be shown that
there is something illegitimate in raising this question
with regard to volitions in particular. This, in turn, seems
implausible on the assumption that volitions are a species
of act, for acts are the proper domain of voluntariness and
involuntariness.
Perhaps then it helps to deny that volitions are acts.
But on the use of 'voluntary' in question, to describe an
event thus is simply to characterise it as an action. Hence,
to deny that any doing, even a volition, is actional is to
deny that it is voluntary, which is to say that it is
involuntary. To admit this is to be impaled on the second
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horn of Ryle's dilemma. So, the simple manoeuvre of denying
that volitions are themselves acts will not suffice to avoid
the dilemma.
It appears that the way out of Ryle's dilemma does not
lie in denying sense to his question when applied to
volitions. For volitionists, the problem becomes that of
finding some way of allowing Ryle's question while avoiding
his di1emma.
At least one philosopher believes this can be done.
According to Hugh McCann, it is possible to regard volitions
as voluntary without falling into Ryle's regress. In
McCann's words:
"To suppose that if volition provides the element
of control in actions like raising one's arm,
volition can itself exhibit control only through
something like a further volition, is rather like
supposing that if we explain the wetness of a wet
street by saying that there is water on it, we
must explain the wetness of water by postulating
further water. Volition can be voluntary, in the
way that water is wet- that is essentially, in a
way that does not require some means as
explanation." (McCann, 1974:472)
McCann's suggestion is this: water causes things to be
wet and is wet itself, but is not caused to be so by water.
In similar fashion, volitions may cause movements to be
voluntary and be voluntary themselves while not being caused
to be so by further volitions. This graphic analogy suggests
the viability of calling volitions voluntary without
succumbing to the regress horn of Ryle's dilemma. For, if
volitions are voluntary in this 'essential' manner, it would
220
be absurd to suppose that their voluntariness lay in
causation by other volitions, just as it would be absurd to
suppose that the wetness of water depended upon other water.
Yet, although McCann's analogy is initially plausible, it is
not easy to assess.
The first point to note appears trivial. While streets
are described as wet if they are covered with water, this is
not what we convey when we say that water is wet. The sense
in which 'wet' applies to streets is different from the
sense in which it applies to water. To call water 'wet' is
to say something different of it, than we say of streets,
umbrellas, or litmus paper, by calling these wet. Further,
just as in this analogy, the sense of 'wet' differs between
its two applications, so too would the sense of 'voluntary'.
Hence, to suppose that the wetness of water (the
voluntariness of volition) lies in being smeared with water
(being caused by a volition), would be a failure to
appreciate the equivocation between the two uses of the key
term. If we supposed no ambiguity in the use of these terms,
then to call water 'wet', and volitions 'voluntary' could
equally result in a regress. For then we would have to
suppose the former due to further water and the latter to
causation by other volitions. And these would in turn be
wet, and voluntary, respectively.
So it appears that McCann's way out of the regress is
to use a different sense of 'voluntary' in describing
volitions. Thus, he describes volitions as voluntary 'in the
way that water is wet- that is essentially...', which
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differs from that applied to movements, as the sense of
'wet' differs when applied to water from that in which
streets, trees, or blotting paper, may be wet. It should be
little wonder then if Ryle's regress does not get started
when confronted with McCann's strategy, for in calling
volitions 'voluntary' in McCann's sense, we are not
supposing them caused by further volitions.
This account of McCann's analogy gives rise to an
obvious objection. If McCann avoids the regress by employing
a changed sense of 'voluntary' as applied to volitions, then
it is open to Ryle to set aside this new sense, and ask
again whether volitions are voluntary or involuntary in the
more familiar sense in which movements are so described. For
it would remain to be answered whether, in this sense,
volitions are, or are not, voluntary. It appears that McCann
neither answers nor validly avoids this question.
Consequently, he does not avoid the difficulties which
follow from either answer.
If, however, the sense in which McCann calls volitions
voluntary, logically barred the question of whether
volitions are voluntary in the ordinary sense, then this
objection to McCann's strategy would be overcome. In fact,
this is precisely what McCann has in mind in his parallel
between the wetness of water and the voluntariness of
volitions. Just as the ordinary sense in which streets,
towels and newspapers get wet is logically based upon the
different sense in which water is wet, so, McCann urges that
the ordinary sense in which movements are voluntary is
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logically based upon the different sense in which volitions
are voluntary. If this were so, then surely one could not
ask of volitions whether they were voluntary in the
non-basic sense of voluntary, any more than one could ask of
water if it was wet in the way that streets are wet. This is
precisely the point of McCann's analogy.
There are two parts to the analogy. Firstly, the
non-basic sense in which streets are wet (so called, by
extension of meaning from the wetness of water), is likened
to the non-basic sense in which movements are voluntary
(presumably, so called, by extension of meaning from the
voluntariness of volitions). Secondly, the basic sense in
which volitions are called voluntary is likened to the basic
sense in which water is wet.
Clearly, McCann wants to view 'volitions are voluntary1
as on a par with "water is wet'. We can suppose the latter
analytically true, which makes the question 'is water wet?',
redundant. Hence, we may regard the former as analytically
true, and deem the question 'are volitions voluntary?'
redundant too. It is by virtue of the analyticity of 'water
is wet' that no further explanation, after the fashion of
the explanation for the wetness of streets, is appropriate.
So, if 'volitions are voluntary' is also analytic, no
further explanation of their voluntariness, after the
fashion of the explanation of the voluntariness of
movements, would be appropriate for volitions.
If it makes sense to call volitions voluntary without
thereby being compelled to suppose them caused by further
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voluntary volitions, Ryle's regress may be avoided. We can
see that McCann attempts this, by supposing that volitions
are 'essentially' voluntary as water is essentially wet.
Thereby, while the voluntary nature of movements may be
explained in terms of volitions (as the wetness of streets
is explained in terms of water), the voluntary nature of
volitions may not be so explained (as the wetness of water
is not explained in terms of further water). As the
structure of the analogy stands it appears to afford McCann
a means of preventing the Rylean regress. But his analogy is
not altogether apposite.
While it is plausible that streets are called wet by
extension of meaning from the sense in which water is wet,
the analogous point for voluntariness is less easy to
accept. Do we ordinarily call movements voluntary by
extension from the sense in which volitions are voluntary?
Presumably not, otherwise we should all be expected to
appreciate that volitions are indeed voluntary, and this
point would not be at issue.
Further, while the wetness of streets can be understood
in terms of the wetness of water, we do not ordinarily think
of the voluntariness of movements as deriving from the
voluntariness of volitions. In fact, the volition theory
gualifies a movement as voluntary if caused by a volition,
it says nothing of the necessity of voluntariness on the
part of this volition. Yet, if McCann's analogy is correct,
it would not simply be causation by a volition that rendered
a movement voluntary. Rather, the movement's voluntariness
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would derive from the voluntariness of the volition.
Furthermore, the voluntariness of the movement would simply
be an extension, so to speak, of the voluntariness of the
volition; as the wetness of a street is an extension of the
wetness of water.
This presents a problem. On the volition theory, the
voluntariness of movements is understood to consist in their
being caused by a volition, yet the analogy requires that
the voluntary nature of movements derives, by extension,
from the more basic voluntariness of volitions. This seems
to lead to the conclusion that voluntariness understood as
'caused by a volition1, may still apply to volitions. After
all, the sense in which streets are wet is really the sense
in which water is wet, extended to cover the instances where
the water is present on the street. So, the sense in which
movements are voluntary should be the sense in which
volitions are voluntary, extended to cover the instances
where volitions occur in conjunction with movements. Since
the voluntariness of movements consists in causation by
volitions, it follows that the voluntariness of volitions
should also require causation by further volitions. Hence,
Ryle's regress would be regenerated within McCann's analogy.
By careful dissection of this analogy, we can see that
the alleged parallel is not entirely convincing. The wetness
of streets derives from the presence of water, which is
inherently wet. Hence the term 'wet' is extended from the
water to the street. To call the street wet is really to say
that there is something inherently wet (water) upon it. This
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wetness is a quality of water, which is present on the
street, by virtue of the presence of water.
To maintain the analogy, the voluntariness of volitions
should be an inherent quality of volitions, and the sense in
which movements are so described should be an extended
usage, signifying that the inherent quality of voluntariness
is present with the movement, because a volition is present.
The obvious difficulty is that 'voluntary', understood as
'caused by a volition', cannot be an inherent quality of
volitions. It is peculiar to construe causal generation as a
quality, let alone an inherent quality, of a particular
event.
We must also note that while 'the street is wet' and
'the movement is voluntary', look to have the same subject
predicate form, their deep structures are different. To call
a street wet is to attribute a certain quality to the
street, whereas, to describe a movement as voluntary is to
ascribe not a quality, but a particular causal genesis to
the movement. This is the basis upon which William Lyons
summarily dismisses McCann's analogy. He observes that
"Streets become wet by being smeared with water,
but bodily movements do not become voluntary by
being smeared with voluntariness. According to the
theory of volitions, bodily movements become
voluntary by being caused by items called
'volitions'. Streets do not become wet by being
brought into existence by water or caused by
water. So while it is redundant to ask whether
water is watery or smeared with water, it is not
redundant to ask whether a volition (a particular
form of exercising power) is caused by another
volition (a similar exercise of power) or not."
(Lyons, 1980:78)
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Thus, Lyons claims that because of the disanalogy between
volitions making movements voluntary and water making things
wet, McCann fails to avoid Ryle's dilemma.
A similar response is made by Michael Gorr, who says of
McCann's analogy:
"Unfortunately this won't do at all. To predicate
wetness of something is to assert that it is in
some way covered or suffused with liquid. Thus, I
suppose, it would be possible (although generally
trivial and pointless) to predicate wetness of a
liquid itself. The concept of 'voluntariness' or
'being under one's control', however, is,
according to the classical view ...properly
explicated in terms of volitional causation. But
to then characterise a volition as itself being
voluntary or under the agent's control would lead
to an infinite regress... Thus the fact that a
liquid, which functions to make other things wet,
may itself be properly characterised as wet in no
way supports the quite different contention that a
volition, which serves to make other things
voluntary, may itself be properly characterised as
voluntary. The analogy, I am afraid, simply
doesn't hold water." (Gorr, 1979a:243)
Gorr is correct on one point. If voluntariness is strictly
explained in terms of volitional causation then to deem
volitions voluntary creates a regress. But why is there no
similar regress when we describe water as wet? After all, if
wetness is to be explained strictly in terms of something's
being covered with liquid, then to deem water wet should
create a regress of liquids covered with liquid. Clearly,
there is no regress in the case of water's being wet, and
this we can attribute to the fact that in saying 'water is
wet' we say something different in terms of 'wetness', than
we say when we say 'the street is wet'. Similarly, this
lesson may apply to volitions being voluntary. But even so,
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there remains the problem of the disanalogy in McCann's
example.
It seems to me that there is a rejoinder to a criticism
such as that of Lyons (above). McCann may accept that there
is a discrepancy in his analogy; that volitions are
differently related to the voluntariness of movements than
water is to the wetness of streets; yet maintain that the
central point of his analogy still obtains. Thus, he may
claim that parallel to the wetness of water, volitions can
be regarded as voluntary in some essential or inherent
manner, such that the question 'are volitions voluntary or
involuntary?" becomes redundant. If this much remains
plausible despite the alleged flaw in the analogy, surely
Ryle's dilemma is defeated?
If McCann's analogy lent credence to the notion of
essential voluntariness of volitions this would be a step
towards defeating Ryle's dilemma. But given the discrepancy
in the analogy between the wetness of water and the
voluntariness of volition, it hardly gives support to this
notion. It is only open to McCann to suggest that volitions
may be essentially voluntary, as water is essentially wet,
yet not precisely as water is essentially wet, for the
relation of wet water to wet streets is different from that
of voluntary volitions to voluntary movements. Because of
this difference, the analogy does not give us reason to
believe that volitions may be inherently voluntary in any
way that might avoid Ryle's regress.
Certainly, it is left open whether volitions might be
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essentially voluntary but this bare possibility does not
show that Ryle's dilemma can be avoided, unless it can be
further shown that the relation of this voluntariness of
volitions to the voluntariness of movements is such as to
render it redundant to ask of volitions whether they are
voluntary in the way that movements may be so. Again it
seems that McCann's analogy cannot offer a solution to the
problem posed by Ryle's dilemma.
Yet it may be objected that the detail of McCann's
analogy has been misconstrued. We have taken the analogy as
a defence against the regress horn of Ryle's dilemma, which
it clearly purports to be. But the sense of 'voluntary'
employed by McCann is not that of 'caused by a volition',
rather it is 'the element of control in actions'. This is
clear if we look again at his presentation of the parallel
between the wetness of water and the voluntariness of
volition, where he says
"To suppose that if volition provides the element
of control in actions like raising one's arm,
volition can itself exhibit control only through
something like a further volition, is rather like
supposing that if we explain the wetness of a wet
street by saying that there is water on it, we
must explain the wetness of water by postulating
further water. Volitions can be voluntary in the
way that water is wet- that is essentially, in a
way that does not require some means as
explanation." (op. cit., p472)
Obviously, in calling volitions voluntary McCann means
that they exhibit a certain element of control. And since
this is readily understood as a quality of volitions, which
they extend over the movements they produce, the parallel
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with the wetness of water seems more precise than hitherto
supposed.
At first sight this seems to make no difference to the
validity of McCann's argument. After all, if the element of
control exhibited in voluntary movement is due to the
movement's being caused by a volition, surely we can
reasonably ask whether the element of control present in
volitions themselves, is the result of their being caused by
further volitions. Whatever the answer, the propriety of
this question proves Ryle's dilemma effective after all.
But is this a proper question to ask? Clearly, McCann
wants to say not. His reason being that to ask this question
of volitions is equivalent to asking the redundant question
of water, what makes it wet. On the other hand, Lyons urges
that this is not a good analogy and hence it fails to
support McCann's claim. In contrast to Lyons, I wish to
argue that McCann's analogy is indeed effective, which can
be appreciated when we see that the voluntariness of
volitions is rightly analogous to the wetness of water. To
appreciate this, we have to reiterate the analogy, and
consider Lyon's objection in detail.
(2) MAKING McCANN'S ANALOGY WORK
According to McCann, while it is proper to ask of
streets what makes them wet, this is a redundant question
when applied to water. For water is not wet by virtue of
something that makes it wet. Rather, its wetness is an
inherent quality, logically tied to its being water. So,
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while we can ask what makes streets wet, and receive the
answer1water1, we cannot ask this of water, for the fact
that water is water renders the question either
illegitimate, or at least foolish.
Turning to voluntariness, it is suggested that the
element of control (which is the voluntariness of volition)
is an inherent quality of volitions. For a volition is not
voluntary by virtue of something which makes it voluntary.
Rather, its voluntariness is logically tied to its being a
volition. So, while it is sensible to ask what makes
movements voluntary, and receive the answer 'volitions', we
cannot ask this of volitions, for the fact that a volition
is a volition renders the question illegitimate, or at least
redundant.
In reply, one might exclaim that it does make sense to
ask what makes volitions voluntary, if they are alleged to
be so. Surely, if something has a particular quality one can
ask how it comes to have it?
But then one may say the same about the wetness of
water. Even if water is essentially wet, one can ask for an
explanation of this wetness; what makes water so. However,
to ask this, is to ask about the nature of water, and this
can only be met with a constitutive answer, in terms,
perhaps, of chemical structures and their physical
correlates. Similarly, to ask of volitions what makes them
voluntary, would be to ask after their nature. It is to ask
what the voluntariness of volitions consists in. And the
answer to this is already given. The voluntariness of
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volitions consists in the element of control that. they
exhibit. We must note however, that while it is proper to
enquire after the nature of both water's wetness and
volition's voluntariness, it remains improper to ask what
makes water wet or volition voluntary, so long as these are
questions of aetiology rather than 'essence', for water's
being wet and volition's being voluntary are qualities
logically tied to the natures of water and volition
respectively.
What then of Lyon's assault on the McCann analogy?
Lyons emphasises that while movements become voluntary
through being caused by volitions, streets do not become wet
by being brought into existence by water. So, he concludes
that while it may be redundant to ask whether water is wet,
or smeared with water, it is not redundant to ask of
volitions whether they are caused by further volitions. The
disanalogy is the difference in relationship between
volitions and voluntary movements on the one hand, and water
and wet streets on the other. Nevertheless, it is difficult
to see this disanalogy as relevant to the issue of
redundancy, for the redundancy of the above questions does
not depend upon the character of the relation between water
and wet streets, nor upon that between volitions and
voluntary movements.
What makes it redundant to ask whether water is wet or
smeared with water, is not the fact that streets (nor any
things that may come to be wet) become so by being smeared
with water. Rather, the question is redundant because
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wetness is an inherent or essential quality of water.
Consequently, if the precise relation between water and
wet streets has no bearing upon the redundancy of asking
whether water is wet, then the fact that this relation is
not precisely analogous to that between volitions and
voluntary movements should indicate nothing about the
redundancy of asking whether volitions are voluntary. As in
the water example, we may say that what makes it redundant
to ask of volitions whether they are voluntary, is not the
character of relation that they bear to voluntary movements,
but the fact that voluntariness is an essential or inherent
quality of volition.
So, it seems that while Lyons correctly locates a
disanalogy between the relations of water to wet streets and
volitions to voluntary movements, he is surely wrong in
supposing that this bears upon the analogy between the
redundancy of asking whether water is wet, and the
redundancy of asking whether volitions are voluntary. We
might conclude from this that McCann's analogy is sound,
despite Lyons' critique. Yet there is a possible response
from the Lyons' camp.
Even though the redundancy of asking whether water is
wet may not require that water make things wet in precisely
the way that it does, it may still be crucial that the
relation of water to wet streets is not one of causal
generation. That is, Lyons may say the relevance of this
disanalogy is that if the relation is one of causal
generation it must affect the redundancy of asking whether
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volitions are voluntary. Such that, since a causal relation
holds , it is not redundant to ash this of volitions.
Lyons' objection indicates that the way water makes
things wet is different from the way in which volitions make
movements voluntary. Thus, while things become wet by having
water upon them, or being smeared with water, movements
become voluntary by being caused to exist by volitions.
Clearly, the basis upon which we describe things as wet
differs from that upon which movements would be described as
voluntary. The question is whether this difference is such
as to remove all plausibility from McCann's analogy. Does it
show that the logic of 'volition' and 'voluntary movements'
is importantly different from the logic of 'water' and 'wet
streets'?
If McCann's analogy is to be plausible and parallel the
water case, we must be able to suppose that the
voluntariness of volitions is an inherent quality which
explains the voluntariness of movements. Surely this much is
plausible. What Lyons' objection notes is that the form of
explanation given in this case will differ from the
explanation of how water makes streets wet. Whereas
volitions explain the voluntariness of movements in terms of
causing those movements to exist, water explains the wetness
of streets in terms of its presence upon those streets. But
this difference can make no difference to McCann's case
unless the relation of causal genesis supposed between
volitions and voluntary movements would fail to render the
question 'what makes volitions voluntary?' redundant, even
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though we suppose that voluntariness is an inherent quality
of volition. And this is precisely the point of Lyons'
revamped case as outlined above.
So, Lyons may claim that the causal relation has the
effect of failing to secure redundancy, but what reason is
there to believe this? There is no argument to lend support
to this view. In addition, we have seen that the redundancy
of asking whether water is wet depends upon the inherent
wetness of water, not upon the nature of water's relation to
whatever it makes wet. We have no grounds on which to
suppose that if a relation of causal generation held between
water and wet streets, it would affect this redundancy. So,
we have no grounds for believing that the causal link
between volitions and voluntary movements affects the
redundancy in this case either. For want of such a ground,
we can only conclude that McCann's analogy stands.
This being the case we are in a position to suppose
that volitions can be construed as voluntary, without fear
of invoking the regress horn of Ryle's dilemma, for on this
account it becomes redundant to ask of volitions, what makes
them voluntary.
(_3 ) VOLITIONS AS INVOLUNTARY
The conclusion that volitions may coherently be
construed as voluntary may be no more than one would expect,
given that willing is something that we do. Yet the opponent
of volition may not be content to discard Ryle's dilemma
from his arsenal. Indeed, he may grant that McCann's analogy
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adequately defends volitions as, in a sense, voluntary, yet
insist that this is still a different sense from that
applicable to actions proper. Thus, even if there is a
possible reading of 'volitions are voluntary' that is
coherent, yet redundant, this does not show that volitions
are either voluntary or involuntary in the sense usually
relevant to actions. Clearly, this manoeuvre threatens to
reinvoke Ryle's dilemma in spite of McCann's analogy. Could
we suppose that volitions are in some sense involuntary?
After all, on the present account, although volitions may
arise from our thoughts, beliefs, intentions and the like,
willing is not something that one can be said to control.
Does this make volitions involuntary?
On this question I am at odds with McCann, who insists
that
"The modality of volition has... to be
fundamentally executive, an exercise of the
agent's general power consciously to cause, and
aimed at causing what is willed." (McCann,
1975:439)
While I accept the 'executive modality' of volition,
and that willing is an exercise of the agent to cause what
he wishes, I have consistently denied that volition is the
sphere of agent's control. And since volition is not a
conscious element in action, it is not consciously 'aimed'
at what one wishes to achieve (see Chapter 6). Rather, the
exercise of 'active power', consists in the bringing about
of some desired end, by the causal means of volition. One
does not consciously 'bring about' volition itself, so
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despite any possibility of regarding it as essentially
voluntary, it may be credible to view its occurrence as
involuntary.
Before considering the threat posed to this contention
by Ryle's dilemma, a word about the apparent contradiction
in deeming volition both 'essentially voluntary' and
'involuntary'. Happily, this contradiction is merely
apparent, for in describing volitions as voluntary this
expresses the conviction that some unique quality of
volition goes to explain the voluntariness of voluntary
movements. Of course this means that the description of
volition itself as involuntary may be entirely apposite
since it is patently not voluntary in the ordinary sense in
which actions are so. Consequently, there is no incoherence
in the view that volition is 'essentially voluntary' yet
involuntary.
The worry with this admission is that the second horn
of Ryle's dilemma is invoked against the view that volitions
are involuntary. Nevertheless, I would suggest that it is
proper to say that volitions are not voluntary, and to
support this I offer an analogy.
When switched on, an electric circuit is 'live', if
there is a flow of electrons through the circuit. The
quality of the circuit's being live is to be explained
causally, in terms of electrons, just as a movements' being
voluntary is to be explained causally in terms of volition.
If we are to understand the voluntariness of movements
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as lying in their being caused by volitions, then it is
inappropriate to regard volitions as themselves, voluntary,
just as it is inappropriate to construe electrons as being
'live'. 'Voluntariness' is properly a feature of movements,
as 'being live' is properly a feature of circuits. We should
not be tempted (under the influence of Ryle) to ask of
electrons whether or not they are live, for they can not be
so. And the alternative, that they are 'dead', does not
leave a mystery as to how the 'life' in the circuit derives
from something which is dead.
Similarly, when we deny that volitions are voluntary
this need leave no mystery as to how something voluntary can
derive from something involuntary. For here, as in the
previous example, we have a change of explanatory level such
that, certain categories of description appropriate to the
one level are inappropriate to the other.
Hence, our analogy suggests that on this pattern of
explanation for voluntary motion, it is inappropriate to ask
whether volitions are voluntary or involuntary. And this
should have no untoward consequences.
But Ryle has a rejoinder to this. For if we deny that
volitions are voluntary we must regard them as involuntary.
In which case the second horn of his dilemma comes into
play. Here, Ryle argues for the absurdity of supposing that
underlying every voluntary movement is an involuntary
volition. Already, our analogy suggests that this may be no
more paradoxical than to suppose that something 'dead'
(electrons), underlies and explains Ihe nature of
/
238
something's being 'live' (an electric circuit). But Ryle
puts his point simply and persuasively:
"If I cannot help willing to pull the trigger, it
would be absurd to describe my pulling it as
'voluntary'." (op. cit., p.67)
Clearly, Ryle identifies something's being voluntary
with its being in the agent's power to affect whether it
will happen or not. Hence, if I 'cannot help' the occurrence
of an event which causes my pulling the trigger, then I
'cannot help' pulling the trigger.
In response, the volitionist may insist that being able
to help doing something is being able to bring about that
thing by willing it. I can bring it about that the trigger
is pulled by willing it to be so. Hence, I can help pulling
the trigger, and my pulling it is voluntary. The fact that I
cannot help willing to pull the trigger is neither here nor
there. This simply means that I cannot bring it about that I
will to pull the trigger by willing that I will to pull it.
Or, to put this in Rylean language, I cannot will the
willing.
Against this, it may be objected that my being able to
help doing something requires that what occurs depend upon
me; that it would not occur otherwise. It is this belief
that gives Ryle's comment its rhetorical force, and
certainly this does not seem to be true if I cannot help
willing. For then, whatever happens as a result of my
willing seems just as inevitable as the willing itself.
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Hence, it should be every bit as involuntary.
The trouble with this rejoinder is that it is not a
necessary condition of something's being voluntary that it
would not have occurred, had it not been willed. Otherwise
we should have to say that overdetermined actions, and those
which would have been otherwise determined, are involuntary.
My intentional breaking of the vase is not rendered
involuntary on the correct assumption that the gust of wind
coming from the open window, shortly after I broke the vase,
would have broken it in any case. Also, in cases where it is
unclear whether the resulting event is caused by one's will
or some other concurrent efficient cause, we would not deem
the result involuntary. It is sufficient that the result
could have been caused by the volition to bring it about.
This is enough to show that Ryle's accusation of
absurdity is ill-founded, for it clearly makes sense to
suggest that I cannot help willing to pull the trigger and
yet my pulling it be voluntary. For it is not a necessary
condition of voluntariness that the event in question would
not have occurred had it not been willed. In turn, this
shows that there is no paradox in supposing that all things
voluntary result from involuntary volitions. Consequently,
Ryle's dilemma fails, for volitions may be construed as
involuntary, without this 'leading to absurdities', as Ryle
would have us believe.
Although volition can be seen to weather such Rylean
storms its coherence is not thereby assured. The following
240
chapter indicates further obstacles that it must face.
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CHAPTER 9 : THE LOGICAL CONNECTION ARGUMENT
(1) THE PROBLEM OF DESCRIPTIVE DEFICIENCY
To insist that volitions are familiar occurrences of
which we all are or can be conscious, seems very rash. (This
is evidenced from our discussions in Chapter Three.) Indeed,
Ryle argues that the concept of volition is problematic for
the fact that we are not aware of such events, and do not
have words to describe their occurrence. Thus, he writes:
"no one, save to endorse the theory, ever
describes his own conduct, or that of his
acquaintances, in the recommended idioms. No one
ever says such things as that at 10a.m. he was
occupied in willing this or that, or that he
performed five quick and easy volitions and two
slow and difficult volitions between midday and
lunchtime." (Ryle, 1949:63)
and again,
"By what sorts of predicates should they
[volitions] be described? Can they be sudden or
gradual, strong or weak, difficult or easy,
enjoyable or disagreeable? Can they be accelerated
or decelerated, interrupted or suspended? Can
people be efficient or inefficient at them? Can we
take lessons in executing them? Are they fatiguing
or distracting? Can I do two or seven of them
synchronously?..." (loc. cit.)
What Ryle's points indicate is the fact that talk of
volitions is not a familiar idiom. They go no further than
this in casting doubt on the volition account of action.
After all, if ordinarily we never talk of volitions, it is
reasonable to expect that we will not know how they should
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be described.
Melden takes the Rylean criticism a step further, by
arguing that if we do not have the facility to describe
volitional occurrences, the notion of volition must be
either incoherent, or simply mistaken. Melden also notes the
impropriety of insisting, in the absence of such
descriptions, that we are all familiar with volitions. As he
puts it:
"Unless I can recognise this act [of volition] by
having some description in mind that applies to
such acts and only to these, it is at best a
simple begging of the question to, insist that all
of us really understand what is being referred to;
in fact it is an implied charge of dishonesty
directed at those who refuse to give their
assent." (Melden, 1961:47)
Clearly, it is absurd to insist that we are all acquainted
with volitions if there is neither the vocabulary nor the
linguistic usage to support this claim. But this alone does
not show that volitions do not occur, nor that they are not
crucial to our understanding of the nature of action.
My own suggestion is not that we are all familiar with
the occurrence of volition, but that volitions are causally
operative in the performance of actions. Specifically, I
claim that volitions cause the bodily movements with which
we are all familiar, which movements constitute
action-results. Unlike other volition theorists, notably
Prichard and McCann, I do not maintain that volition is
itself an action. Nevertheless, problems of description
still arise for this volition theory.
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Melden forwards several related objections against the
concept of volition, some of which construe volitions as
themselves being actions. Although in this respect, my own
position differs from that which Melden is attacking, this
difference is not crucial to his arguments, which can
thereby be applied to the present volition theory.
The main difficulty that emerges for the volition
account is that of describing the alleged volition, for
there appears to be no ready way of referring to it save by
mentioning the bodily movement(s) it is supposed to cause.
Thus, if we suppose that when I raise my arm, a volition
occurs which by causing my muscles to move makes my arm
rise, there appears to be no available description of the
volition in this seguence, other than, the volition to raise
my arm, or the willing to move my muscles. Both of these
descriptions mention supposed effects of the volition
itself. There are several reasons why this apparent
descriptive deficiency is problematic.
The first difficulty is that talk of volitions can only
be comprehensible if we are able to describe them
independently of their supposed effects. Otherwise, if the
willing A is describable only as the action (or movement) B,
then the claim that movement B is caused by volition A
degenerates into the uninformative 'the cause of B causes
B'. This leaves us wondering why anyone should proffer a
theory which says so little; which in fact says nothing at
all. As Melden puts it;
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"If all that can be said of the alleged act of
volition, by virtue of which a muscle movement is
produced, is that it is the sort of thing that
produces a muscle movement, there is every
uncertainty that anyone has understood what is
meant by 'the act of volition', (op. cit., p.47)
In the absence of any informative description, it seems
pointless to talk of volitions, for this can offer nothing
more than the implication that bodily movements have causes,
which assumption is surely common-place and innocuous.
It does seem that all convenient reference to the
alleged occurrence of volitions cites the bodily movements
that they are supposed to cause, but if we accept this, must
we accept the worthlessness of the concept of volition?
Even if it were true that the facility we have for
describing volitions is limited to citing their effects this
does not mean that the volition theory is empty of content.
The theory says that volitions are occurrences that cause
bodily movements, hence, that volitions are causally
effective in the performance of action. In saying this, or
in declaring that my arm raising was brought about by my
volition to raise my arm, we may not be informed to the
extent of knowing precisely what volitions are, or to the
point of recognising or identifying the volition that
produced my arm movement.
The significant content of the theory is not simply the
implication that bodily movements or actions are caused, it
is the contention that the causes of such bodily movements,
termed 'volitions', are what characterise actions as such.
It is the hypothesis that the presence of a particular sort
245
of occurrence, namely volition, distinguishes actions from
non-actions. This account is not born of the belief that we
are initially acquainted with volitions, for we have not
noticed that volitions accompany all, and only actions, and
thereby formed a volitional account of the nature of action.
The strategy is the reverse. From the belief that actions
and non-actions are different, we develop a theory to
account for this difference, a theory which points to the
existence, or the hypothetically required existence, of
volitions.
So long as the volition theory is viewed in this light
the accusation, based upon descriptive deficiency, that the
theory is vacuous may be discharged. For although it may not
actually locate volitions or present them for scrutiny, that
it gives reason for belief in the existence of volition is a
measure of its success as a theory of action.
While it is possible to dismiss this attack on
volition, descriptive deficiency gives rise to further
difficulties for this theory. If our facility for describing
volitions is limited to citing their alleged effects, a
problem arises as to the relation between volition and
bodily movement.
According to the volition account, volitions are
causally related to the movements involved in actions, yet
how can these items be related as cause and effect if they
are logically related to each other? The supposed necessity
of describing volitions in terms of bodily movements implies
the logical tie between the two. The problem that emerges is
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the apparent inconsistency of the volition and movement
being logically related, which relation is non-contingent,
and also causally related, which relation is contingent.
Hence it appears that volition and movement are both
contingently and non-contingently related, which is
contradictory.
This point is put strongly by Melden:
"This then is the logical incoherence involved in
the doctrine of acts of volition: Acts of volition
are alleged to be direct causes of certain bodily
phenomena... just as the latter are causes of the
raising of one's arm. For, it is alleged, just as
we raise our arms by moving our muscles, so we
move our muscles by willing them to move. But no
account of the alleged volitions is intelligible
that does not involve a reference to the relevant
bodily phenomenon. And no interior cause, mental
or physiological can have this logical feature of
acts of volition. Let the interior event which we
call 'the act of volition', be mental or physical,
it must be logically distinct from the alleged
effect. Yet nothing can be an act of volition that
is not logically connected with that which is
willed- the act of willing is intelligible only as
the act of willing whatever it is that is willed.
In short, there could not be such an interior
event like an act of volition since nothing of
that sort could have the required logical
consequences." (op. cit., pp.52-3)
This criticism would be met if we could provide a means
of reference to volitions other than through their effects.
Following Alvin Goldman (Goldman, 1970:110), we might try
identifying volitions as those occurring at a particular
time. Hence we could refer to the agent's volition to move
his arm as the volition that occurred at t.
The difficulty with this procedure is that there is no
assurance that the volition in question, his volition to
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move his arm, occurs at just this time t. There is every
uncertainty as to the length or duration of volitions, so it
will not be readily possible to identify such an occurrence,
with any degree of confidence, as that which occurs, or is
occurring, at a particular time.
Furthermore, we may wish to attribute more than one
volition to the agent at any one time. In which case we have
the same problem of how to distinguish between his
volitions. If more than one volition occurs at t, how do we
refer to one of these in particular, other than by reference
to their effects?
Neither will it do to suggest referring to that
volition which is most intense at time t. Unlike desires,
which undoubtedly vary in intensity and hence in practical
effect, the significance of volitions is in their occurrence
not in the strength of their occurrence.
An action has taken place if the appropriate effect is
caused by the occurrence of a volition, but there is no
reason to suppose that volitions 'vary in intensity', or
that if they do, this would differentiate an effective from
an ineffective volition. Hence, this suggestion holds no
prospect for an alternative means of reference to volitions.
It appears that our only means of describing volitions
is by referring to bodily movements, in which case the
logical connection between volition and movement presumably
excludes the possibility that volitions cause such bodily
movements. But let us for the moment ignore the question of
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causal relationship and concentrate on the logical
connection which binds volition and movement.
Suppose it true that we only refer to volitions via
bodily movements, why should this be? This would make sense
if we accept, as my account of volition proposes, that
volitions are intrinsically tied to movements in the concept
of action. In other words, our concept of action is such
that it includes not merely a bodily movement or specific
sort of response, for frequently these are not actions, but
the bringing about of such movements by the agent. In this
case the movement is 'included' in the action when a
volition is too. On such an account, it is to be expected
that we logically tie volition and movement, they are thus
linked by the concept of what constitutes an action.
Still, this leaves us with the query about the alleged
causal link between volition and bodily movement. Even if
the logical connection is comprehensible on the present
account of volition, this does not show its compatibility
with a causal connection. If we are to accept the force of
the logical connection argument there would seem to be only
one strategy available to the volition theorist, and that is
to explicate the logical link between volition and movement
in terms of the supposed causal connection between the two.
In other words we can claim that volitions and bodily
movements are logically tied because they are causally
connected. This possibility is certainly not excluded by the
logical connection argument. Yet this alone is no defence.
While it may be possible to construe the logical
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connection as stemming from the causal link this does not
explain the absence of independent reference to volitions.
In supposing the causal link between volition and movement
basic to their logical connection, we are thereby committed
to volition and movement being independent of one another
outside of their causal relationship. So we must accept the
possibility of independent reference to each, if we are to
make sense of this supposed causal link.
Perhaps then, the volition account can concede that it
must be possible to describe volitions independently of the
movements which are their effects, yet claim that our
present inability to achieve such reference does not
invalidate the theory. After all, the fact that we are
unable to independently refer to volitions does not disprove
the claim that such reference is theoretically feasible.
Furthermore, this theoretical feasibility should not be
discounted as an extreme defensive position on the part of
the volitionist. It is in keeping with the present account
of action that volition be hypothesised as a type of event
which causes bodily movements, wherein this causing by
volition, constitutes the performance of action.
Similarly, in some scientific theory it may be found
necessary to hypothesise a more fundamental particle to
explain the known phenomena. And just as the characteristics
of such a particle may be theoretically formulated to fill
the need of the physical theory, so we may articulate the
characteristics that volition must have if it is to be a
contributive concept in our understanding of action.
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To summarise: we have an argument to the effect that if
logically linked, volitions and bodily movements cannot be
related as cause to effect. The defence is to accept the
logical link between volitions and movements whilst claiming
that it is to be understood as stemming from, rather than as
excluding, the causal connection between the two. In other
words, when we refer to a volition as the volition to raise
my arm, this description makes sense if we suppose there to
be some occurrence, called a volition, which causes that arm
movement. Furthermore, this strategy accepts in principle,
that such occurrences (volitions) may be identified
independently of the movements they produce. Clearly, if
volitions are internal happenings of which we are not
ordinarily conscious, this would explain the absence of
ready independent references to them.
As to the sort of descriptions that might, in
principle, be achieved, we may assume that these would come
through progress in biological and physiological science,
and would be couched in the sort of terms characteristic of
reports of causal sequences. Importantly, whilst it accepts
the possibility of securing such independent descriptions of
volitions, the present account is not itself committed to
providing such descriptions.
Evidently, there is scope for an account which presents
volitions as both causally and logically linked to bodily
movements. It appears that the present logical connection
argument can be surmounted.
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(2) MELDEN'S SECOND PRONG
Unfortunately, this is not the end of the matter, for
Melden's attack has two prongs. He presents a dilemma for
the volitionist:
"Let the act of volition issue in a muscle
movement, then... the act must be the willing of
that muscle movement, otherwise we should have
only inductive grounds for supposing the act to
issue in the particular muscle movement.
Accordingly, we are faced with the following
dilemma: if in thinking of VI (some particular act
of volition) we are of necessity to think of it as
the willing of Ml (some particular muscle
movement), then VI cannot be any occurrence mental
or physiological, which is causally related to Ml,
since the very notion of a causal sequence
logically implies that cause and effect are
intelligible without any logically internal
relation of the one to the other. If on the other
hand, we think of VI and Ml as causally related in
the way in which we think of the relation between
the movement of muscles and the raising of one's
arm, then we must conclude that when we first
perform VI, we should have no reason to suppose
that Ml would in fact ensue. If to avoid this
latter consequence we maintain that the thought of
the muscle movement enters into the very character
of the act of volition... no description of the
act of volition can be given that does not involve
an account of the muscle movement, and hence we
must abandon the idea that the act of volition VI
is a cause that produces Ml, the muscle movement."
(op. cit., p.51)
Clearly, Melden relies heavily on the 'Humean' side of
this dilemma, viz. 'not both causal and logical connection'.
But we have seen that this horn does not succeed in
impailing the present account of volition. What of Melden's
other horn?
Here, Melden argues that volitions cannot be causally
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linked to bodily movements, otherwise we would have only
inductive evidence for supposing that a specific volition VI
would produce a specific movement Ml, and we might well be
surprised to find, on performing some volition, which
movement was the result. This reductio argument attempts to
show that the connection between volition and movement
cannot simply be causal. There are two points to be made in
response.
Firstly, this objection holds only on the assumption
that the link between volition and movement is not both
causal and logical, which claim has not been substantiated.
Furthermore, in making the assumption that volitions and
movements are related as cause to effect, Melden likens this
to the link between muscle movement and arm raising. But
were we ever surprised on contracting our arm muscles to
find that our arm raised?
We did not learn by induction which muscles to contract
in order to raise an arm, so the assumption of a causal link
between volition and muscle contraction, does not require
that we learn by induction to use our volitions in order to
move our body. The important point is that we do not learn
to raise our arms by first learning which muscles to
contract. We learn to raise our arms, and thereby we learn
to contract our arm muscles, though we may not even be aware
of this aspect of the arm raising. Hence, we may not realise
that we are contracting muscles, we-may not even realise
that the muscles exist. Similarly, with volition and
movement, we do not first learn which volition produces
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which muscle movement. Just as the muscle contractions come
with the arm movement, so the volition comes with muscle
contraction. And just as we may not be conscious of
contracting our muscles, we may not be conscious of
volition. We may not appreciate that it occurs at all.
Nevertheless, 'willing' is part and parcel of raising one's
arm, just as is the contraction of the arm muscles.
To suppose otherwise, like Melden, is to construe
volition as a separate act which one must perform first,
before one can raise one's arm. But this is not an accurate
representation. When one raises one's arm, muscles contract
and volition occurs. These are all aspects of the action,
not acts which must be completed separately as means to the
action of raising one's arm. I would conclude therefore that
Melden's dilemma fails to defeat the present volitional
account.
(3_) OTTEN ON THE LOGICAL CONNECTION ARGUMENT
Again, the logical connection argument is not readily
dismissed? it may be formulated in several different ways,
each with different subtleties. In his paper 'Reviving the
logical connection argument' (Otten, 1977), James Otten
discusses several versions of the logical connection
argument (LCA), as they affect the causal theory of action.
Specifically, his concern is with the theory that construes
wants as causes of action. Nevertheless, we can learn much
from a consideration of his paper, both about the LCA and
its application to the volition account.
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Otten distinguishes two central theses that causal
theorists might endorse. What he calls the General Causal
Thesis maintains that a human action is caused by certain
wants of the agent who performs it, while the Restricted
Causal Thesis maintains that a human action is caused by the
agent's want to perform that action. It should be evident
that only the restricted thesis matches the volition theory,
for volitionists maintain that an action is brought about by
the specific volition to perform that action. In
consequence, while Otten considers it a shortcoming common
to formulations of the LCA that they only attempt to refute
the restricted causal thesis, for our purposes- to consider
their application to the volition account- this is entirely
apposite.
One form of LCA appears in Richard Taylor's "Action and
Purpose":
"The fact... that a given event occurs can never
entail that another wholly different one will
occur, or has occurred, if the relation between
them is that of cause to effect. The fact, for
example, that a piece of zinc is dropped into a
volume of a certain acid cannot entail that it
dissolves, nor vice versa, and if there were such
entailment, the relation embodied in the
hypothetical expressing the fact could not at the
same time be regarded as one of causation.
Suppose, then, that someone moves his finger...
[W]e regard the former [the fact that the person
wanted to move his finger] as something entailed
by what we now find, namely, just his moving his
finger." (Taylor, 1966:51-2)
Otten expresses Taylor's argument as follows:
255
Argument _1
(1) If W is S's want to perform A, then the fact that A
occurs entails that W occurs.
(2) If W causes A then the fact that A occurs does not
entail that W occurs. (Otten, 1977:727)
The problem for the causal theorist is that, given the
supposed logical connection between want and action, the
occurrence of the action entails that the event, which
caused the action, also occurred. Yet, the supposition that
want and action are causally linked does not entail, from
the occurrence of the action, that its cause has occurred.
Hence,
"the causal thesis entail[s] the contradiction
that it both is and is not the case that the fact
that A occurs entails that W occurs." (loc. cit.)
Before considering the application of this argument to the
volition account, I want first to consider what Otten has to
say about this particular formulation of the LCA.
In response to Taylor's argument, Otten distinguishes a
strong and a weak version of the restricted causal thesis.
He argues that Taylor's formulation of the LCA is only
effective against the strong version, which version Otten
claims is in any case committed to an absurd position.
Thereby, Taylor's argument is dismissed as pointless. Since
I feel that there is more to this fomulation than meets
Otten's eye, I shall review the way in which he dismisses
Taylor's case.
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Firstly, there is the distinction between strong and
weak versions of the restricted causal thesis, explained by
Otten as follows:
"the strong version maintains that a human
action, in the full sense of the word 'action', as
involving both certain behavior and the want to
perform that action, is caused by the agent's want
to perform that action. And the weak version
maintains that a human action, in a qualified
sense of the word 'action, as involving only
certain behavior and not the want to perform that
action, is caused by the agent's want to perform
that action." (op. cit., p.728)
Next, the absurdity of the position of the strong version:
"the strong version would maintain that
Anderson's want to perform [an] action causes both
the movement of his arm and his want to perform
that action, whereas the weak version would
maintain only that Anderson's want to perform that
action causes the movement of his arm. So, the
strong version is committed to the absurd position
that a want to perform an action causes itself."
(loc. cit.)
Finally, the contention that Taylor's Argument 1 is
effective only against the strong version:
"given the strong version of the restricted
causal thesis, premise (1) of Taylor's argument
clearly comes out true, and since premise (2) is
obviously true, Taylor's argument successfully
refutes the strong version. On the other hand,
given the weak version of the restricted causal
thesis, premise (1) comes out false, for the fact
that certain behavior occurs does not entail that
a certain want occurs. The fact that Anderson's
arm goes up, for instance, does not entail that
Anderson has the want to perform the action of
raising his arm; his arm may go up against his
will because of a mere muscle spasm. Hence, since
premise (1) comes out false, the weak version of
the restricted causal thesis is untouched by
Taylor's argument." (loc. cit.)
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On the strong version outlined by Otten, the action
consists of the agent's behaviour plus the want to perform
the action, of which his behaviour is the action-result.
Hence the peculiar consequence that the want, which
allegedly causes the action, must cause itself, for it is
included as part of the action.
In contrast, on the weak version, the action is
identified with the agent's behaviour, which results from
his want to bring about that behaviour. Here, there is no
absurdity in supposing the action caused by the want, for
the want is not itself part of the action. Otten concludes
that Taylor's formulation is ineffectual against the weak
version because the fact that certain behaviour occurs would
never entail that any want has occurred. Hence, the
entailment in Argument 1 does not hold good for the weak
version.
While on the face of it, Otten's conclusion seems
correct, there are alternatives to his account of the weak
version, which he fails to consider. His comment that the
weak version escapes Taylor's formulation is only valid so
long as A in premise (1) is construed as behaviour rather
than action. While the fact that certain behaviour occurs
(the fact that Anderson's arm goes up, for instance) does
not entail that a certain want occurs (that Anderson has the
want to perform the action of raising his arm), the fact
that a particular action occurs (that Anderson has raised
his arm) may well entail that a particular want has
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occurred. Surely it is open to the causal theorist to
maintain that action entails want, while denying that
behaviour carries such an entailment? Furthermore, to insist
that the occurrence of action entails the occurrence of want
is not to move from the weak to the strong version of the
causal thesis, for this version need not construe the want
as included in the action.
In consequence, the causal theorist may be advancing
the weak version yet not thereby escape Taylor's argument,
for if the theorist maintains that actions are pieces of
behaviour caused by wants, it follows logically from the
fact that an action has occurred that a want also occurred.
In other words, the entailment in premise (1) of Argument 1
would hold good for this version of the causal thesis, which
shows that, despite what Otten claims, if Taylor's argument
is effective against the strong version, it is equally
effective against the weak.
We have seen that Otten contrasts two versions of
causal thesis. One identifies the action as including the
cause, while the other identifies the action with the effect
produced by the right sort of cause. Yet there is a third
form which Otten does not recognise. In this third version,
the want would be included in the action, but would not be
the cause of the action, hence would not cause itself.
Rather than cause the action, the want may cause the
behaviour which constitutes the action-result. Thereby, the
action may be identified as the bringing about, causally, of
this action-result by a want. It should be apparent that
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this version of the causal thesis in important respects
matches the volition account which I have been advocating.
The only major difference being that in the above example,
the cause is a want, and not a volition. I shall refer to
this new form of causal thesis as the Modified Causal
Thesis.
(4) BEATING THE LCA
The important question is how this modified version of
the causal thesis would fare against Taylor's formulation of
the LCA. Apparently, this approach would fall to Taylor's
Argument 1 as surely as the earlier versions of the causal
thesis, for it seems to render true both premise (1) and
premise (2), thereby entailing the contradiction noted by
Otten. But to suppose this would be a mistake, for given
that the want does not cause the action, premise (2) is not
true. If W does not cause A, the antecedent of (2) is false,
hence premise (2) is false.
Yet the situation is not clear-cut. In response, Taylor
might urge that to construe wants as cause of action-results
rather than actions is merely a way of concealing the
implicit causal link between wants and actions.
The modified causal thesis advocates that
action-results, not actions, are the effects of wants, hence
the link between want and action-result is straightforwardly
causal. But the link between action-result and action is
logical, for the action-result is that event whose
occurrence is logically necessary for the occurrence of the
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action, it follows that the want is causally necessary for
the occurrence of the action. So there is a clear sense in
which the want and action are causally linked. But is this
link such as to render Taylor's Argument 1 valid? In
particular, does this fact make premise (2) true?
Premise (2) may be revised as follows:
(2a) If W is causally related to A, then the fact that
A occurs does not entail that W occurs.
Now that the antecedent of (2a) is true, it would appear
that this causal thesis cannot avoid contradiction on
Taylor's formulation of the LCA. But here we must remind
ourselves that 'action' on this account consists of want and
action-result. Furthermore, so long as this fact is not
represented in (2a) then Taylor's argument begs the question
against the causal theorist.
This can be appreciated if we replace A in (2a) by
action-result plus want (R+W), thus:
(2b) If W is causally related to R+W then the fact that
R+W occurs does not entail that W occurs.
So long as A is understood in this way it is clear that the
occurrence of A, viz. of action-result plus want, does
indeed entail the occurrence of want W. If Taylor were to
reject this instantiation of A he would in effect be begging
the question against the causal theorist, for this would be
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a prior rejection of this account of action as action-result
plus want-
It follows from these considerations that the present
causal account of action (whereby action consists of an
action-result produced by the agent's want to perform that
action) does not succumb to Taylor's argument. For, despite
the amendment of (2) to (2a), which renders the antecedent
true, amendment (2b) shows that the consequent would be
false. The occurrence of A would indeed entail the
occurrence of W.
The only worry that remains with the modified causal
thesis is that it now suffers the same defect as the strong
version earlier considered and rejected by Otten. This was
the version that construed the want W as part of the action
A, of which Otten remarked:
"the strong version would maintain that
Anderson's want to perform that action causes both
the movement of his arm and his want to perform
that action... So, the strong version is committed
to the absurd position that a want to perform an
action causes itself." (op. cit., p.728)
Is not this the position of the present modified causal
account? Here it is said that the want W is causally related
to action A, while action A is presented as the causing of
an action-result plus this very want W. Which is to say that
want W is causally related to itself. Is this not Otten's
'absurd position'?
In defence, I would argue that while it is absurd to
allege that want W causes itself, it is not absurd to claim
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that W is 'causally related' to itself as part of action A.
The sense of 'causally related' has yet to be fully
explicated.
To understand the coherence of the present position we
must recall that action A is not an effect produced by want
W. Rather, A is the causing that consists in the bringing
about of the action-result R, by want W. Hence, W is
straightforwardly causally related to R, but not so to A,
for W causes R, it does not cause A. W is causally related
to A through the fact that the effect of W, i.e. R, is
logically tied to A. And since W is causally necessary for
R, it follows that W is causally necessary for the
occurrence of A.
But there is nothing absurd in this position, for
although W is causally necessary for A, and A consists in
W's causing R, it does not follow that W is causally
necessary for itself. From the fact that the occurrence of W
is causally required for it to be the case that W causes R,
it does not follow that the occurrence of W is required for
the occurrence of W. It is not legitimate to separate the
cause (W) and the effect (R) in the causing (A), and thereby
claim that because W is causally necessary for W and R
jointly as a causing, that W is causally necessary for W and
R separately.
The same would be true of another example: striking a
match is causally necessary for the match lighting, but the
match lighting is not itself my action of lighting the
match. This action must also embody the striking of the
263
match. Hence, my action of lighting the match is a causing;
it is my bringing it about that the match ignites by
striking it.
Here, my striking the match is causally required for
its ignition, and the match igniting is logically required
for my action of lighting the match. So we can say that
striking the match is causally required for my action of
bringing it about that the match ignites. But then, one
might suppose, since this action incorporates the striking,
that striking the match is causally required for striking
the match. This conclusion would be absurd.
One cannot validly move from the fact that S (striking
the match) is causally required for A (my bringing it about,
by striking the match, that it ignites), to the conclusion
that S is causally required for S, on the grounds that A
incorporates S. This would be the fallacy of supposing the
father of a family causally necessary for his own existence
since he is both a member of that family unit, and causally
necessary (as father of the children), for the family's
existence.
We can see therefore that the present modified causal
account does not suffer from the absurd aspect that Otten
earlier attributed to the strong version. For there is no
incoherence in the implied causal link between the want W,
and the action A. This being so, we can conclude that this
form of causal thesis does not succumb to Taylor's
formulation of the LCA. What remains to be considered is
whether Otten's own formulation of the LCA, which he regards
264
as 'a conclusive refutation of the restricted causal thesis'
(op. cit., p.737), is effective against the modified causal
account.
Otten's formulation of the LCA is derived from Raziel
Abelson, whose version of the argument he draws from the
following extract:
"Assume that Jones wants, intends, desires, or in
some sense has a motive to open the window. What
does this entail about what he will do? Well it
entails that he will open the window, but it does
not entail this tout court. It entails that he
will open the window, provided that no reason
arises for his not doing so... and provided
nothing prevents him... The provisos here
constitute the contextual limitation... on the
entailment between motive and act... In this
contextually limited way, a motive is indeed
logically connected to an action, and not just
through the way it happens to be described, and
not just to the concept of action, but to its
actual performance." (Abelson, 1969:183-4)
Abelson's version of the LCA is expressed as follows:
Argument 2_
(3) If W is S's want to perform A, then the fact that W
occurs under optimal conditions 0 entails that A
occurs.
(4) If W causes A, then the fact that W occurs under
optimal conditions 0 does not entail that A occurs.
As Otten explains,
"these two premises when taken in conjunction
with the restricted causal thesis entail the
contradiction that it both jls and i_s not the case
that the fact that W occurs under optimal
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conditions 0 entails that A occurs, but when they
are taken apart from this thesis they entail no
contradiction. Therefore the causal thesis is
contradictory." (op. cit., p.731)
Although he feels that support and defence is required
for premise (3) in the above argument, with this provision,
Otten regards Argument 2 as effectively destructive of the
causal thesis. For my purposes, it is not necessary to go
into the details of Otten's misgivings with premise (3). I
shall, for the sake of argument, grant the truth of this
premise. Does this mean that the modified causal thesis
falls to Argument 2? It should be evident that I think it
does not.
This causal thesis, whereby a want causes an
action-result, which causing constitutes action, is not
straightforwardly a 'causal' thesis on the lines considered
by Otten. The versions he considers construe wants as
efficient causes of action, which this modified thesis does
not. From this difference, we can show that Argument 2 fails
to defeat the modified causal thesis.
According to the modified thesis, the want W does not
cause the action A. This means that the antecedent of
premise (4) is false, and although this ensures the truth of
premise (4) as a conditional statement, it does not ensure
the truth of the consequent of this premise. Thus, since its
antecedent is false, premise (4) will be technically true no
matter what its consequent may be. Hence the truth of the
consequent is not established, and the combination of
premise (4) with premise (3) produces no contradiction for
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the modified causal theorist. He can accept the truth of
both of these premises without accepting the truth of both
of their consequents. Thereby, the modified causal thesis
avoids any contradiction, and is unscathed by Argument 2.
Given the theoretical differences between the standard
causal account considered by Otten and the modified account
which I have detailed, we should perhaps ask whether
Argument 2 can be altered in any way so as to apply directly
to the modified thesis.
At present, the difficulty with Argument 2 is that
premise (4) is ineffectual since on the modified causal
account the want causes the action-result and not the action
A. This may suggest an amendment to premise (4), as follows:
(4a) If W causes R then the fact that W occurs under
optimal conditions 0 does not entail that R occurs.
With this modification, premise (4a) should be true, but the
combination of (3) and (4a) does not look helpful as an
argument against the amended causal thesis. While (4a)
expresses the entailment that R does not occur, premise (3)
expresses the entailment that A occurs. There is no apparent
contradiction from the combination of (3) and (4a).
The remaining alternative is to amend premise (3) after
the fashion of (4a), thereby producing:
(3a) If W is S's want to perform R, then the fact that
W occurs under optimal conditions 0 entails that R
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occurs.
But while the resultant entailment of (3a) does conflict
with that of (4a), premise (3a) is unacceptable to the
causal theorist, since its antecedent, 'W is S's want to
perform R', is false. R is an action-result, and as such,
though it is caused by W, it is not what S wants to perform.
S can only perform the action A, not the result R. Hence, W
is not S's want to perform R, and (3a) is false.
Although it appears that such amendments cannot rescue
Otten's argument, we might take a second looh at the
argument consisting of premises (3) and (4a), viz.:
Argument _3
(3) If W is S's want to perform A, then the fact that W
occurs under optimal conditions 0 entails that A
occurs.
(4a) If W causes R then the fact that W occurs under
optimal conditions 0 does not entail that R occurs.
We have said that, although both of these premises are
acceptable, this combination seems to produce no
contradiction. But to suppose this would be an error, for in
fact (3) and (4a) do conflict.
The appearance of no conflict comes from the fact that
while (3) states an entailment about the occurrence of A,
(4a) states an entailment about the non-occurrence of R. But
if we recall that R is the action-result of the action A,
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and that the.occurrence of an action logically requires the
occurrence of its action-result, it follows that the
entailment in (3), that A occurs, also entails that R
occurs.
With the additional premise that the occurrence of A
entails the occurrence of R, to which the causal theorist is
committed, it becomes evident that (3) and (4a) present
contradictory conclusions. When combined they entail the
contradiction that it both is and is not the case that the
fact that W occurs entails that R occurs. In the combination
of (3) and (4a), expressed as Argument 3, we may have the
conclusive argument that Otten sought against the causal
thesis.
Still, I am unhappy with the resultant Argument 3. If
valid, it obviously deals effectively with the causal
thesis, but is it valid? If we can show that one of the
premises in this argument is false, this would render
Argument 3 ineffective against the modified causal thesis.
With good reason, I shall argue that premise (4a) is false.
In order to appreciate the falsity of (4a) we first
have to turn our attention to premise (3), which states that
under optimal conditions 0, the occurrence of W entails the
occurrence of A. But what exactly is included under optimal
conditions 0? Otten offers the following explanation:
"The optimal conditions 0 which are mentioned in
Argument [3] are just those conditions which place
the contextual limitation on the entailment
between having the want and performing the action.
Presumably S's want W to perform A occurs under
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optimal conditions 0 just in case S has the
opportunity to exercise his ability to perform A,
nothing interferes with S's opportunity, S has no
overriding wants, S has the appropriate beliefs
and knowledge, and S's endeavor to perform A would
end in his doing so." (op. cit., p.731)
So, the optimal conditions 0 are the contextual limitation
on the entailment between having the want and performing the
action, but would this entailment still take effect if we
added the following proviso?:
(P) There are empirical conditions which prevent R from
following upon W.
Clearly, if (P) applies then the entailment in (3) would not
work. If W is S's want to perform A and W occurs when there
are empirical conditions which prevent R from following upon
W, this means that A will not occur, for the occurrence of A
logically requires the occurrence of R.
What this shows is that the entailment in (3) requires
that the optimal conditions 0 include the negation of (P).
In other words, it must be the case that there are no
empirical conditions which prevent R from following upon W
(i.e. not-P), otherwise, the occurrence of W will not entail
the occurrence of A.
We may conclude therefore that optimal conditions 0,
include the negation of (P). This restores the validity of
premise (3), and we can turn our attention to premise (4a).
This premise states that, if W causes R, then if W
occurs, even under optimal conditions 0, this does not
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entail that R occurs. But we have shown that 0 must include
not-P, and this must lead us to reconsider the truth of
premise (4a).
Making explicit the negation of (P) included in the
optimal conditions 0, premise (4a) may be restated as
follows:
(4a) If W causes R then the fact that W occurs under
optimal conditions 0, with no empirical conditions
which prevent R from following upon W, does not entail
that R occurs.
What are we to say of this expansion of (4a)? Is it true or
false? Consider the following statement:
(5) If W causes R then the fact that W occurs, when
there are no empirical conditions which prevent R from
following upon W, entails that R occurs.
Surely, if 'W causes R' means anything it means that in thej
absence of empirical conditions which would prevent R from
following upon W, if W occurs, then R must also occur. In.
which case, statement (5) is true, and this, in turn,
indicates the falsity of (4a). For given that W causes R,
and that W occurs when there are no empirical conditions
which prevent R from following upon W, it follows, from the
logic of causality, that R occurs.
A possible objection is that there may be non-empirical
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reasons why, given that W causes R and that W occurs, R does
not follow upon W. In which case, the inclusion of not-P in
the optimal conditions may not be sufficient to render the
entailment in (4a) false. If this were so, the optimal
conditions may also not be sufficient to ensure the truth of
(3). Obviously, the appropriate strategy is to include
within the optimal conditions, not merely that there are no
empirical restrictions to R following upon W, but also that
there are no non-empirical restrictions which prevent this.
Thereby, we would restore the truth of (3), and yet be in a
position to insist upon the falsity of (4a). For this
additional change to the optimal conditions would ensure
that if W causes R, then the fact that W occurs under
optimal conditions 0 entails that R occurs.
So we have seen that premise (4a) is false. My argument
proves that under optimal conditions 0, if W causes R, then
the occurrence of R is entailed. In turn, the falsity of
(4a) indicates the invalidity of Often's Argument 3, which
ultimately fails against the causal thesis.
This leaves us in a position to assert the coherence of
our modified causal account, contrary to the views of those
who endorse the LCA. Furthermore, while the above arguments
have been applied in defence of a modified causal account in
terms of wants, the matching volition account, in terms of
volitions causing action-results, is, by the same defence,
proved secure from the logical connection argument.
In conclusion, it may be noted that since the causal
account in terms of wants, and the volition account both
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meet the rigours of the logical connection argument, this
leaves open the issue of which thesis is the mere
acceptable, for it is clear that the two are incompatible.
So far as the LCA goes, there is nothing to choose between
these two accounts of action, but we have already learned
from our discussion of wayward causation (Chapter 2), that
the causal approach is flawed in a way that the volition
account is not. (I shall have more to say on this latter
contention in Chapter 10.)
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CHAPTER 10 : ASSESSING VOLITIONS
U) CHARACTERISING VOLITION
A considerable hurdle faced by any volition theory of
action is to meet the criticism, as old as the theory
itself, that no one is familiar with these allegedly
omnipresent elements in action, which are called volitions.
This complaint has been the impetus behind many rejections
of volition. Thus, Melden, for example, insists that
"The attempt to distinguish bodily movements that
do from those that do not count as actions in
terms of occurrent psychological processes is
doomed to failure. What passes through my mind as
I now act may be anything or nothing; it may be
that all that happens is that without anything
relevant passing through my mind, I just act."
(Melden, 1956:64; reference to Gustafson, 1970)
In similar vein, Richard Taylor denies that
"anyone has ever found volitions occurring within
himself, or within his mind, by any introspective
scrutiny of his mental life." (Taylor, 1966:??)
We have seen that Ryle is another who makes great play
on the claim that no one is familiar with volition (cf.
Chapter 9). Certainly, the evidence endorses such criticisms
of volition. Earlier volition theories were marred by claims
as to the indefinable, or ultimately unknowable nature of
such alleged occurrences. Such has never been an enticing
doctrine. Additionally, attempts, such as that of William
James, to detail the processes of the will seemed destined
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to fail, in virtue of the emphasis placed upon introspection
(cf. Chapter 3).
In the face of such bad press, we should not expect to
find modern theorists advocating introspectible volitions.
Yet this does occur. Michael Gorr urges that
"a person who is... deliberating about a
difficult and painful decision is often very aware
of what is going through his mind; when he does
act, therefore, it is likely that he has excellent
introspectible evidence of the volition that so
prompted him." (Gorr, 1979a:239)
On this basis, he suggests that
"our everyday concept of an action is rooted in
our awareness of behaviour as flowing (causally)
from volition; the degree to which we are
conscious of such volitions, however, varies
greatly..." (loc. cit.)
How can we understand such a view?
The answer may lie in the first of these quotations
from Gorr. He supposes that an agent may have introspectible
evidence for his volitions, on the grounds that he is 'aware
of what is going through his mind' when he comes to actJ.-
There is no denying that we are often acutely aware of our
conscious thought processes when we deliberate over a
difficult decision. And, presumably, if there is any
possible introspectible evidence of volition we could be
most aware of it under these circumstances. But it is far
from obvious that there is anything present to consciousness
that may be unequivocally identified as volition.
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Of course this is not to say that the agent may not be
aware when he comes to act precisely why he is doing what he
does. We do generally appreciate what we are doing and why
we are doing it. But such awareness is not consciousness of
volition. More plausibly, it is consciousness of our
activity7 that we are engaged in action. While Gorr is right
in seeking to relate such consciousness to volition he is
rash in equating it with consciousness of volition itself.
An alternative account has already been given of how best to
understand such awareness in agency (cf. Chapter 5).
There may always be a tendency to misconstrue our
awareness of our own activity as awareness of a special
conscious element that characterises actions as such. We saw
earlier that representing volition as a species of thought
is Hugh McCann's way of construing volition as a conscious
introspectible element in action (Chapter 6, Section (3)ff.)
In contrast, such complications may be avoided if we suppose
that volition is not itself a conscious element in action,
but serves to explain the agent's sense of his own activity.
While a major criticism of volition is circumvented on
the assumption that such occurrences are not introspectible,
a query naturally arises as to the status of volition
itself. If we are not conscious of such features of action,
why suppose that they occur at all?
The answer is simple. We need to suppose that volitions
occur if we are to make sense of our belief in agency and
the distinction commonly drawn between actions and mere
events. It emerges that we have reason to posit volition as
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an essential characteristic of action. Still, we may face
the criticism that little or nothing has yet been said as to
the nature of volitions. It is all very well noting that
volitions are not introspectible, not actions, not causes of
actions, not intentional, etc. Aside from what they are not,
what qualities do volitions actually possess?
As previously suggested {Chapter 5), we must suppose
that volitions have just those features that we find
necessary to attribute to them, according to the phenomena
to be explained, and the needs of the analysis of action.
Thus, it is appropriate to treat volition as a constituent
of action, rather than its cause, as a causing (sequence of
causally related events) rather than an event, and as a
non-intentional doing which is not itself actional. This
procedure for detailing the relation of volition to action
is what Lawrence Davis calls 'a functional characterisation'
(Davis, 1979:18ff.), for we have characterised volition in
terms of what it does; the part we must suppose it to play
in action.
(2_) OBJECTIONS
In this section I want to attend to what appear to me
to be the most likely objections to the volitional account
of action that I have detailed in the present work. The
first of these criticisms centres on what may be considered
the counter-intuitive elements in my portrayal of volition.
Three aspects come immediately to mind. I have
described volition as non-actional; have said it is
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non-intentional; and should perhaps not be regarded as
voluntary. Taken singly, or all together, these features may
run counter to our intuition that willing is an activity in
which we engage, and should thereby be voluntary,
intentional, and actional. After all, if volition is neither
voluntary nor intentional, it must be something that one
suffers rather than something one does.
In my defence, I would point out that on the account I
have detailed, willing qualifies as something one does. But
this is not to imply that it is either an action or
intentional. Willing counts as a doing because it is a
causal means employed by agents in performing actions.
Because it is not a teleological means to action, volition
does not qualify as intentional. It is not a means that
figures in the agent's conscious purposes (cf. Chapter 6,
Section (5)).
As to the complaint that willing must be something one
suffers, this is partly rebuffed by the detail of volition
as a doing. A remaining worry is that, if not intentional,
volition may occur to the surprise of the agent himself.
After all, if it does not form part of his conscious
purposes, he may not know of its likely occurrence until he
finds himself active.
This certainly would be odd. Again, this raises the
issue of how volitions come about (see also Chapter 5,
Section (3)). A clearer view of the situation may be
achieved once it is realised that while willing is not part
of the agent's conscious purposes, this does not imply that
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it must take "him by surprise, when he is involved in action.
For his volitions will arise from the agent's intentions and
aims, combined with his beliefs about appropriate courses of
action.
Unlike actions, volitions cannot form part of the
agent's conscious aims and purposes, but like actions,
volitions can accord with the agent's intentions, desires,
and aims. This being the case, the agent will not ordinarily
find his behaviour at odds with what he consciously wishes
to do or to achieve. (There is a possible exception to this
which I will detail in Section (3) of the present chapter.)
We see therefore, that although it is not intentional,
volition does not simply happen to the agent. Indeed, the
air of peculiarity in denying that willing is intentional,
may be relieved if we note that it may be intentional in the
sense of according with the agent's intentions, since it
will ordinarily be part of the process of fulfilling these
intentions. But it remains unintentional if that means being
performed consciously as a means to an end
The suggestion that willing is not voluntary may carry
a similar sense of oddity, but as is made clear in Chapter 8
(Section (3)), it is a mistake to suppose that the
voluntariness of actions must stem from the voluntariness of
volitions. Actions will be voluntary by virtue of their
relation to volition, not because voluntariness is a
transitive quality, passed on from volition to action.
As to the non-actional status of volition, this should
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be no more counter-intuitive than the details just
considered. That volition is part of action and not
something separate is reflected in the fact that the
occurrence of volition does not serve to adequately explain
the occurrence of an action. Thus, if we ask 'why did you
shoot the milkman?' it would not be considered appropriate
to reply 'because I willed to shoot him'. If the volition
were indeed an entity separate from the action, yet
responsible for the action's occurrence, we should expect
that reference to the volition would be adequate to explain
the action in question.
Significantly, an acceptable answer to the question
'why did you shoot the milkman?' would also adequately
answer 'why did you will to shoot the milkman?'. This is in
keeping with volition being a part of the action, whereby
one cannot explain one's action without thereby explaining
one's willing to do that action. Both the volition and the
corresponding action are properly explained in terms of the
agent's wants, beliefs, reasons and intentions. If it is
appreciated that volitions, like complete actions, accord
with the agent's desires and intentions, and also qualify as
something he does, there should be no worries over denying
that volition is itself action. Nothing is lost through this
denial that we should ordinarily wish to retain.
To sum up: there is no absurdity in deeming volitions
non-intentional, non-voluntary, and non-actional. Any
inclination to view these features as implausible should be
dispelled once their full significance is appreciated.
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I turn now to an implication of my account of volition
that would appear to be problematic. Actions have been
characterised as causings, comprising the bringing about of
some effect by a volition. Thus, my raising my arm is a
causing comprising of my bringing it about that my arm rises
by my volition to raise my arm.
In addition, I have noted as a characteristic of
volition that it accounts for the agent's awareness of
acting whenever he performs any doing. From these two
aspects, a possibly awkward consequence emerges. The agent's
belief that he is active derives from his volition, we can
reasonably suppose that his belief would be caused by his
volition. But this means that the agent's belief that he is
active is itself an action, for this belief bears the
requisite relation to volition. It is surely
counter-intuitive to suppose that an agent's belief that he
is doing something should itself be one of his actions.
As a step toward meeting this problem, we must be clear
on what it is that under such circumstances, apparently
qualifies as action. If I will, and consequently believe
that I have acted, then I have acted in bringing about this
belief. The action is not my believing that I have done
such-and-such, but my bringing it about that I believe that
I have done such-and-such. This should remove some of the
counter-intuitive air from the situation, for it is not in
fact alleged that the agent's belief constitutes action.
Such a view would be peculiar, since beliefs are essentially
different in nature from action; being things that we have
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rather than things that we do.
But is it acceptable that the agent's bringing it about
that he believes himself to be active should count as
action? It may help to ask why bringing about such a thing
should not so qualify.
Certainly, I might be held responsible for leading a
neighbour to believe that I would care for his house during
his foreign holiday. Indeed, bringing it about that he
believes such a thing, perhaps directly, by telling him that
I would care for the house, would be an action on my part.
So, why may it not be my action to bring it about that I
believe myself active? The obvious reply is that I am
unaware that I have done such a thing.
While it may be true that my belief is caused by my
willing to do such-and-such, it is also true that I am
ordinarily oblivious of this connection. It seems strange
therefore that bringing it about that I believe something
could be my action, on a par with opening a window, or
abusing one's mother-in-law.
Fortunately, this oddity is removed when we see that
like many other actions, bringing about such a belief is
ordinarily unintentional. Indeed, it is unintentional in
both of the senses noted earlier. My bringing about such
beliefs does not figure in my conscious purposes, nor does
it accord with my aims and intentions. In this way, evoking
such a belief in oneself is on a par with accidental
actions, such as unintentionally giving my neighbour the
impression that I would act as caretaker for his home, or
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creating a static electric charge when I comb my hair.
So, while it is a consequence of my account that
agent's coming to believe themselves active would count as
action, this is not a problem, for as such, these will be
unintentional deeds that every agent ordinarily performs in
virtue of his willing.
The final difficulty that I envisage for my account of
the volition theory assails the view that volitions can have
objects, if volitions are not elements of consciousness.
Traditionally, volitions do have objects. Thus,
according to Reid,
"Every act of will must have some object. He that
wills must will something, and that which he wills
is called the object of his volition. As a man
cannot think without thinking of something, nor
remember without remembering something, so neither
can he will without willing something. Every act
of will, therefore, must have an object; and the
person who wills must have some conception, more
or less distinct, of what he wills." (Essays,
p. 59)
The objection I anticipate is that if we are not aware of
volitions they cannot be the sort of occurrence to have
objects. This may be supported by Reid's examples of mental
phenomena other than volitions, that have objects.
Certainly, thinking and remembering have objects, but
we are always aware of both thinking and remembering
whenever such phenomena occur. So, if volitions have
objects, why are we not aware of willing?
This line of argument is misleading. It is true that
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mental occurrences such as thinking, remembering, wondering,
wishing, and the like, have objects. Also, we are generally
aware when thinking, remembering, or wondering that we are
doing so. But precisely what is it that we are conscious of
in such instances?
If the argument against volitions having objects is to
carry weight we should expect to be aware of our thinking,
remembering, wondering, etc. Yet there is a tendency here to
confuse the mental activity with its object. Thus, when I
remember my ration card number I am certainly conscious of
the object of my remembering, for this is just the number
that comes to mind. But apart from my consciousness of this
number coming to mind when I want it to, is there any
awareness of the process whereby this end is achieved?
Surely, what we are conscious of is not the mental process
of remembering, or thinking, or wondering, but only of what
we remember, what we think, and what we wonder. By the same
token, upon willing, one should expect to be conscious not
of this process itself, but of what one wills. And what one
wills is not a volition, but the object of one's volition.
Hence, it is natural that we should not be conscious Of
our volitions, just as we are unconscious of the processes
whereby we come to have thoughts, or remember ration card
numbers. It is a mistake to suppose it a requirement of any
mental occurrence with an object that one be conscious of
such an occurrence. Ordinarily, we are aware of the objects
that we will, but not of such a process as willing.
The lesson we can learn from this discussion is summed
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up well by Daniel Dennett:
"Lashley long ago pointed out that if asked to
think a thought in dactylic hexameter we (many of
us) can oblige, but we have no awareness of how we
do it: the result arrives, and that is the extent
of our direct access to the whole business.
Lashley's provocative comment on his example was
that 'no activity of the mind is ever conscious',
and the interpretation of this that I am
supporting is that we have access- conscious
access- to the results of mental processes, but
not to the processes themselves." (Dennett,
1978:165)
On this issue, I accord with Dennett. As with other
mental processes, willing is not a subject of consciousness,
though what we will (what we intend to bring about)
generally is. Consequently, we can appreciate that far from
being problematic, the fact that we are not conscious of our
volitions is in keeping with such occurrences having
obj ects.
This is also in line with Reid's comment that 'every
act of will... must have an object; and the person who wills
must have some conception more or less distinct, of what he
wills'. (loc. cit.). It is generally true that agent's have
some conception of what they will. This is reflected in the
fact that their volitions will accord with what they intend
or desire to bring about. Hence, the usage of 'what a person
wills' as 'what they desire or would choose to be the case".
In conclusion, I submit that such criticisms as I have
detailed, are readily seen to be either misleading or
misdirected, and thus pose no serious threat to my account
of action. Yet, we cannot be content with the present
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volition theory until it has been shown preferable to the
causal theory in respect of the problem of wayward
causation. In what follows, I shall attempt to prove this
final point.
(3_) VOLITION AND WAYWARD CAUSALITY
The question that remains is whether my account of
action in terms of volition can avoid the failing of the
causal theory when faced with anomalous causal chains (cf.
Chapter 2). The examples of wayward causality considered
earlier, indicate the inadequacy of describing actions as
events caused, for example, by the agent's reasons. In
contrast, is it adequate to describe actions as causings
consisting in action-results caused by volitions?
To begin, we might reconsider Davidson's climber
example. In this instance, the climber's reason for
releasing the rope may cause him to do so, without his
resulting behaviour qualifying as action. What if his
behaviour were produced by volition?
Certainly, we could imagine a volition having results
that the agent neither chose nor intended, so we may have a
parallel to the problem of wayward causality in the case of
volitions. Consider a revision of Davidson's example.
A climber, while holding another man on a rope, may
wish to blow his nose. This he does whilst retaining hold on
the rope with one hand. But the result of removing a hand
from the rope is that he is unable to maintain his hold, and
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so the other man is dropped.
We can suppose that the climber's action of blowing his
nose was the direct result of a volition to blow his nose,
while his releasing the rope, although also resulting from
this volition, was not part of its object. To parallel the
problem for the causal account, we should expect that the
climber's releasing the rope, although it has the right sort
of cause, does not count as action, because it was not
caused in the right sort of way. If this were so, then the
problems of wayward causality would snooker the volitionist
account as surely as the causal one. But this does not
happen, for although the climber did not choose, intend, nor
wish to release the rope, it will still count as his action
under these circumstances. In this case, it is an
unintentional action, which occurred as a result of his
intentional action of blowing his nose, which in turn,
qualified as actional by virtue of its relation to his
volition to blow his nose. So, it appears that an event's
being causally related to a volition is sufficient to
qualify it as actional. But is it?
This parallel to Davidson's example of wayward
causality is not precise, for in the former instance no
it
action was performed by the climber, while in the present
case, he does perform an action in blowing his nose. Could
there not be a causal consequence of a volition with no
other action performed? After all, this may make all the
difference to whether releasing the rope counts as action or
not.
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The exact parallel we require is something like this:
the climber has a volition to blow his nose, but he does not
do so (knowing that it might affect his grip on the rope),
yet the occurrence of this volition, and the thought of the
possible consequences of acting upon it, so unnerve him that
he releases the rope.
In this case, his releasing the rope would not count as
action, even though caused by a volition. But, though this
example more closely parallels the problem case for the
causal theory, such an occurrence could never happen. This
example misrepresents the nature of volition. In effect, it
treats having a volition as on a par with having a reason,
belief, or desire. But one is not aware of 'having
volitions', nor do we decide whether or not to act upon
them; otherwise we would have to will to will, and so on.
So, the above example could not occur, and does not
represent a problem for the volitionist account.
Of course there are always Variants upon such putative
problem cases. One such version is forwarded by Myles Brand,
who believes that the volition theory succumbs to wayward
causation. His example is this: suppose I will to raise my
arm, but my arm is suddenly paralysed. I become alarmed at
this, and a nervous reaction develops causing my eye to
twitch. Here there is a bit of behaviour, my eye twitching,
that is a causal consequence of the right sort of cause,
viz. volition (Brand, 1979:135-6). The question is whether
this eye twitching would qualify as action.
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One's immediate reaction may be to deny that it could
be so, although it must be deemed so by the volitionist. It
seems absurd that a nervous response should qualify as
action. Yet, this is not precisely the implication of
Brand's example.
There is no denying that the volitional account is
compelled to describe something in this behaviour as
actional, but what? Bearing in mind that actions are
causings comprising the bringing about of some effect by
volition, we can appreciate that what this agent has done,
albeit inadvertently, is to bring it about that his eye
twitches nervously. Obviously, under the circumstances, this
is not an intentional action, but as a bringing about, it is
an action nonetheless.
In like fashion, I may be held responsible for bringing
it about that my neighbour develop hay fever, through my
exposing him to vast quantities of pollen. Although
developing such an allergy is never itself an action,
bringing it about that someone develop such a condition may
well be. Thus, while developing a nervous twitch is never of
its own right an action, bringing it about that someone,
even myself, develop such a twitch can readily be so.
In consequence, Brand's example does no violence to the
volitionist's claim that actions are a combination of events
caused by volitions, and the volitions that cause these
events.
Lawrence Davis offers the following counter-example for
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the volitionist:
"Noticing the occurrence of a volition [in Sam],
the mind reader, obligingly moves Sam's arm for
him. Had Sam not willed to move his arm, the mind
reader would not have done anything, so the mind
reader's action, hence the motion of Sam's arm,
occurred as a result of Sam's volition. It follows
that Sam has moved his arm, and that his doing so
was an action." (Davis, 1979:22)
Why should his suggestion worry us? We may hesitate to
accept that Sam has performed an action of moving his arm,
because of the role played by the mind reader. Yet there is
no denying the causal link between Sam's volition and his
arm going up. Is this a serious difficulty for the volition
account?
In fact, we met a similar example in our earlier
discussion of wayward causality (Chapter 2, Section (2)). As
before, the resolution of this problem is to note that
agency is not transitive through persons. Thus, it would be
apt to say that the mind reader raised Sam's arm, rather
than, Sam raised it. Additionally, of course, we can
attribute Sam with the action of getting the mind reader to
raise his arm. This is certainly Sam's action and not the
mind reader's. So, this version is easily assimilated by the
volition account.
One further Variant remains from our earlier discussion
of wayward causation. This is the instance where Jones is
connected to an electronic black box which responds to his
volition by causing the appropriate movement in Jones's
body. But this is no problem for the volitionist. If we
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suppose that Jones's arm raising is the result of his
volition via this black box, then, even if he is ignorant of
the part played by this device, his arm raising still
qualifies as a component of his action of arm raising. It is
proper in such circumstances to describe Jones as having
raised his arm.
So far it would appear that the volition account can
readily accommodate such examples as have defeated its
rival, in the causal theory. There now remains one variation
on the theme of wayward causation to be considered.
This final variety stems from the possibility that
someone might intercede between an agent's reasons, beliefs,
purposes,intentions, and his volition, so as to initiate the
volition other than by its usual path from these reasons,
intentions, and the like. The question is what we should say
about such a bringing about of action-results. Is it action,
or not?
This looks awkward for the volitionist, since he is
compelled to accept such instances as causings with the
right sort of cause in volition, and a corresponding effect.,
in bodily movement. Yet, considering the element of outside
interference in this example do we really want to class this
as a genuine case of action on the part of the manipulated
individual? (Possibly, such a case describes the situation
in hypnosis, with the subject's volition being cued by the
hypnotist, independently of any reasons, or intention on the
subject's part.)
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We may be tempted to describe the resultant behaviour
as action not on the part of the person whose body moves,
but on the part of him who initiates the volition that
produces such movements. This would certainly be in
opposition to the volition account. But there may be a more
plausible story, in keeping with the demands of the volition
theory.
We may deem the behaviour of the subject as actional;
we would, after all, say that someone had got him to act as
he did. The fact that his behaviour does not accord with his
intentions, desires and beliefs, ensures that he does not
act intentionally, and we may even expect him to be
surprised at what he does. This can be expected, because
what he does is done for no reason of his own. We might
imagine the subject wondering why he did what he did, though
he will not wonder whether he did it. Since he willed his
behaviour, he would be aware of what he was doing. He simply
may not understand why he is doing it. In this fashion, he
is still the agent, although he would not be held
responsible for his actions. Whoever has initiated the
agent's volition will be responsible for the outcome.
In conclusion, I submit that the volition account
adequately meets the rigours of wayward causality, and this
fact, when considered in conjunction with its other
strengths, indicates that it may plausibly be regarded as an
appropriate account of action.
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(4) CLOSING REMARKS
We are now in a position to note the significant
changes in the proposed account of action from the classical
approach detailed in Chapter 3. On the present volitional
theory the following aspects are evident:
(1) Volition is not a mental 'act', and is not action
in its own right. Instead, it is a cause of
action-results, and thereby a component of action.
(2) The relation of volitions to their effects is still
causal, but the effects of volition are not actions but
action-results.
(3) Volition is not something that we are conscious of
doing, although we are aware when we will, of our
1 being active' .
(4) Volition can to some degree be characterised
functionally, since it is posited to explain the nature
of action.
(5) Volitions have objects; these are not the actions
that we will, but the results whose occurrence are
necessary for our actions.
(6) It is the relation of volition to action (and
specifically to action-results) that serves to
distinguish the voluntary from other deeds and
sufferings.
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We should note that of these tenets, only the sixth
remains essentially unchanged from the views of the earlier
volitionists. This should be expected since without this
final thesis no theory could rightly claim to be a
volitional account of action.
That so many features of the earlier volitionism should
require modification is salutary. Having considered their
shortcomings, we may appreciate the recent disregard for the
volitional approach to action. At the same time, we are in a
position to realise the true potential of just such a theory
to resolve the problem of action. The account of action
developed here can hope to serve this purpose, for therein
we can seek justification for our familiar concept of
action, and a ground for our distinction between actions and
mere occurrences. There is every reason to suppose that this
ground may lie in volition, as the essential component of
action. This will be the real difference between actions and
other events.
In concluding, it is worth noting that my account of
actions as causings, comprising of action-results caused by
volitions, is an echo of a view expressed by John Stuart
Mill. Of our early group of volitionists, Mill was singular
in regarding action as
"not one thing but a series of two things; ...a
volition, followed by an effect. ...the two
together constitute action." (Logic, p.35)
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